M. Madhu Sudhana Reddy v. Union of India

Delhi High Court · 11 Mar 2019 · 2025:DHC:2744-DB
C. Hari Shankar; Ajay Digpaul
W.P.(C) 8007/2020
2025:DHC:2744-DB
administrative other Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court directed the CRPF authorities to decide the petitioner’s application for withdrawal of resignation under Rule 26(4) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, emphasizing that only a formal communicated order can confer legal rights, not tentative file notings.

Full Text
Translation output
W.P.(C) 8007/2020
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 8007/2020
M. MADHU SUDHANA REDDY .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Ankur Chhibber, Adv.
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Bhagvan Swarup Shukla, CGSC
WITH
Mr. Sarvan Kumar and Mr. Satyam Singh, Advs. for UOI
Mr. Raj Kumar Yadav, SPC
WITH
Mr. Vaibhav Bhardwaj, Ms. Tripti Sinha and
Ms. Srishti Gupta, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL
JUDGMENT
(ORAL)
20.03.2025 C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

1. The petitioner joined as Assistant Commandant in the Central Reserve Police Force[1] on 12 January 2008. He was posted at the 29 Battalion CRPF at Srinagar, Jammu & Kashmir on 20 February 2009.

2. On 7 February 2015, the petitioner was promoted to the rank of Deputy Commandant while serving in National Disaster Relief Force[2] and thereafter repatriated back to CRPF in November 2018. The petitioner represented against the transfer, citing his own, as well as CRPF his family’s health and other issues which did not allow him to accept the posting.

3. On 24 November 2018, the petitioner had applied for resignation from the post of Deputy Commandant. The said application was forwarded on 26 November 2018 by the respondents to DIGP CRPF, Range Nagpur, vide the following communication: OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT-29TH BN CRPF C/O 56 ΑΡΟ No.T.IX-1/2017-29-Steno Dated: 26 Nov, 2018 To, The DIGP CRPF, Range Nagpur. Sub: Regarding forwarding of discharge application in R/o MS Reddy M. Deputy Commandant. Please refer Digcent (Pers) Dte Signal No.T.IX-7/2018- Pers-DA-4 dated 22.11.2018.

02. Shri Madhu Sudhana Reddy M, Deputy Commandant (IRLA-7571) of this unit is submitted an application dated 24.11.2018 through proper channel addressed to Hon'ble President of India for resignation from service wef 12.01.2019 on extreme compelling ground. Request of the officer seems to be genuine, therefore application of officer in Pentaplicate are enclosed herewith duly recommended for your kind consideration please. Encl: leaves. sd/- (Vijay Kumar Singh) Commandant-29 Bn

4. Mr. Chhibber submitted that the application for withdrawal was recommended by the Ministry of Home Affairs and forwarded to the DG, CRPF for further action. Mr. Chhibber sought to characterise this as an acceptance of the petitioner’s request for withdrawal of resignation. Mr. Chhibber submits that the aforesaid application was accepted by the respondent w.e.f. 22 January 2019. Mr. Chhibber has taken us through certain notings in that regard which, according to him, evince a tentative acceptance of the petitioner’s application as being meritorious.

5. We are not inclined to enter into that aspect as it is a well settled position that file notings do not confer any right on a citizen as they merely represent a tentative opinion taken on the file which is always open to change. It is only the final order which is communicated to the citizen which can constitute the basis of a claim in law. A recent decision, which reiterates this position, is to be found in Yadaiah v State of Telangana[3], from which the following paragraphs merit reproduction in this context: “61. Coming now to the issue of the date of assignment, we agree entirely with the respondent's stance that the actual assignment took place only at the time of issuance of temporary pattas and not at any point prior thereto. On perusal of the documents brought on record, which are merely collection of interdepartmental correspondence before the issuance of temporary pattas, we find that the assignment process was still underway. The appellant's reliance on the document dated 28-10-1953 is unfounded as the same only communicated the sanction by the executive and nothing else. In fact, the letter dated 4-6-1960 brings out the fact that the area of the sanctioned land was to be reduced to 142 acres and 39 guntas and then only was to be assigned. In this regard, this Court has repeatedly held and recently reiterated again in Mahadeo v Sovan Devi[4] that:

“15. It is well settled that inter-departmental communications are in the process of consideration for appropriate decision and cannot be relied upon as a basis to claim any right. This Court examined the said question in a judgment reported as Omkar Sinha v Sahadat Khan5. Reliance was placed on Bachhittar Singh v State of Punjab6, to hold that merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before something amounts to an order of the State Government, two things are necessary. First, the order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) of Article 166 and second, it has to be communicated. As already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up, the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file.” (Emphasis supplied)

62. Similarly, the decision of this Court in Bachhittar Singh v State of Punjab which is cited in the above reproduced paragraph notes:

“9. The question, therefore, is whether he did in fact make such an order. Merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before something amounts to an order of the State Government two things are necessary. The order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) of Article 166 and then it has to be communicated. As already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file. As long as the matter rested with him the Revenue Minister could well score out his remarks or minutes on the file and write fresh ones.”

6. On 11 March 2019, the petitioner applied for re-joining the service.

7. On 30 June 2020, the petitioner’s application for re-joining the

8. One of the issues arose before this Court during the course of these proceedings was whether Rule 26(4) of the CCS (Pension) Rules would apply to the CRPF. We are not inclined to enter into this arena either as, in the counter-affidavit filed by the CRPF, it is admitted that the CRPF was processing applications for withdrawal of resignation under Rule 26(4).

9. We, therefore, proceed on the premise that Rule 26(4) was applicable to the petitioner at the relevant point of time.

10. One of the submissions advanced by Mr. Chhibber was that the respondents could be directed to take a decision on the petitioner’s application in terms of Rule 26(4) of the CCS (Pension) Rules. The suggestion commends itself to acceptance.

11. Accordingly, this writ petition is disposed of with a direction to the respondents to take a decision on the petitioner’s application dated 11 March 2019, seeking withdrawal of the resignation tendered by him on 24 November 2018. The decision would be taken dispassionately and in accordance with the provisions of Rule 26(4) of the CCS (Pension) Rules.

7,323 characters total

12. Needless to say, we expect the authority to approach the issue in an empathetic fashion, keeping in mind the assertions contained in the petitioner’s representation for withdrawal of resignation.

13. But, for this caveat, the discretion would vest with the authority to decide the writ petition one way or the other.

14. Needless to say, should the petitioner continue to remain aggrieved, the right of the petitioner in that regard would remain reserved.

15. As the matter is of considerable vintage, we direct the respondents to take a final decision on the petitioner’s application dated 11 March 2019 and communicate it to the petitioner positively within a period of four weeks from today.

16. This writ petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.