Nagrajan v. State GNCT of Delhi

Delhi High Court · 12 Dec 2013 · 2013:DHC:6404

G. S. Sistani

W.P.(CRL) 1828/2013

2013:DHC:6404

criminal petition_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that under Section 428 Cr.P.C., the period of undertrial detention in a subsequent case must be set off against the sentence in an earlier case, even if the accused was undergoing sentence in another case during that period.

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W.P.(CRL). 1828/2013
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(CRL) 1828/2013

JUDGMENT

dated 12.12.2013 ZILE SINGH ..... Petitioner
Through : Mr.Jai Bansal, Mr.Tarun Satija, Mr.Pushpendra Singh and Mr.Atul
Nagrajan, Advs.

versus

STATE GNCT OF DELHI ..... Respondent
Through : Mr.Pawan Sharma, Standing counsel for State along with Ms.Priyanka
Kapoor, Adv.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI G.S.SISTANI, J (ORAL)

1. By the present petition, the petitioner seeks a direction to the respondent to grant benefit of the statutory provision, as mentioned in Section 428 Cr.P.C., and set off the period of imprisonment already undergone by him as an undertrial prisoner against the term of imprisonment imposed on him or else the petitioner would be forced to languish in jail despite completion of his sentence.

2. The necessary facts, to be noticed for disposal of this petition, are that the petitioner herein was convicted in a case arising out of FIR No.201/2007, registered under Sections 397/411/34 IPC and Sections 25/54/59 Arms Act, P.S. Mandir Marg, Delhi, on 6.11.2008 by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi. The petitioner was sentenced to RI for seven years and fine on 6.11.2008. Petitioner is stated to be confined in Central Jail No.2, Tihar, New Delhi, and is undergoing sentence of seven years, which was likely to be completed when the petition was filed and 2013:DHC:6404 according to the petitioner his sentence has now been completed. The petitioner has also preferred an appeal against the judgment and order on sentence dated 6.11.2008. The said appeal, being Crl.A.No.1017/2008, is pending adjudication before this Court.

3. It is the case of the petitioner that while petitioner was in custody in FIR No.201/2007 he was also convicted and sentenced to RI for six months in another case arising out of FIR No.258/2010 under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, P.S. Sabzi Mandi, Delhi, vide order dated 3.8.2011 passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate. The said sentence was directed to commence after serving sentence of seven years awarded in a case arising out of FIR No.201/2007. It is clarified that the maximum punishment under Section 20 of NDPS Act is six months, however, the petitioner was undertrial for a period w.e.f. 29.10.2010 to 2.8.2011 i.e. approximately ten months.

4. The petitioner thereafter made an application on 27.8.2013 and applied to the Superintendent, Central Jail, No.2, Tihar, seeking details and information regarding his custody period in case FIR No.258/2010 under Section 20 of NDPS Act. In response to the petitioner’s application on 5.9.2013 Deputy Superintendent informed the petitioner that he would not be given benefit of Section 428 Cr.P.C. undertrial period undergone by him from 29.10.2010 to 2.8.2011. This communication has led to the filing of the present petition.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that for the offence committed on 19.10.2010 (FIR No.258/2010 registered under Section 20 NDPS Act) the petitioner was convicted vide order dated 3.8.2011 and sentenced to RI for six months. At that point of time the petitioner was already serving a sentence in FIR No.201/2007 and he had remained as an undertrial prisoner from 19.10.2010 to 2.8.2011 in FIR No.258/20110 and accordingly in view of Section 428 Cr.P.C. the period of detention undergone by the petitioner is to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the petitioner in case arising out of FIR No.201/2007.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that it is the case of the petitioner that in view of clear statutory mandate of Section 428 Cr.P.C. the petitioner cannot be denied of this benefit. Counsel further submits that it is settled law by a catena of judgments of the Supreme Court of India and the High Courts wherein it has been held that all accused persons are entitled to the benefit of Section 428 Cr.P.C. as a mandate and not as a discretion even when a person is undergoing sentence of imprisonment in another case.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision rendered in the case of State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Najakat @ Mubarak Ali, reported at 2001 Crl.L.J. 2588, wherein a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court after considering in detail the earlier pronouncement of the Supreme Court of India and various High Courts and the scope of Section 428 Cr.P.C., held that after conviction and sentence in a criminal case, if arrested in the second case, the accused shall be entitled to claim the benefit of Section 428 of the Code.

“14. The purpose of Section 428 of the Code is also for advancing amelioration to the prisoner. We may point out that the section does not contain any indication that if the prisoner was in jail as an under-trial prisoner in a second case the benefit envisaged in the section would be denied to him in respect of the second case. However, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the words “of the same case” in the section would afford sufficient indication that the benefit is intended to cover only for one case and not more than that. It must be remembered that the ideology enshrined in Section 428 was introduced for the first time only in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. For understanding the contours of the legislative measure involved in that section, it is

advantageous to have a look at the Objects and Reasons for bringing the above legislative provision. We therefore extract the same here: “The Committee has noted the distressing fact that in many cases accused persons are kept in prison for very long period as under-trial prisoners and in some cases the sentence of imprisonment ultimately awarded is a fraction of the period spent in jail as under-trial prisoner. Indeed, there may even be cases where such a person is acquitted. No doubt, sometimes courts do take into account the period of detention undergone as under-trial prisoner when passing sentence and occasionally the sentence of imprisonment is restricted to the period already undergone. But this is not always the case so that in many cases the accused person is made to suffer jail life for a period out of all proportion to the gravity of the offence or even to the punishment provided in the statute. The Committee has also noted that a large number of persons in the overcrowded jails of today are under-trial prisoners. The new clause seeks to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs. The new clause provides for the setting off of the period of detention as an under-trial prisoner against the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him. The Committee trusts that the provision contained in the new clause would go a long way to mitigate the evil.” (emphasis supplied)

15. The purpose is therefore clear that the convicted person is given the right to reckon the period of his sentence of imprisonment from the date he was in jail as an under-trial prisoner. In other words, the period of his being in jail as an under-trial prisoner would be added as a part of the period of imprisonment to which he is sentenced. We may now decipher the two requisites postulated in Section 428 of the Code. (1) During the stage of investigation, inquiry or trial of a particular case the prisoner should have been in jail at least for a certain period. (2) He should have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment in that case.

16. If the above two conditions are satisfied then the operative part of the provision comes into play i.e. if the sentence of imprisonment awarded is longer than the period of detention undergone by him during the stages of investigation, inquiry or trial, the convicted person need undergo only the balance period of imprisonment after deducting the earlier period from the total period of imprisonment awarded. The words “if any” in the section amplifies that if there is no balance period left after such deduction the convict will be entitled to be set free from jail, unless he is required in any other case. In other words, if the convict was in prison, for whatever reason, during the stages of investigation, inquiry or trial of a particular case and was later convicted and sentenced to any term of imprisonment in that case the earlier period of detention undergone by him should be counted as part of the sentence imposed on him.

17. In the above context it is apposite to point out that very often it happens when an accused is convicted in one case under different counts of offences and sentenced to different terms of imprisonment under each such count, all such sentences are directed to run concurrently. The idea behind it is that the imprisonment to be suffered by him for one count of offence will, in fact and in effect be imprisonment for other counts as well.

18. Reading Section 428 of the Code in the above perspective, the words “of the same case” are not to be understood as suggesting that the set off is allowable only if the earlier jail life was undergone by him exclusively for the case in which the sentence is imposed. The period during which the accused was in prison subsequent to the inception of a particular case, should be credited towards the period of imprisonment awarded as sentence in that particular case. It is immaterial that the prisoner was undergoing sentence of imprisonment in another case also during the said period. The words “of the same case” were used to refer to the presentence period of detention undergone by him. Nothing more can be made out of the collocation of those words.

19. Various High Courts have expressed on this question. A Division Bench of Delhi High Court has dissented from a contrary view taken by a Single Judge of that High Court and held in K.C. Das vs. The State (1979 Criminal Law Journal 362) that the statute does not make any distinction between the first case and the second case for application of Section 428 of the Code. A Division Bench of the High Court of Gauhati in Lalrinfela vs. State of Mizoram (1982 Criminal Law Journal 1793) has adopted the same view. Lahiri and Hansaria, JJ, said in the said decision that: (Crl.L.J. p. 1797, para 7) “if the accused is simultaneously arrested and detained in two or more cases and on conviction obtains set off for the period of his detention in the first case he is not ineligible to obtain set off for the period in the subsequent cases; in each case the court is to count the number of days the accused was in such detention separately and the liability to undergo imprisonment on conviction should be restricted to the remainder of the terms of the imprisonment imposed on him in that case.”

20. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gedala Ramulu Naidu vs. State of A.P. (1982 Criminal Law Journal 2186) and a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Chinnasamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1984 Criminal Law Journal

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447) have also adopted the same view in tune with the interpretation given by us. While speaking for the Division Bench of the Madras High Natarajan, J (as he then was) has made a survey of most of the decisions thus far rendered by different High Courts and opted to flow with the view adopted by all the other High Courts almost uniformly.

21. We have no reason to think that the High Courts mentioned above have gone wrong in taking the view that Section 428 of the Code permits the accused to have the period undergone by him in jail as an under-trial prisoner set off against the period of sentence imposed on him irrespective of whether he was in jail in connection with the same case during that period. We therefore, respectfully dissent from the view expressed by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Raghbir Singh vs. State of Haryana (1984) 4 SCC 348.

44. The only question which according to me needs consideration is the true effect of the expression “same case” as appearing in section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The provision is couched in clear and unambiguous language and states that the period of detention which it allows to be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on the accused on conviction must be one undergone by him during investigation, enquiry or trial in connection with the “same case” in which he has been convicted. Any other period which is not connected with the said case cannot be said to be reckonable for set-off. The view of learned Brother Mr.Justice Thomas according to me accords the legislative intent. Acceptance of any other view would mean necessary (sic. necessarily) either adding or subtracting words to the existing provision, which would not be a proper procedure to be adopted while interpreting the provision in question.

45. I am, therefore, in respectful agreement with the views expressed by my learned Brother Mr Justice Thomas.”

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a similar view was also expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of K.C. Dass & N.K. Chatterjee v. State, reported at ILR 1978 (II) Delhi 341, more particularly paras 7 to 12. “(7) On a true interpretation of the section it appears to us that in the second case also in which the accused person was convicted on 31st March, 1978 he will be entitled to set off the period of pre-trial detention i.e. 1st January, 1977 to 31st March, 1978 against the sentence of three years imposed on him. The Statute does not make any distinction between the first case and the second case. The principle is the same. It has to be applied to all cases even-handedly and uniformly. (8) The key words of the section are "the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction". This "period of detention" shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on conviction. The liability of such person to undergo imprisonment shall be restricted to the remainder of the term of imprisonment imposed on him. (9) The words "of the same case" are important. The section speaks of the "period of detention" undergone by the accused person, but it expressly says that the detention mentioned refers to the detention during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the case in which the accused person has been convicted. The section makes it clear that the period of detention which it allows to be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on the accused on conviction must be during the investigation, inquiry or trial in connection with the "same case" in which he has been convicted. (See Government of A.P. v. A. V. Rao, AIR 1977 SC 1097 (1100) (1). (10) S. 428 provides that the period of detention of an undertrial prisoner shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on conviction. Will it not be true to say that the accused is an undertrial prisoner in the second case in our illustration. If it is so he will be entitled to set off his pre-conviction period against the term of imprisonment imposed on him in the second case as in the first. We see no ground to deny him the benefit in the second case. (11) The provision as to set off expresses a legislative policy (See Government of A.P. supra). We sit here to carry out the will of Parliament. The Supreme Court has said: "S- 428 is absolute in its terms. It provides for set off the preconviction detention of an accused person against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on conviction" (B. P. Andre v. Supdt. Central Jail, AIR 1975 SC 164 (168) (2). (12) The principle of s. 428 has to be applied in all cases whether the accused is convicted in one case or many, whether simultaneously or at different times. The reason is that in the second case the accused person remains an untried and unsentenced prisoner till his trial is concluded. At the end of the trial he is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Before trial is finished he remains an unconvicted person accused of a crime. Nothing more than this. The statute says that if on trial he is convicted and a term of imprisonment is imposed allow him set off of the period of pre-trial detention. Therefore, if the accused person is in detention as an unconvicted, untried or unsentenced prisoner and is, on trial, convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment he is entitled to set off. Whether such period of pre-trial detention is common to a considerable extent in the two cases is of no consequence to the application of s. 428.”

9. In the case of Dinesh Soni v. State of CG, reported at 2001 Law Suit (CHH) 506, similar view was taken by the High Court of Chhattisgarh. Para 13 reads as under:

“13 It is thus clear in the case of State of Maharashtra and Anotehr v. Najakt Ali Mubarak Ali, 2001 6 SCC 311, the Supreme Court finally concluded by saying that the period, during which, the accused was in prison subsequent to the inception of a particular case, should be counted towards the period of imprisonment awarded as sentence in that particular case. It was held that it is immaterial that the prisoner was undergoing sentence of imprisonment in another case also during the said period. What therefore follows from the aforesaid decision is that even the period of imprisonment, while undergoing sentences in other case, is to be reckoned for the purpose of allowing the set-off against the sentence of imprisonment awarded in the case in hand. In the present case, the result, therefore, would be that the entire period of imprisonment undergone by the petitioner from the date of his arrest i.e. 20-02-2010 till the date of conviction i.e. 02.-07-2011 is required to be reckoned for the purpose of set-off notwithstanding conviction in the earlier case vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 11-03-2011. It need be noted that in both the cases, the petitioner has been granted set-off under Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. with effect from the date of his arrest i.e. 20-02-2010.”

10. Similar view has been taken by Madras High Court in the case of Daulat v. The State of Tamil Nadu, reported at Habeas Corpus Petition No.1083/2009.

11. In the case of Ram Chandra & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, reported at 2003 (1) WLC 680, a similar view was taken by Rajasthan High Court. Paras 6 and 7 read as under:

“6. Section 428, CrPC makes a clear provision to the effect that when an accused has been sentenced to an imprisonment for a term, the period of detention undergone by him during investigation, inquiry or trial before the date of conviction shall be set off against the term of imprisonment and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder. 7. Thus, the accused petitioner Ram Chandra was entitled to the benefit of provisions of Section 428, CrPC and the directions given

by the learned Special Judge in the warrant of commitment to jail dated 13.9.1995 that the accused petitioner Ram Chandra would not get benefit of the provisions of Section 428, CrPC are wholly illegal and liable to be set-aside and this petition from jail deserves to be allowed.

12. The trial court in its order on sentence has observed that the accused would not be entitled to set off. The Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Aslam v. State of Maharashtra, reported at (2001) 9 SCC 362 held that the jail authorities shall give benefit of set off provided under Section 428 Cr.P.C. notwithstanding such an observation. Para 9 reads as under:

“9. Learned counsel lastly made a plea for reduction of the sentence as he is sentenced to RI for 10 years. We pointed out the futility of the said argument in view of the fact that A-1 was already convicted in another case for the offence under Section 302 IPC and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. For him to complete that period of life imprisonment he would have to suffer imprisonment of about 4 years more which will complete almost with the sentence imposed in this case. But learned Counsel pointed out that the Designated Court has observed in paragraph 5 of the operative part of the sentencing order that A-1 will not be entitled to set-off under Section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the period between 8-12-1994 to 19-7-1998. The jail authorities shall give the benefit of set-off provided under Section 428 of the CrPC notwithstanding such observations, if he is otherwise entitled to it as per the law declared by this Court.”

13. Reliance is also placed in the case of Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, reported at 2010 (12) SCC 506, wherein the Supreme Court of India made an observation with regard to the benefit of set off under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. and accordingly granted the benefit of set off. Paras 2 to 4, which read as under:

“2. The appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.), 10 years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 I.P.C. and 10 years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 333 I.P.C. While sentencing the

appellant, the Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, did not grant him benefit of set off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the basis of the judgment of this Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Haryana [AIR 1982 SC 1439 = 1982 (3) SCC 1].

3. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Bhagirath v. Delhi Administration [1985 (2) SCC 580], has specifically overruled Kartar Singh's judgment (supra), the relevant paragraph of which reads as under: “We have considered with great care the reasoning upon which the decision in Kartar Singh (1982 3 SCC 1) proceeds. With respect, we are unable to agree with the decision. We have already discussed why imprisonment for life is imprisonment for a term, within the meaning of section 428. We would like to add that we find it difficult to agree that the expressions 'imprisonment for life' and 'imprisonment for a term' are used either in the Penal Code or in the Criminal Procedure Code in contradistinction with each other. Sections 304, 305, 307 and 394 of the Penal Code undoutedly provide that persons guilty of the respective offences, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding a certain number of years. But, that is the only manner in which the Legislature could have expressed its intention that persons who are guilty of those offences shall be punished with either of the sentences mentioned in the respective sections. The circumstances on which the learned Judges have placed reliance in Kartar Singh, do not afford any evidence, intrinsic or otherwise, of the use of the two expressions in contradistinction with each other. Two or more expressions are often used in the same section in order to exhaust the alternatives which are available to the Legislature. That does not mean that there is, necessarily, an antithesis between those expressions.”

4. In our considered view, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of set off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

14. Mr.Sharma, learned counsel for the State submits that the petitioner is not entitled to set off. Counsel relies on a recent decision rendered by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Atul Manubhai Parekh v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2010) 1 SCC

603. Paras 14 and 15 read as under:

“14. The wording of Section 428 is, in our view, clear and unambiguous. The heading of the Section itself indicates that the period of detention undergone by the accused is to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment. The Section makes it clear that the period of sentence on conviction is to be reduced by the extent of detention already undergone by the convict during investigation, enquiry or trial of the same case. It is quite clear that the period to be set off relates only to pre conviction detention and not to imprisonment on conviction. 15. Let us test the proposition by a concrete example. A habitual offender may be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment at frequent intervals. If the period of pre-trial detention in various cases is counted for set-off in respect of a subsequent conviction where the period of detention is greater than the sentence in the subsequent case, the accused will not have to undergo imprisonment at all in connection with the latter case, which could not have been the intention of the legislature while introducing Section 428 in the Code in 1973.”

15. Mr.Sharma further submits that in the above decision the Apex Court has taken note of the decision of a three Judge Bench in the case of Najakat Ali and, thus, it cannot be said that this judgment is per incuriam. Mr.Sharma has also drawn a distinction to the facts of this case and the facts in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Nazakat Ali (supra). He further submits that in the case of State of Maharashtra (supra), the person was convicted by two separate courts in one day and in this backdrop Section 428 Cr.P.C. was invoked by the Supreme Court of India.

16. In my view, this submission of learned counsel for the State cannot come to his aid and rescue in view of the observations of a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharasthra (supra) more particularly para 18 wherein it has been categorically held that the words “of the same case” are not to be understood as suggesting that the set off is allowable only if the earlier jail life was undergone by a person exclusively for the case in which the sentence is imposed. It was further clarified that the period during which the accused was in prison subsequent to the inception of a particular case, should be credited towards the period of imprisonment awarded as sentence in that particular case. It was further clarified that it would be immaterial that the prisoner was undergoing sentence of imprisonment in another case during the said period as is the case in the present matter where the petitioner was undergoing sentence in the first FIR and he was awarded a sentence of seven years and it is during the period when he was serving the sentence that a subsequent FIR was lodged under Section 20 of the NDPS Act and he was convicted and sentenced to 6 months of RI.

17. This court will be bound by a decision rendered by a Three Judge Bench in view of the mandate of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Tripura v. Tripura Bar Association & Ors., reported at 1998 (5) SCC 637, wherein the Apex Court has observed that Division Bench of High Court, being a coordinate Bench, could not have taken a view different from that taken by the earlier Division Bench, however, in the instant case the judgment relied upon by the petitioner is of Three Judges Bench on the contrary the respondent has relied on a decision rendered by a Division Bench. In the cases of Official Liquidator v. Daya Nand & Ors., reported at JT 2008 (11) 467; Pradip Chandra Parija & Ors. v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik & Ors., reported at (2002) 1 SCC 1; Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2005 (2) SCC 673, a similar view has been taken by the Apex Court that a Bench of lesser quorum cannot doubt the correctness of view of law taken by a Bench of Larger Quorum. Similar view has also been taken in State of Uttaranchal v. Sandeep Kumar Singh & amp, Civil Appeal No.4494/2006, and Siddiharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in 2011 (1) SCC 694; Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, reported at 2002 (7) SCC 273.

18. In view of clear mandate of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra (supra) which in my view is applicable to the facts of the present case, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner will be given benefit of Section 428 Cr.P.C.

19. Petition stands disposed of. G.S.SISTANI, J DECEMBER 12, 2013 msr

Nagrajan v. State GNCT of Delhi

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