Pamposh Construction India Pvt Ltd v. Saliha Khaton & Ors.

1. Both the above noted appeals have been filed against the order dated 19^'' January, 2012 passed by the Commissioner Employee's Compensation 2013:DHC:8013 ("CEC", for short), thus, are being disposed oftogether.

2. CEC has directed the appellant - M/s. Pamposh Constructions India Pvt. Ltd. (For short hereinafter referred to as "the company") to pay Rs.3,19,600/- (Rupees Three Lacs Nineteen Thousand Six Hundred Only) to the legal heirs of Late Mohd. Taiyab (hereinafter referred to as "deceased") who have been arrayed as respondent nos. 1 to 5. Appellant - IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Insurance Company") has been directed to pay interest @ 12% per annum on the compensation amount from 3"^^ June, 2005 till itsrealization.

3. Legal heirs alleged that deceased was employed with the company as a "Carpenter". He was posted at Ashgabat, Turkmenistan in the month of January, 2000. Company used to take extra and heavy work from the deceased. On 4'^ May, 2005, when the deceased was on duty at the Presidential Palace, he suffered acute cardiovascular failure due to strain and stress of work resulting in his death. Company had taken 'Group Personal Accident Policy' for its employees from the Insurance Company. Since deceased died due to stress of work while on duty, thus, Company was liable to pay compensation in tenns of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923("the Act", for short).

4. InIts writtenstatement, company allegedthatitwasnotliableto pay any compensation much less Rs.lO lacs, as claimed by the legal heirs since deceased had died due to heart attack at his home. He was not on duty at thattime. In itsreplyInsurance Companyalleged that ithad nothingto do withthe liability ofthe company under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 ("the Act", for short), since the nomenclature of the policy itself indicated that it was a'Group Accident Insurance Policy' issued to the group ofemployees working in the company.

5. CEC, pennitted the parties to lead evidence. Upon appreciation of evidence, he concluded that deceased had died at the work place and not at hishome. ReliancewasplacedonEx. CWl/3 whichindicatedthatdeceased diedon4'^May, 2005 athis workplace. Itwas heldthatdeceased suffer^ heart attack due to stress ofwork which amomited to 'accident' within the meaning ofSection3read with Section 4ofthe Act. Reliance was placed onNationalInsuranceCo.Ltd. vs. Balawwa, 1993ACJ815 (Kamataka).

6. Findings of fact recorded by the CEC cannot be gone into by this Comt in exercise ofits power ofjudicial review under Article 226 ofthe nstitution of India by re-appreciating the evidence. Adequacy of evidencehas also notto be lookedinto. In case findings are basedonsome evidence, same cannot be interfered with. This Court can interfere with the findings of fact returned by the CEC only if it is shown that same are based on no evidence and/or are pei-verse or suffer from manifest error of law or jurisdiction.

7. Learned counsel for the company has vehemently contended that deceased died due to heart attack, which is a natural cause. Since deceased did not die due to injuiy suffered in any accident Section 3 and Section 4 of the Act were not attracted in this case. Reliance has been placed on Rashida Haroon Kupurade vs. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Others, (2010) 3 Supreme Court Cases 271. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company has contended that in terms of the policy, Insurance Company was liable to pay only in case of accident due to 'external violent and visible means'. Death due to heart attack was not covered under the policy, thus, liability of interest could not have been fastened on the Insurance Company.

8. As against this, learned counsel for the legal heirs has vehemently contended that deceased suffered a massive heart attack due to stress and strain of work and such an eventuality will fall within the meaning of 'accident' as envisaged under Section 3 of the Act. Reliance has been placed on Param Pal Singh vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Am*. 2013 ACJ 526.

9. I have considered the rival contentions of both the parties and I do not find any force in the contention of the appellants that since deceased died due to heart attack, Section 3 of the Act would not be attracted. In Param Pal Singh (supra), the Supreme Court has held thus, "Applying the various principles laid down in the above decisions to the facts of this case, we can validly conclude that there was casual connection to the death of the deceased with that of his employment as a truck driver. We cannot lose sight of the fact that a 45 years old driver meets with his unexpected death, maybe due to heart failure while driving the vehicle from Delhi to a distant place called Nimiaghat near Jharkhand which is about 1, 152 km away from Delhi, would have definitely undergone grave strain and stress due to such long-distance driving. The deceased being a professional heavy vehicle driver when undertakes the job of such driving as is regular avocation it can be safely held that such constant driving of heavy vehicle, being dependent solely upon his physical and mental resources and endurance, there was every reason to assume that the vocation of driving was a material contributory factor if not the sole cause that accelerated his unexpected )fc death to occur which in all fairness should be held to be an untoward mishap in his lifespan. Such an 'untoward mishap' can therefore be reasonably described as an 'accident' as having been caused solely attributable to the nature of employment indulged in with his employer which was in the course of such employer's trade or business." In the said case, a driver died due to suffer heart attack while driving the truck of the employer and Apex Court held that such a 'untoward mishap' can therefore be reasonably described as an 'accident' as having been caused solely attributable to the nature of employment indulged in with his employer. Rashida Haroon Kupurade (supra) is in the context of different facts as in the said case victim had died after six months of the 'accident'. Hence, no nexus could be found between the death of the workman and the accident.

10. In the present case, deceased had, from the findings of CEC, suffered heart attack due to stress and strain of work. He died at the work place. He was on duty at that time. He was far away from his home. He suffered heart attack due to stress and strain of work, accordingly, his untimely death can be described, due to 'accident' within the meaning of Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Act. As regards plea taken by the 'Insurance Company', same is not convincing. It was a 'group accident policy'. Heart attack (7 suffered by the employee has been held to be an 'accident' within the meaning of Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Act. Thus, insurance company carmot be permitted to take a plea that it is only applicable in case of accident due to 'external violent and visible means'.

11. Both the above appeals are dismissed. Miscellaneous applications are disposed of as infructuous. A.K. PATHAK, J. DECEMBER 10, 2013 rb