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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
FAO(OS) 581/2013
NATIONAL fflGHWAYS AUTHORITY OFINDIA Appellant
Through: Ms Meenakshi Sood, Adv. with Mr Mukesh Kumar, Adv.
FAO(OS) 581/2013
NATIONAL fflGHWAYS AUTHORITY OFINDIA Appellant
Through: Ms Meenakshi Sood, Adv. with Mr Mukesh Kumar, Adv.
VERSUS
AFCONS INFRASTRUCTURE LTD Respondent
Through: Mr Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Sr. Adv. with
Mr Manu Seshadri, Adv.
Through: Mr Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Sr. Adv. with
Mr Manu Seshadri, Adv.
CORAM:
C HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU
17.12.2013 Cav. No. 1156/2013 The learned counsel for the respondent/caveator is present.
The caveat stands discharged.
CM No. 20083/2013 Exemption is allowed subject to all just exceptions.
FAOrOS^ No. 581/2013 & CM No. 20082/2013 This appeal is directed against the order dated 01.10.2013 passed by alearned Single Judge ofthis court in lA no. 10241/2013 in
OMP no. 628/2013. The said OMP was apetition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, directed against the award dated 19.08.2012. The said lA no. 10241/2013 was an application seeking condonation ofdelay in filing the petition under section 34 of the said Act. The point in controversy before the learned Single
2013:DHC:7287-DB 0/ Judge was whether the starting point of limitation would be the date on which asigned copy ofthe award was received by the Chairman of the petitioner or would it be the point oftime when a communication with regard to the signing of the award is received by the Project
Implementation Unit (PIU), Chennai. It is the contention of the appellant that the starting point would be when acopy ofthe award is received by the Project Implementation Unit at Chennai. To clarify things, the minutes of the meeting which recorded the fact that the award had been passed was received by the Project Implementation
Unit, Chennai on 27.08.2012 though the award itselfwas not received by the said Project Implementation Unit. The award was received by the Chairman ofthe appellant company on 27.08.2012.
It is the case of the appellant that since the award was not served on the Project Implementation Unit at Chennai, the starting point oflimitation has not been triggered as yet. We may also note that, subsequently, on 22.01.2013 a communication was sent by the respondent to the Project Implementation Unit which brought to light the fact that the award had been pronounced in the matter. That communication was received by the Project Implementation Unit on
28.01.2013. If the starting point of limitation, in the alternative, according to the learned counsel for the appellant was to be taken as
28.01.2013 then there would be only 15 days delay in filing the petition under section 34 insofar as it would be 15 days beyond the three months period prescribed under the said provision. However, if the starting point oflimitation is taken to be 27.08.2012 which is the date onwhich the Chairman ofthe appellant received the signed copy of the award then the delay would be 169 days beyond the three months period stipulated under section 34(3) ofthesaidAct.
The learned Single Judge examined the matter and held that service of the award on the Chairman was sufficient service and therefore the limitation would run from 27.08.2012. While coming to the conclusion, the learned Single Judge observed that the Chairman was the highest officer of the appellant company. He was invested with the power to accept the arbitration award. Placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular
Construction Co.: (2001) 8 SCC 470, and on a Division Bench decision of this court in National Hishwavs Authority of India v.
Bhaseeratha Ensineerins Ltd: (FAO(OS) 621/2011 decided on
02.01.2012), the learned Single Judge came to the aforesaid conclusion. We have also been shown a copy of the contractbetween the appellant and the respondent. We find that the same has been signed by one Mr P.S. Tyagi, General Manager, for the appellant in the presence ofthe Chairman ofthe appellant who has also affirmed his signatures on the contract. Both the signatures were affixed in
Delhi. The agreement itself is between the National Highways
Authority ofIndia, New Delhi, and therespondent.
The learned Single Judge had also noted the contention of the respondent that both in the contract executed between the parties as well as inthememo ofparties, theaddress setoutistheaddress ofthe appellant at Delhi which is also where the signed copy ofthe award was served. Attention of the learned Single Judge was also drawn to the memorandum of delegation of power in respect of the appellant company which demonstrated that the power to institute legal proceeding was entrusted upon the Member (Administration) and the power with regard to acceptance of an arbitration award was vested upon the Chairman ofthe appellant. As such the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge in coming to the conclusion that the signed copy of the award on the Chairman was sufficient service, cannot be faulted. That being the position, the filing of the petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act on the part of the appellant was well beyond the time stipulated in section 34(3). Therefore, the learned Single Judge was right in dismissing the application for condonation of delay and, consequently, the petition under section 34 of the said Act also.
The appeal has no merit. The same is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs.
BADARDURREZ AHMED, J VIBHU BAKHRU, J DECEMBER 17,2013 kb
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU
17.12.2013 Cav. No. 1156/2013 The learned counsel for the respondent/caveator is present.
The caveat stands discharged.
CM No. 20083/2013 Exemption is allowed subject to all just exceptions.
FAOrOS^ No. 581/2013 & CM No. 20082/2013 This appeal is directed against the order dated 01.10.2013 passed by alearned Single Judge ofthis court in lA no. 10241/2013 in
OMP no. 628/2013. The said OMP was apetition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, directed against the award dated 19.08.2012. The said lA no. 10241/2013 was an application seeking condonation ofdelay in filing the petition under section 34 of the said Act. The point in controversy before the learned Single
2013:DHC:7287-DB 0/ Judge was whether the starting point of limitation would be the date on which asigned copy ofthe award was received by the Chairman of the petitioner or would it be the point oftime when a communication with regard to the signing of the award is received by the Project
Implementation Unit (PIU), Chennai. It is the contention of the appellant that the starting point would be when acopy ofthe award is received by the Project Implementation Unit at Chennai. To clarify things, the minutes of the meeting which recorded the fact that the award had been passed was received by the Project Implementation
Unit, Chennai on 27.08.2012 though the award itselfwas not received by the said Project Implementation Unit. The award was received by the Chairman ofthe appellant company on 27.08.2012.
It is the case of the appellant that since the award was not served on the Project Implementation Unit at Chennai, the starting point oflimitation has not been triggered as yet. We may also note that, subsequently, on 22.01.2013 a communication was sent by the respondent to the Project Implementation Unit which brought to light the fact that the award had been pronounced in the matter. That communication was received by the Project Implementation Unit on
28.01.2013. If the starting point of limitation, in the alternative, according to the learned counsel for the appellant was to be taken as
28.01.2013 then there would be only 15 days delay in filing the petition under section 34 insofar as it would be 15 days beyond the three months period prescribed under the said provision. However, if the starting point oflimitation is taken to be 27.08.2012 which is the date onwhich the Chairman ofthe appellant received the signed copy of the award then the delay would be 169 days beyond the three months period stipulated under section 34(3) ofthesaidAct.
The learned Single Judge examined the matter and held that service of the award on the Chairman was sufficient service and therefore the limitation would run from 27.08.2012. While coming to the conclusion, the learned Single Judge observed that the Chairman was the highest officer of the appellant company. He was invested with the power to accept the arbitration award. Placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular
Construction Co.: (2001) 8 SCC 470, and on a Division Bench decision of this court in National Hishwavs Authority of India v.
Bhaseeratha Ensineerins Ltd: (FAO(OS) 621/2011 decided on
02.01.2012), the learned Single Judge came to the aforesaid conclusion. We have also been shown a copy of the contractbetween the appellant and the respondent. We find that the same has been signed by one Mr P.S. Tyagi, General Manager, for the appellant in the presence ofthe Chairman ofthe appellant who has also affirmed his signatures on the contract. Both the signatures were affixed in
Delhi. The agreement itself is between the National Highways
Authority ofIndia, New Delhi, and therespondent.
The learned Single Judge had also noted the contention of the respondent that both in the contract executed between the parties as well as inthememo ofparties, theaddress setoutistheaddress ofthe appellant at Delhi which is also where the signed copy ofthe award was served. Attention of the learned Single Judge was also drawn to the memorandum of delegation of power in respect of the appellant company which demonstrated that the power to institute legal proceeding was entrusted upon the Member (Administration) and the power with regard to acceptance of an arbitration award was vested upon the Chairman ofthe appellant. As such the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge in coming to the conclusion that the signed copy of the award on the Chairman was sufficient service, cannot be faulted. That being the position, the filing of the petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act on the part of the appellant was well beyond the time stipulated in section 34(3). Therefore, the learned Single Judge was right in dismissing the application for condonation of delay and, consequently, the petition under section 34 of the said Act also.
The appeal has no merit. The same is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs.
BADARDURREZ AHMED, J VIBHU BAKHRU, J DECEMBER 17,2013 kb
JUDGMENT