Rajinder Kumar v. Union of India & Ors.

8. This is not the case ofthepetitioners in the writpetitions that no decision with respect to the licencefee of the land subject matter of the writ petition has been taken by the competent authority after the order of the Estate Officer dated 13.9.1993. Consequently, the respondents had no opportunity to file any such decision along with their counter affidavit. The learned counselfor the respondents, however, hasplaced on record two decisions taken by the Government of India — one dated 29.8.1995 and the other dated 10.1.2005 with respect to the licencefee ofRailway land.

9. In view of the aforesaid decisions dated 29.8.1995 and 10.1.2005, it is evident that the competent authority, i.e., the Government ofIndia, Ministry ofRailways, revisited the issue of licence fee ofRailway lands, after the order passed by the Estate Officer on 13.9.1993. In view ofthe aforesaid decision of the Government the order of the Estate Officer became inapplicable w. e.f 1.4.1994. The licencee has rightly beenfixed at 20 per cent of the land valuefor the period 1.4.1995 to 31.3.2004 whereafter the decision dated 10.1.2005 became applicable and the licence fee was reduced to 10 per cent of the land rate. The land rate has also been rightly revised @10 per cent per annum up to 31.3.2004 and thereafter @ 7 per cent per annum w.e.f 1.4.2004. The demand raised by the respondents, therefore, cannot be said to be illegal, arbitrary or unjustified. No ground for quashing the impugned demand notices, therefore, is made out. The writpetitions are devoid ofany merit and are hereby dismissed." LPA Nos. 974, 975, 977, 978, 979 & 981 of2013 Mr. R.D. Sharma, learned counsel for appellants submits that the demand notices issued by the respondent-Railways are beyond limitation. He further states that in any event the respondents could not have been charged any interest. Even though the impugned demands pertain to licence fee for the last 16 years, we are of the opinion that it is within limitation inasmuch as immediately on non-payment, the respondents had initiated proceedings under the Public Premises Act in which the appellants had stated that they were willing to pay licence fee at Rs.1,105/- per annum with 10% increase every year instead of licence fee calculated on the basis of revision of land rates at periodic intervals. Further, we find that before the learned Single Judge, the issue of limitation which is a mixed question of facts and lawhadnotbeen raised. In any event, Article 112 ofthe Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under " Description ofsuit

112. Any Suit (except a Suit before the Supreme Court In the exercise ofits original Jurisdiction):by or on behalf ofthe Central Government or any State Government, including the Government ofthe State ofJammu and Kashmir. Period of limitation Thirty years Timefrom which period begins to run When the period oflimitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person. It is pertinent to mention that the Limitation Act, 1963 grants extended limitation of 30 years only to Central and State Governments. LPA Nos. 974, 975, 977, 978, 979 & 981 of2013 Page 5 of[7] Consequently, the railways would be entitled to the extended period of 30 years. Hence the amount claimed as licence fee by the respondents is within limitation. We are also of the view that the amount being charged by the respondent-Railways is very meagre as in a place like Delhi it is impossible to get even a small shop on rent at Rs.1800/- to Rs.l900/- per month, which rate is being currently charged by the Railways. The Supreme Court's judgment in Lala Ram(D) by L.R. & Ors. vs. Union ofIndia & Anr. [Civil Appeal Nos.243-247 of 2003] referred to by the learned Single Judge is rather apt. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:- "8. Undoubtedly, the enhanced license fee being 13 times, the earlier license fee amount seems excessive, and such an observation was also made by the Hon 'ble Railway Minister in order dated 11.4.1981, but the enhanced license fee would be illusory ifthe same is compared with the prevailing license fee in the said market as applicable to private shops. A welfare state must serve larger public interest, "Salus Popudi Suprema lex", means that the welfare ofthepeople is the supreme law. A state instrumentality must serve the society as a whole, and must not grant unwarrantedfavour(s) to a particular class of people without any justification, at the cost ofothers. However, in order to serve largerpublic interest, the State instrumentality must be able to generate its own resources, as it cannot serve such higher purpose while in deficit. Merely because the appellants have been occupying the suit premises for a prolonged period of time, they cannot claim any special privilege. In the absence ofany proofofviolation oftheir rights, such concession cannot be granted to them. " Keeping in view the aforesaid, present appeals and applications being bereft ofmerit, are dismissed.

DECEMBER 20, 2013 js J CHIEF JUSTICE J MANMOHfe^NrJ^ Page 7 of[7]