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34. Deposits. – (1) A candidate shall not be deemed to be duly nominated for election from a constituency unless he deposits or causes to be deposited. – (a) in the case of an election from a Parliamentary constituency, a sum of twenty-five thousand rupees or where the candidate is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, a sum of twelve thousand five hundred rupees; and (b) in the case of an election from an Assembly or Council constituency, a sum of ten thousand rupees or where the candidate is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, a sum of five thousand rupees: Provided that where a candidate has been nominated by more than one nomination paper for election in the same constituency, not more than one deposit shall be required of him under this sub-section. (2) Any sum required to be deposited under sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to have been deposited under that sub-section unless at the time of delivery of the nomination paper under sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, sub-section (1A) of section 33 the candidate has either deposited or caused to be deposited that sum with the returning officer in cash or enclosed with the nomination paper a receipt showing that the said sum has been deposited by him or on his behalf in the Reserve Bank of India or in a Government Treasury. xx xx xx

35. Notice of nominations and the time and place for their scrutiny. – The returning officer shall, on receiving the nomination paper under sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, sub-section (1A) of section 33, inform the person or persons delivering the same of the date, time and place fixed for the scrutiny of nominations and shall enter on the nomination paper its serial number, and shall sign thereon a certificate stating the date on which and the hour at which the nomination paper has been delivered to him; and shall, as soon as may be thereafter, cause to be affixed in some conspicuous place in his office a notice of the nomination containing descriptions similar to those contained in the nomination paper, both of the candidate and of the proposer.

36. Scrutiny of nomination. – (1) On the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations under section 30, the candidates, their election agents, one proposer of each candidate, and one other person duly authorised in writing by each candidate but no other person, may attend at such time and place as the returning officer may appoint; and the returning officer shall give them all reasonable facilities for examining the nomination papers of all candidates which have been delivered within the time and in the manner laid down in section

33. (2) The returning officer shall then examine the nomination papers and shall decide all objections which may be made to any nomination and may, either on such objection or on his own motion, after such summary inquiry, if any, as he things necessary, reject any nomination on any of the following grounds:– (a) that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations the candidate either is not qualified or is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under any of the following provisions that may be applicable, namely:– Articles 84, 102, 173 and 191, Part II of this Act, and sections 4 and 14 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963; or (b) that there has been a failure to comply with any of the provisions of section 33 or section 34; or

(c) that the signature of the candidate or the proposer on the nomination paper is not genuine. (3) Nothing contained in clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (2) shall be deemed to authorise the rejection of the nomination of any candidate on the ground of any irregularity in respect of a nomination paper, if the candidate has been duly nominated by means of another nomination paper in respect of which no irregularity has been committed. (4) The returning officer shall not reject any nomination paper on the ground of any defect which is not of a substantial character. (5) The returning officer shall hold the scrutiny on the date appointed in this behalf under clause (b) of section 30 and shall not allow any adjournment of the proceedings except when such proceedings are interrupted or obstructed by riot or open violence or by causes beyond his control: Provided that in case an objection is raised by the returning officer or is made by any other person the candidate concerned may be allowed time to rebut it not later than the next day but one following the date fixed for scrutiny, and the returning officer shall record his decision on the date to which the proceedings have been adjourned. (6) The returning officer shall endorse on each nomination paper his decision accepting or rejecting the same and, if the nomination paper is rejected, shall record in writing a brief statement of his reasons for such rejection. (7) For the purposes of this section, a certified copy of an entry in the electoral roll for the time being in force of a constituency shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that the person referred to in that entry is an elector for that constituency, unless it is proved that he is subject to a disqualification mentioned in section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950). (8) Immediately after all the nomination papers have been scrutinized and decisions accepting or rejecting the same have been recorded, the returning officer shall prepare a list of validly nominated candidates, that is to say, candidates whose nominations have been found valid, and affix it to his notice board.”

7. After having taken note of the aforesaid statutory provisions, let us now proceed to discuss some of the important judgments of this Court and to cull out legal principles therefrom on the subject, which have a direct bearing on the issue of disclosure of information.

8. First case that needs a mention, which is a milestone and trigerred electoral reforms in this country, is Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 294. In this case, the Court held that it was incumbent upon every candidate, who is contesting election, to give information about his assets and other affairs, which requirement is not only essential part of fair and free elections, inasmuch as, every voter has a right to know about these details of the candidates, such a requirement is also covered by freedom of speech granted under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The summing up the entire discussion in the judgment can be found in the following passage:

3. The word “elections” includes the entire process of election which consists of several stages and it embraces many steps, some of which may have an important bearing on the process of choosing a candidate. Fair election contemplates disclosure by the candidate of his past including the assets held by him so as to give a proper choice to the candidate according to his thinking and opinion. As stated earlier, in Common Cause case, (1996) 2 SCC 752 the Court dealt with a contention that elections in the country are fought with the help of money power which is gathered from black sources and once elected to power, it becomes easy to collect tons of black money, which is used for retaining power and for re-election. If on an affidavit a candidate is required to disclose the assets held by him at the time of election, the voter can decide whether he could be reelected even in case where he has collected tons of money. Presuming, as contended by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Ashwani Kumar, that this condition may not be much effective for breaking a vicious circle which has polluted the basic democracy in the country as the amount would be unaccounted. May be true, still this would have its own effect as a step-in-aid and voters may not elect law-breakers as law-makers and some flowers of democracy may blossom.

4. To maintain the purity of elections and in particular to bring transparency in the process of election, the Commission can ask the candidates about the expenditure incurred by the political parties and this transparency in the process of election would include transparency of a candidate who seeks election or reelection. In a democracy, the electoral process has a strategic role. The little man of this country would have basic elementary right to know full particulars of a candidate who is to represent him in Parliament where laws to bind his liberty and property may be enacted.

5. The right to get information in democracy is recognised all throughout and it is a natural right flowing from the concept of democracy. At this stage, we would refer to Article 19(1) and (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is as under: “(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. (2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”

6. On cumulative reading of a plethora of decisions of this Court as referred to, it is clear that if the field meant for legislature and executive is left unoccupied detrimental to the public interest, this Court would have ample jurisdiction under Article 32 read with Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution to issue necessary directions to the executive to subserve public interest.

7. Under our Constitution, Article 19(1)(a) provides for freedom of speech and expression. Voter's speech or expression in case of election would include casting of votes, that is to say, voter speaks out or expresses by casting vote. For this purpose, information about the candidate to be selected is a must. Voter's (little man – citizen's) right to know antecedents including criminal past of his candidate contesting election for MP or MLA is much more fundamental and basic for survival of democracy. The little man may think over before making his choice of electing law-breakers as lawmakers.

9. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, this Court issued directions for filing affidavit and the nature of information which was to be given, spelling out the same in para 48 of the judgment, which reads as under:

10. The judgment in Association for Democratic Reforms led to amendment in the Act with the induction of Section 33A (already reproduced above) as well as Section 33B therein. Election Commission also laid down guidelines in the year 2002. Insofar as Section 33B is concerned, it was struck down by this Court in the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 399.

11. In order to bring the directions contained in the aforesaid two judgments within the statutory framework, revised guidelines were issued by the Election Commission on March 23, 2006. In para 5 of these guidelines, para 14 of the judgment in Association for Democratic Reforms is reproduced. Likewise, para 13 takes note of the directions given in the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties. In para 15, it is noted that the Supreme Court, while striking down Section 33B of the Act, stated that earlier directions of Election Commission dated June 28, 2002 would continue to operate subject to the afore-mentioned directions of the Court and, therefore, revised directions had become necessary. In para 16, these directions are issued in supersession of earlier directions dated June 28, 2002. Paras 1 and 3 of these guidelines/directions are relevant for us, and, therefore, we reproduce the same as under: “(1) Every candidate at the time of filing his nomination paper for any election to the Council of State, House of the People, Legislative Assembly of a State of the Legislative Council of a State having such a council, shall furnish full and complete information in regard to the matters specified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and quoted in paras 13 and 14 above, in an affidavit, the format whereof is annexed hereto as Annexure-I to this order. xx xx xx (3) Non-furnishing of the affidavit by any candidate shall be considered to be violation of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the nomination of the candidate concerned shall be liable to rejection by the returning officer at the time of scrutiny of nomination such non-furnishing of the affidavit.”

12. We would also like to reproduce para 17 of these guidelines, which concerns the case at hand:

13. The meaning and scope of these guidelines came up for discussion before this Court in Resurgence India v. Election Commission of India & Anr., (2013) 11 Scale 348. That judgment was rendered in a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for issuance of specific directions to effectuate meaningful implementation of the judgments in Association of Democratic Reforms, People's Union for Civil Liberties and also to direct the Election Commission to make it compulsory for the Returning Officer to ensure that the affidavits filed by the contestants are complete in all respects and to reject the affidavits having blank particulars. This petition, thus was filed taking note of the practice which had started prevailing, namely, many candidates were leaving some of the columns blank in their affidavits thereby omitting to provide the required information. As per the petitioner in that case, in such an eventuality the Returning Officer should reject the nomination whereas the Union of India pleaded that it should be treated at par with filing false affidavits and the candidate filing such an affidavit should be prosecuted under Section 125A of the Act. The Court took note of the provisions of Sections 33A, 36 and 125A of the Act and thereafter referred to the earlier three Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Shaligram Shrivastava v. Naresh Singh Patel, (2003) 2 SCC 176, wherein the Court had discussed the power of rejecting the nomination paper by the Returning Officer of a candidate filing the affidavit with particulars left blank. The relevant discussion in this behalf is in paras 15 and 16 of the said judgment, which read as under:

14. The legal position is, thereafter, summarized in para 27, which becomes important for our purpose and, therefore, we produce the same hereunder:

15. Keeping in mind the aforesaid statutory framework as well as the legal principles enunciated in the afore-noted judgments, we now proceed to discuss the nature of information about which there was nondisclosure by the appellant. RE – Non-disclosure of Government dues

16. The appellant had not disclosed, in his nomination paper/ affidavit, that he was in arrears in respect of two electricity meters standing in his name, in respect whereof electricity connection was given by the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (for short, 'MSEB'). The outstanding amount in these two meters was Rs.79,200/- and Rs.66,250/- respectively. It was proved, on the basis of evidence led by the respondent herein, that the aforesaid dues were outstanding against these two electricity connections. The defence of the appellant, however, was that one electricity meter, which was in his residential bungalow, was defective and complaints in this behalf were made to MSEB from time to time and because of that dispute he was orally advised by the officials of MSEB not to pay the amount.

17. The High Court proceeded on the assumption that there was a dispute. However, as per the High Court that could not be a valid reason for not disclosing this information with a note that the matter was pending review at the hands of MSEB. Thereafter, the High Court posed the question as to whether such non-disclosure can be treated as a technical defect or it is a substantive one. As per the High Court, the answer could be found by adverting to the form and the affidavits to be filed along with the nomination form. These forms required the candidates to disclose his liabilities/overdues to public financial institution and Government dues. Since MSEB is a Government body, the appellant was supposed to give this information. The High Court opined that non-disclosure of this information, which is very vital to enable the voter to form his opinion about the candidate's antecedents, resulted in misinformation and disinformation thereby influencing the voters to take an uninformed decision. The discussion on this aspect is summed up by the High Court in the following manner: “Accordingly, I have no hesitation in taking the view that it is a case of non-disclosure of liability in respect of outstanding electricity bills payable to Government Undertaking (M.S.E.B.); and that non-disclosure is a substantive defect in the affidavits filed along with nomination form. The test to hold that the defect is substantive, in my opinion, is not the amount involved, but the conscious act of non-disclosure and suppression of that fact. It would be a case of technical defect if there was some clerical error in the information disclosed by the candidate or for that matter, a case of omission due to lack of knowledge of existence of such dues. In the present case, the Respondent was conscious and aware of the fact that on the date of filing of the nomination form, there were two outstanding electricity bills in relation to two meters standing in his name, payable to M.S.E.B. It would have been a different matter if the Respondent was unaware of that fact or that no such bill was ever issued by the M.S.E.B. That is not the case of the Respondent. Thus understood, non-disclosure about the outstanding electricity bill in the sum of Rs. 79,200/- payable by the Respondent to M.S.E.B. Is a substantive defect in the affidavit. Resultantly, the nomination form filed along with such affidavit would become tainted and for which reason, it will have to be held that the same has been improperly accepted within the meaning of Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act. Besides, the candidate has failed to comply with the requirements of the order issued by the Election Commission in exercise of powers under Article 324(1) of the Constitution of India which order is founded on the Law declared by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Association for Democratic Reforms (supra) and binding under Article 141 of the Constitution, therefore, affecting his nomination as well as the Election being void under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act.”

18. Insofar as outstanding dues in respect of the second electricity meter are concerned, that pertained to premises which had been let out by the appellant to his tenants. There was no dispute that the amount was outstanding. However, the defence of the appellant was that the primary liability of making payment was that of the tenants. The High Court had discarded this defence with the observations that electricity meter stood in the name of the appellant in relation to which there was an outstanding, which amount was payable on the date of filing of the nomination. Even the premises where this meter had been installed were owned by the appellant. Therefore, in law, it was the appellant who was liable to be proceeded against for recovery of the amount and this fact was enough justification to disclose the aforesaid outstanding. As per the High Court, even this non-disclosure amounted to substantive defect. On that basis, the High Court held that non-disclosure of these Government dues rendered the nomination paper invalid and, therefore, it was a case of improper acceptance.. RE – Non-disclosure of bungalow No. 866 in the name of spouse and outstanding taxes thereof

19. Bungalow No. 866 at Badlapur in the limits of Kulgaon-Badlapur Municipal Council stands in the name of Kamal Kishore Kathore, wife of the appellant. At the time of filing the nomination, there were municipal dues in the sum of Rs.3,465/-. Allegation of the first respondent was that both the aforesaid informations were suppressed and not disclosed in the affidavit filed by the appellant along with the nomination form. According to him, this was crucial information regarding immovable property owned by the appellant's wife, suppression whereof amounted to filing a defective affidavit and such an affidavit was no affidavit in the eyes of law.

20. Significantly, the averment of the first respondent in the election petition that the appellant had suppressed information regarding the aforesaid immovable property belonging to his wife was not specifically denied by the appellant. The appellant only denied the liability of taxes pertaining to this property, that too on the ground that this property was required to be put to revaluation and reassessment for the purpose of assessing the taxes and for this purpose since the measurement of the property was undertaken to assess the taxable value, no demand notices were issued by the municipal authority. Even hearing regarding re-assessment took place on December 28, 2014 before the Collector and it is only after the completion of the reassessment work the municipal authority had issued tax demand notices.

21. In view of the aforesaid, the High Court observed that as far as the ownership of the property in the name of the wife of the appellant is concerned, it was a clear case of non-disclosure and the ownership was proved even on the basis of evidence produced before the Court. As far as non-payment of municipal dues is concerned, the High Court noted that the appellant merely explained the circumstances in his written statement as to why the municipal taxes in relation to that property had not been paid. However, the municipal taxes were paid in part on October 28, 2004, after the date of filing of nomination with the payment of Rs.1,783/- pertaining to the year 2003-04. It would show that the appellant was in arrears. The Court also discussed the evidence on this aspect, namely, about the purported dispute relating to the reassessment as set up by the appellant in his defence and has returned a finding of fact that, in fact, there were arrears of municipal taxes in relation to that house.

22. As far as non-disclosure of the immovable property is concerned, the only reply given by the appellant was that there was a substantial compliance because of the reason that the appellant in his affidavit had disclosed the value of all the properties belonging to him and his spouse, in the sum of Rs.11,10,000/-. The High Court, however, found that no such case was made out in the written statement. Moreover, in the affidavit filed by the appellant, against the column of immovable properties, he had disclosed the properties at Badlapur and Kulgaon, valued at Rs.11,10,000/-, shown against the column 'Self'. Thus, the valuation of the properties given in the affidavit was of those properties which belong to the appellant and, therefore, it was a clear case of non-disclosure of wife's property. This nondisclosure is also taken as a material defect. Summing up the discussion on this aspect, the High Court, in para 74, observed as under:

23. Here again, from the detailed discussion contained in the impugned judgment of the High Court, it becomes clear that by leading requisite and sufficient evidence, the first respondent proved that wife of the appellant owned the aforesaid vehicle and the particulars thereof were not disclosed. The defence of the appellant was that he had mentioned the value thereof in his affidavit, but accepted that it was against column 'Self' and not in the independent column of his spouse. His defence is discussed and rejected by the High Court in the following manner:

24. The first respondent had alleged that the appellant has a right, title and interest in land measuring 1330 sq.mts. being Survey No. 48, Hissa No. 9, Plot No.2 and also in land admeasuring about 1292 sq.mts. being Survey No. 48, Hissa No. 9, Plot No.3 at Mouje Kalyan, Taluka Ambernath, District Thane. These properties are purchased in the name of the partnership firm M/s. Padmavati Developers under agreement of development and sale. The appellant was one of the partners in the said firm. However, the appellant had not disclosed his interest in the aforesaid assets in the affidavit filed along with the nomination form. The defence of the appellant in relation to this allegation was that he had retired from the partnership firm in the year 2003 and in his letter dated October 28, 2004 sent to the Returning Officer, he had stated that the aforesaid two properties do not belong to him. The High Court noted that admittedly there was no reference about the two properties in the affidavits filed along with the nomination form. Further, it was a common case that M/s. Padmavati Developers was formed as a partnership firm in the year 1995, of which the appellant was one of the partners. There was also no dispute that the bank account was operated in the name of the said partnership firm and appellant was one of the joint signatory. Thus, the only aspect which needed determination was as to whether the appellant had retired from the said partnership firm in November 2003, as claimed by him. However, from the plethora of documentary evidence placed on record, the High Court returned a finding that those documents clearly show that the appellant continued to remain an active partner even after 2003 and was, in fact, a partner on the date of filing of the nomination. Apart from various documents revealing and establishing this fact, most important document was the Deed of Dissolution of the partnership firm, which was dated January 11, 2005 and at the time of evidence, the appellant had admitted the contents thereof, as well as the signatures of the three partners appearing on that document. The High Court summed up the decision on this aspect in the following manner:

25. It would be pertinent to mention here that the first respondent had alleged non-disclosure of many other assets, liabilities, etc. or suppression of other material information in the affidavits. However, apart from the aforesaid four non-disclosures, other allegations have not been accepted by the High Court. We would also like to mention at this stage itself that on all the four counts the High Court has recorded finding of facts, which are based on the evidence produced on record. As would be noted hereinafter, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant did not even attempt to argue that these findings are wrong on facts. He only made legal submissions and his entire endeavour was that for non-disclosure of the aforesaid information, the High Court could not have held that the nomination was wrongly accepted and further that since there was a substantial compliance, there was no reason to set aside the election of the appellant.

26. On these aspects, the High Court had framed issues No. 7 and 8, which are as under: “(7) Does the Petitioner proves that the Respondent's Nomination Form is improperly accepted by the Returning Officer” (8) Whether on account of improper acceptance of the nomination paper, the Election result is materially affected?”

27. On Issue No.7, finding of the High Court is that nomination was improperly accepted by the Returning Officer by giving the following reasons:

28. Issue No. 8 pertains to the question as to whether the election result was materially affected because of non-disclosure of the aforesaid information. The High Court took note of provisions of Section 100(1) (d)(i) and (iv) and discussed the same. Thereafter, some judgments cited by the appellant were distinguished and deciding this issue against the appellant, the High Court concluded as under:

29. As pointed out above, there is no dispute on facts that information in respect of the aforesaid four aspects was not disclosed by the appellant in the affidavit filed by him along with the nomination form. The defence and/or justification given for non-disclosing these particulars is rightly rebuffed by the High Court. However, submission of Mr. B. Adinarayana Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, was that having regard to the judgment of this Court in G.M. Siddheshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776, the Court was required to examine as to whether information given in the affidavits was substantial compliance of those particulars regarding Government dues, assets and liabilities, etc. He submitted that the information amounted to substantial compliance. For this purpose, his attempt was to demonstrate that insofar as electricity dues of MSEB are concerned, there was a genuine dispute about the nonpayment; as far as ownership of bungalow No. 866 in the name of his wife is concerned, it was added to the value of the properties belonged to the appellant; municipal taxes in respect of this bungalow were again subject matter of dispute; the value of the vehicle owned by his wife was also disclosed against his own name; and as far as properties owned by the partnership firm are concerned, the appellant was simply a partner from which he had resigned, even when this event occurred after the filing of the nomination form.

30. We may state, in the first instance, that the judgment in G.M. Siddheshwar has no application insofar as the present case is concerned. The Court was dealing with the form of affidavit that is required to be filed along with the election petition in order to comply with the provisions of Section 83(1) proviso of the Act. The very maintainability of the election petition was challenged on the ground that the affidavit furnished by the election petitioner was not in absolute compliance with the format affidavit (Form 25). The Court, however, upheld the view of the High Court holding that on perusal of the affidavit, there was substantial compliance with the prescribed format. Even when some defect was found in the verification to the election petition, it was held that said defect is also curable and cannot be held fatal to the maintainability of the election petition. In the present case, we are concerned with the affidavit which a candidate seeking election is required to file along with his nomination form. At the same time, we proceed on the basis that if there is a substantial compliance of the requirements contained in the said affidavits, in the sense that there is a disclosure of required particulars, including assets/liabilities etc., it can be treated as adequate compliance of the provisions of the Act, Rules and Orders.

31. We have also kept in mind the following observations in G.M. Siddheshwar, while undertaking our analysis of the issue in the present case:

32. In view of the aforesaid, two facets of the issue, which require consideration, are as follows: a) Whether there is a substantial compliance in disclosing the requisite information in the affidavits filed by the appellant along with the nomination paper? b) Whether non-disclosure of the information on account of aforesaid four aspects has materially affected the result of the election?

33. We have already discussed in detail each item of non-disclosure as well as defence of the appellant pertaining thereto. For the reasons recorded in detail at that stage by the High Court and stated above, with which we agree, we are of the opinion that its finding about nondisclosure of the information qua all the aspects is without blemish. There is a specific format in which the information is to be given, which was not adhered to.

34. With these remarks we proceed to deal with the first aspect. Insofar as non-disclosure of the electricity dues is concerned, in the given facts of the case, we are of the opinion that it may not be a serious lapse. No doubt, the dues were outstanding, at the same time, there was a bona fide dispute about the outstanding dues in respect of the first electricity meter. It would have been better on the part of the appellant to give the information along with a note about the dispute, as suggested by the High Court, we still feel that when the appellant nurtured belief in a bona fide manner that because of the said dispute he is not to give the information about the outstanding amount, as it had not become 'payable', this should not be treated as a material lapse. Likewise, as far as the second electricity meter is concerned, it was in the premises which was rented out to the tenants and the dues were payable by the tenants in the first instance. Again, in such circumstances, one can bona fide believe that the tenants would pay the outstanding amount. No doubt, if the tenants do not pay the amount the liability would have been that of the owner, i.e. the appellant. However, at the time of filing the nomination, the appellant could not presume that the tenants would not pay the amount and, therefore, it had become his liability. Same is the position with regard to non-payment of a sum of Rs.1,783/- as outstanding municipal dues, where there was a genuine dispute as to revaluation and reassessment for the purpose of assessing the taxes was yet to be undertaken. Having said so, we may clarify that it would depend in the facts and circumstances of each case as to whether such a non-disclosure would amount to material lapse or not. We are, thus, clarifying that our aforesaid observation in the facts of the present case should not be treated as having general application.

35. Even if it is so, in respect of the aforesaid aspects, on other nondisclosures, the case of the appellant has to fail. We find clear case of non-disclosure of bungalow No. 866 in the name of the appellant's wife, which is a substantial lapse. So is the case about the nondisclosure of vehicle in the name of appellant's wife. Likewise, nondisclosure of the appellant's interest/share in the partnership firm is a very serious and major lapse. On all these aspects, we find that the defence/explanation furnished by the appellant does not inspire any confidence. It is simply an afterthought attempt to wriggle out of the material lapse on the part of the appellant in not disclosing the required information, which was substantial. We, therefore, are of the view that in the affidavits given by the appellant along with the nomination form, material information about the assets was not disclosed and, therefore, it is not possible to accept the argument of the appellant that information contained in the affidavits be treated as sufficient/substantial compliance.

36. We have already reproduced above the relevant portions of judgments in the cases of Association for Democratic Reforms and People's Union for Civil Liberties and the guidelines issued by the Election Commission pursuant thereto. A conjoint and combined reading thereof clearly establishes that the main reason for issuing directions by this Court and guidelines by the Election Commission pursuant thereto is that the citizens have fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India to know about the candidates contesting the elections and this is the primary reason that casts a solemn obligation on these candidates to furnish information regarding the criminal antecedents, educational qualifications and assets held by the candidate, his spouse and dependent children. It is on that basis that not only Election Commission has issued guidelines, but also prepared formats in which the affidavits are to be filed. As a fortiorari, it follows that if the required information as per the said format in respect of the assets of the candidate, his wife and dependent children is not given, it would amount to suppression/nondisclosure.

37. It was argued that acceptance of nomination is as per Section 33 of the Act, which contains requirement for a valid nomination. Further Section 36(2) deals with rejection of nomination on grounds specified therein. It was the submission of the learned senior counsel that at the time of scrutiny of the nomination under Section 36, nomination could be rejected only if any of the grounds stipulated in sub-section (2) are satisfied and there cannot be any 'deemed' ground, which is not covered by Section 36(2) of the Act. Therefore, the Returning Officer had rightly accepted the nomination form as none of the grounds specified in sub-section (2) of Section 36 were attracted. He further submitted that Sections 8A, 9, 9A, 10 and 10A provide disqualifications for Members of Parliament and State Legislature. As per the counsel, from the scheme of the Act it can be seen that at the time of scrutiny of nomination, all that the Returning Officer is required to examine is as to whether the candidate suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 8 to 10A of the Act and as to whether the nomination is in the form prescribed by Section 33 and accompanied by the documents mentioned in sub-sections 2 to 7 of Section 33 and whether it is accompanied by an affidavit prescribed by Rule 4A and the deposit required by Section 34 of the Act. Apart from the aforesaid, the Returning Officer is not empowered to reject the nomination on any other ground. He argued that the right of the Returning Officer to conduct a summary inquiry into the correctness or otherwise of the contents of the affidavit filed along with the nomination was expressly taken away as can be seen from the judgment of this Court in the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties. Having noted that the Returning Officer has no power to reject a nomination where false information is furnished or material information is suppressed, the Election Commission of India and Union of India have requested this Court to treat the same as equal to a blank affidavit, as noted in the case of Resurgence India. It is difficult to accept the aforesaid submissions of the learned senior counsel as that would amount to nullifying the effect of the judgments as well as guidelines issued by the Election Commission.

38. When the information is given by a candidate in the affidavit filed along with the nomination paper and objections are raised thereto questioning the correctness of the information or alleging that there is non-disclosure of certain important information, it may not be possible for the returning officer at that time to conduct a detailed examination. Summary enquiry may not suffice. Present case is itself an example which loudly demonstrates this. At the same time, it would not be possible for the Returning Officer to reject the nomination for want of verification about the allegations made by the objector. In such a case, when ultimately it is proved that it was a case of non-disclosure and either the affidavit was false or it did not contain complete information leading to suppression, it can be held at that stage that the nomination was improperly accepted. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel appearing for the Election Commission, right argued that such an enquiry can be only at a later stage and the appropriate stage would be in an election petition as in the instant case, when the election is challenged. The grounds stated in Section 36(2) are those which can be examined there and then and on that basis the Returning Officer would be in a position to reject the nomination. Likewise, where the blanks are left in an affidavit, nomination can be rejected there and then. In other cases where detailed enquiry is needed, it would depend upon the outcome thereof, in an election petition, as to whether the nomination was properly accepted or it was a case of improper acceptance. Once it is found that it was a case of improper acceptance, as there was misinformation or suppression of material information, one can state that question of rejection in such a case was only deferred to a later date. When the Court gives such a finding, which would have resulted in rejection, the effect would be same, namely, such a candidate was not entitled to contest and the election is void. Otherwise, it would be an anomalous situation that even when criminal proceedings under Section 125A of the Act can be initiated and the selected candidate is criminally prosecuted and convicted, but the result of his election cannot be questioned. This cannot be countenanced.

39. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion would be to hold that the present appeal is totally devoid of any merits and is, accordingly, dismissed. … ...................................... J. (Surinder Singh Nijjar) … ...................................... J. (A.K. Sikri) New Delhi; May 09, 2014.