Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 06.1.2014 RC. REV. NO.6 OF 2014 & CM 117/2014
PAWAN PATHAK ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Ram Lal, Advocate.
Through: None
JUDGMENT
1. This is a revision petition filed under Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“Act”), challenging the order of 21st September, 2013 of the learned SCJ-cum-RC, Karkadooma Courts (“impugned order”). By the impugned order, the learned ARC dismissed the application of the petitioner-tenant (“tenant”) seeking leave to defend and passing an order of eviction against the tenant in Eviction Petition No. E-10 of 2013.
2. The dispute can be traced back to an eviction petition filed by the respondent-landlord (“landlord”) before the learned ARC, wherein the landlord sought eviction of the tenant from the suit property – a shop – on the grounds of his bona fide requirement. The case of the landlord, who was 2014:DHC:93 – at the time of filing of the petition before the ARC – about to retire, was that he required the suit property for setting up a provisions / grocery store for his son. He had submitted that after his retirement, he would not be able to support his son and hence needs to set up a business for his son, who has studied only till 7th standard and a daily wage earner. He had submitted that he had no other suitable alternative accommodation for the same.
3. It was admitted that on the ground floor of the building containing the suit property, there were three shops on the ground floor that belonged to the landlord. Of the three shops, it was submitted, one was sold by the landlord to one Ms. Gayatri Devi, in April, 2009 to meet the expenses of one of his daughter's marriage, one was being used by the landlord's other daughter for running a beauty parlour, and the third is the suit property. The tenant, before the ARC filed an application seeking leave to defend the petition and raised four grounds:
(i) There are four shops on the ground floor, not three as contended.
The wall between the shop being used as a beauty parlour and the shop adjoining it might have been broken down to show the same as one shop instead of two. The landlord, although he is showing to have only three shops, is really in possession of four shops.
(ii) No beauty parlor is being run by the said daughter of the petitioner as alleged or otherwise and the shop said to have been run as the beauty parlour is available to the landlord.
(iii) The tenant has spent a considerable amount as conversion charges towards the suit property.
(iv) The landlord and his family members are already possessed of sufficient means – they have many commercial vehicles and have sufficient credit in bank. Thus the contention that the landlord needs the property to set up a shot or that his son is a daily wage earner is false and concocted.
4. The learned ARC, after considering the contentions of the landlord and those of the tenant, as earlier observed, dismissed the application for leave to defend. He reasoned as follows:
(i) It has already been admitted by the landlord that one of the shops on the ground floor has been sold. It is not believable that the wall between two shops adjoining the tenant's shop could have been taken down by the landlord without the tenant knowing of it. It is not even the case of the tenant that the wall has been taken down recently so as to defeat any claims of the tenant.
(ii) The tenant has not been able to lead any material to show that the ground floor has four shops. On the other hand, it is amply clear from the documents produced by the landlord that there are only three shops therein.
(iii) The denial qua the daughter of the landlord not running any beauty parlour and of not being in possession of one of the shops is a mere bald denial and is fit to be ignored. While the landlord has produced the electricity bill of 2007 in the name of the said daughter in support of his submissions, the tenant has not even pleaded as to whose possession the shop is in or what business was being carried out thereform.
(iv) That the tenant has spent a large amount towards conversion charges is irrelevant in the context of this dispute.
(v) The contention that the landlord and his family members are in possession of commercial vehicles or that they have sufficient credit in the bank is not relevant in considering whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide.
(vi) When the son of the landlord is shown to have studied only till the 7th standard, and not in possession of any shop to run any business from, and when the landlord himself is shown to be a retired person who might be in need of further means to support his family, the bona fide requirement is clearly proven.
5. Thus reasoning, the learned ARC, by the impugned order, rejected leave to defend and passed an order of eviction. The tenant has hence filed the instant petition seeking revision of the impugned order.
6. Before this Court, the counsel for tenant strenuously contended that the learned ARC has misinterpreted and misconstrued the facts and documents on record in passing the impugned order. Particular reliance was placed on two documents:-
(i) an agreement to sell between the landlord and Ms. Gayatri Devi, and, (ii) of rent receipts issued in respect of the suit property. It was submitted that since the agreement to sell referred to shop no. 697/4 and the rent receipts referred to shop no. 697/3, it is indicative of the fact that the ground floor has four shops and that the tenant is in possession of shop no. 3 and not shop no. 2 as alleged.
7. It was further contended that the site plan of the ground floor clearly shows four shops and the landlord would have demolished one wall between two shops to make it seem like one shop. Additionally, the tenant largely reiterated his contentions before the ARC and submitted that the findings of the ARC qua the same are incorrect and ought to be reversed.
8. This court is unpersuaded by the contentions of the tenant, which are issues of fact; it finds no infirmity with the findings of the learned ARC that requires interference under the proviso to section 25-B of the Act. The learned Supreme Court, even as early as in 1987, in the case of Sushila Devi v Avinash Chandra Jain, (1987) 2 SCC 219, held that the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under the proviso to Section 25-B is wider than that under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It held: 3....It is necessary to emphasise that unlike Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 where the High Court's power of interference in revision touches jurisdiction, the power of the High Court to interfere in revision under sub-section (8) of Section 25-B of the Act is much wider in scope and enables the High Court to satisfy itself as to whether the decision rendered by the Rent Controller on the facts in issue is in accordance with law, that is to say, in accordance with the well-settled principles.”
9. However, in the very next year, in the case of Hiralal Kapur v Prabhu Choudhury, (1988) 2 SCC 172, the Supreme Court had opportunity to clarify that the scope of jurisdiction, even if wider than that under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ought to not be exercised to enter into the merits of the matter. It observed: “8....Though under Section 25(B)(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act the powers of the High Court are somewhat wider than similar powers of revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is well established by a series of decisions of this Court that the power of revision under the Rent Control Acts does not entitle the High Court to enter into the merits of the factual controversies between the parties and to reverse findings of fact in this regard. It is sufficient, in this context, to refer to the decision of this Court in Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad [(1987) 3 SCC 538] which reviewed earlier decisions. The decision in Sushila Devi v. Avinash Chandra Jain [(1987) 2 SCC 219] to which counsel for the respondent referred, lays down no different principle.”
10. On the issue of when the High Court can interfere with findings of the learned ARC on questions of fact, the Supreme Court, in Ram Narain Arora v Asha Rani, (1999) 1 SCC 141, held: “12. It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition under Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act is a very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court could examine the facts available in order to find out whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the matters on record to decide the case. Pure findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but (sic:if) in a given case, the finding of fact is given on a wrong premise of law, certainly it would be open to the revisional court to interfere with such a matter.”
11. In a decision that reprised the dicta of the precedents and clarified as to the limited scope of the provision, the Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119, observed: “5. Section 25-B of the Act lays down “special procedure for the disposal of application for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement”. Sub-section (1) says that every application for recovery of possession on the ground specified in Section 14(1)(e) of the Act shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in Section 25-B. Sub-section (8) says that no appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Rent Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. The proviso to that sub-section reads thus: “Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.” “6. The above proviso indicates that power of the High Court is supervisory in nature and it is intended to ensure that the Rent Controller conforms to law when he passes the order. The satisfaction of the High Court when perusing the records of the case must be confined to the limited sphere that the order of the Rent Controller is “according to the law”. In other words, the High Court shall scrutinize the records to ascertain whether any illegality has been committed by the Rent Controller in passing the order under Section 25-B. It is not permissible for the High Court in that exercise to come to a different fact finding unless the finding arrived at by the Rent Controller on the facts is so unreasonable that no Rent Controller should have reached such a finding on the materials available. “7. Although, the word “revision” is not employed in the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Act, it is evident from the language used therein that the power conferred is revisional power. In legal parlance, distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction is well understood. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction is wide enough to afford a rehearing of the whole case for enabling the appellate forum to arrive at fresh conclusions untrammelled by the conclusions reached in the order challenged before it. Of course, the statute which provides appeal provision can circumscribe or limit the width of such appellate powers. Revisional power, on the contrary, is ordinarily a power of supervision keeping subordinate tribunals within the bounds of law. Expansion or constriction of such revisional power would depend upon how the statute has couched such power therein. In some legislations, revisional jurisdiction is meant for satisfying itself as to the regularity, legality or propriety of proceedings or decisions of the subordinate court. In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar [(1980) 4 SCC 259] this Court considered the scope of the words (“the High Court may call for and examine the records … to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order …”) by which power of revision has been conferred by a particular statute. Dealing with the contention that the above words indicated conferment of a very wide power on the revisional authority, this Court has observed thus in the said decision: (SCC p. 262, para 3) “The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words „to satisfy itself‟ under Section 25 appears to be that the power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section 25 the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority.”
12. Given the above, it is amply clear that the jurisdiction of this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 25-B has to be to a limited extent and only to ensure that the findings of facts are in accordance with law. The tenant, by this petition, is praying that the court upset the reasoned findings of the learned ARC in the impugned order. The findings of the learned ARC on the basis of the documents on record is a possible interpretation and is reasonable, based on the documents on record. Given the same, this Court does not find it appropriate to substitute the reasoned findings of the learned ARC with any other possible opinion.
13. For the above reasons, the petition is dismissed.
NAJMI WAZIRI (JUDGE) JANUARY 06, 2014