Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 17.1.2014
SUNITA CHAUHAN @ GAYATRI DEVI ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. K.N. Popli, Adv.
Through: None.
MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI (Open Court)
JUDGMENT
1. This petition impugns an order dated 20th November, 2013 which rejected the petitioner’s appeal under Section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act which in turn assailed an order of 27.9.2013 in the context of rent deposit petitions preferred earlier by the petitioner-tenant under Section 27 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The tenant had impugned the order of the Additional Rent Controller who dismissed her application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC for lack of bonafides and also as being barred by time.
2. The facts leading to the case are that the landlord had failed to accept rents and upon his refusal, three petitions were filed under Section 27 of the DRC Act being DR No.154/2011, 272-A/2011 and 426/2011 for the rental 2014:DHC:298 periods from 01.01.2011 to 30.04.3022; 01.05.2011 to 30.09.2011 and 1.10.2011 to 31.12.2011. In the meanwhile, the landlord’s petition under Section 14(1)(a) of DRC Act was decided in his favour on 30.10.2010. Thereafter, on 8.5.2012, the benefit under Section 14(2) of the Act was declined to the tenant presumably on account of default in compliance of the order under Section 15(1) of the Act. Upon challenge in appeal, this order was set aside and the case was remanded for fresh consideration vide judgment dated 2.5.2013. There was continuous default in appearance by the tenant and when rent deposit petitions came up for hearing on 3.8.2012, 7.12.2012 and 21.12.2012. Accordingly, it was dismissed on the latter-most date. The Appellate Tribunal reasoned that the dismissal of the rent deposit petitions was justified since the appellant had failed to show any good cause for default in appearance nor had he moved any application for condonation of the delay; the default was not properly explained and it was incumbent upon the tenant to pursue her petition diligently; at any rate there was no explanation as to why the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC seeking restoration be allowed especially where there was no application seeking condonation of the delay.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Courts ought to be liberal and that a pedantic and a hyper-technical view of the matter ought not to be taken as it would defeat a valuable right of the party and the expression “sufficient cause” should be interpreted liberally. He further contends that in the present case where the petitioner had already deposited the rent in Court, no prejudice would be caused to the landlord if the petition was restored and then decided on its substantive merits. He further contends that in the interest of justice, the application for restoration ought to have been allowed, subject to payment of costs. He relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Nagina Singh vs. Naga Singh in support of his contentions.
4. Learned counsel further submits that there was only a delay of 107 days which ought to have been condoned. The default in appearance is sought to be explained as a bonafide mistake on the part of the counsel. However, there is explanation as to how counsel came to know about it only on 26.4.2013. The default has to be explained for each day of delay. Admittedly, the restoration application was filed on 8.5.2013. Therefore from the date of dismissal of the rent deposit petition on 21.12.2012, 128 days had passed. No endeavour has been made to explain each day of delay. There is no explanation either apropos the default before the Additional Rent Controller on 3rd August, 7th December and 21st December, 2012. The conduct of the petitioner/tenant betrays a lack of sincerity and seriousness in pursuing his case. The delays are unexplained. The reasons for dismissal of his application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC by the ARC as well as the petition under Section 38 of the DRC Act are justified and the reasons mentioned in both the orders are correct. The impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity warranting the interference of this Court in revisionary jurisdiction. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
NAJMI WAZIRI (JUDGE) JANUARY 17, 2014