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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
RSA No. 199/2012 & CM No. 21160/2012 (Stay)
10th February, 2014 NAWAL KISHORE MEHTA @ NAWAL MEHTA ......Appellant
Through: Mr. A.C.Bhasin and Mr. Amit Bhasin, Advocates.
Through: None.
To be referred to the Reporter or not? VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
JUDGMENT
1. This regular second appeal is filed by the appellant against the judgment of the first appellate court dated 1.2.2011 whereby the suit of the appellant-plaintiff has been dismissed as being barred by limitation.
2. The following substantial question of law was framed by this Court on 21.2.2013:- “Whether the findings arrived at by the trial court are perverse, if so, to what effect?”
3. Appellant-plaintiff filed a suit for declaration, injunction, recovery of arrears of rent of Rs.93,960/- etc on the ground that the original owner of the 2014:DHC:781 property being Flat No. BH-610C, Shalimar Bagh, Delhi was one Sh. Ram Sarup who sold the same to Sh. Kewal Krishan Kamboj and who further sold the property to the appellant-plaintiff-Nawal Kishore Mehta in terms of the documentation dated 2.6.1998. Notice of attornment was pleaded to be sent to the respondent-defendant. Appellant/plaintiff further pleaded that the respondent-defendant relied upon forged and fabricated documents claiming purchase of rights in the suit property on 12.11.1994, and that these documents have been found to be forged and fabricated documents in the earlier proceedings before the Additional Rent Controller titled as Shri Naval Mehta Vs. Smt. Babli @ Smt. Shashi Bansal bearing case no. E- 155/2004/2001. Though the eviction petition before the Additional Rent Controller was dismissed, however, the issue with respect to forgery of the documentation dated 12.11.1994 claimed by the respondent-defendant became final only on passing of the judgment on 20.3.2007. It is thus argued by the appellant/plaintiff that the subject suit was accordingly filed within a period of three years from 20.3.2007 i.e on 14.11.2008 and is not time-barred.
4. The appellate court dismissed the suit as being barred by time inasmuch as, the cause of action to cancel the documents alleged by the respondent-defendant in his favour dated 12.11.1994 arose on 14.12.2001 when the written statement was filed by the defendant in the court of Additional Rent Controller claiming rights on the basis of the documentation dated 12.11.1994. The relevant para of the impugned judgment is para 5 and which reads as under:-
5. In my opinion, the first appellate court has erred in holding that the appellant-plaintiff was bound to file the suit within three years from 14.12.2001 inasmuch as, it was only when the judgment was passed by the Additional Rent Controller on 20.3.2007 that the appellant-plaintiff would have known the finality of his stand with respect to forgery and fabrication of the documents dated 12.11.1994 claimed by the respondent-defendant, and accordingly, the cause of action also accrued w.e.f 20.3.2007 inasmuch as, for arising of a cause of action there has to be certainty with respect to the same and since the issue was alive in the eviction petition filed before the Additional Rent Controller, appellant-plaintiff had necessarily to wait for the conclusion of those proceedings before it can be said to be of one view or the other with respect to forgery of the documentation dated 12.11.1994. In any case, looking at it from another manner that if the cause of action had accrued on 14.12.2001, I find that in a case such as the present, the cause of action had continued till 20.3.2007 when finality was achieved in the earlier proceedings before the Additional Rent Controller. Therefore, the present suit which is filed within three years from 20.3.2007, cannot be said to be barred by time when the same sought declaration of illegality of the documentation dated 12.11.1994 relied upon by the respondent-plaintiff to claim ownership in his favour. In my opinion, unless and until an Article in the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 specifically talks of cause of action accruing on a specific date, rights which a plaintiff has, should not be extinguished or should not be allowed to be got lost by reading of an Article of the Limitation Act for construing extinction of the right/entitlement of a plaintiff.
6. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed answering the substantial question of law in favour of the appellant holding that there is perversity in the finding of the first appellate court holding the suit to be barred by limitation. The impugned judgment of the first appellate court is set aside. The first appeal before the first appellate court is accordingly revived for being decided on merits. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
FEBRUARY 10, 2014 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J. ib