Full Text
CRL.M.C. 5354/2018, CRL.M.A. 34590/2018 & CRL.M.(BAIL)
1853/2018 RAMBIR KAUSHIK .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Abhimanyu Shrestha and Mr. Pritesh Pathi, Advs.
Through: Mr. Utkarsh, APP for State
Mr. Viresh B. Saharya, Mr. Harshvar Devan Sharma, Mr. Akshat Aggarwal and Mr. Rishabh Mathur, Advs. for
R-2
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 CrPC praying for quashing of order dated 27.08.2018 passed by the learned ASJ-06 (SE), Saket, New Delhi whereby the bail granted to the petitioner vide order dated. 27.06.2017 in connection with FIR No. 49/2016 under Sections 420/468/471/506/34 IPC registered at PS Pul Prahladpur (subsequently transferred to PS Crime branch), was cancelled. The said FIR was registered on allegations of offence of forgery in respect of bills and documents of alleged purchases of clothing and jewellery against the petitioner and his family members.
VIKAS MAHAJAN, J.
2. Mr. Abhimanyu Shrestha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the supervening circumstances which have been considered by the learned ASJ in the impugned order are all pertaining to the period prior to the grant of interim protection by this Court vide order dated 30.11.2018.
3. He submits that one of the supervening circumstances which have weighed with the learned Additional Sessions Judge is the registration of NCR on 25.03.2018 bearing no. 12/2018 at PS Pul Prahladpur regarding the threat call made by an Ex-Minister MLA of Haryana to the complainant (respondent no.2) on behalf of the petitioner and his family.
4. The second supervening circumstance which has been considered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is the registration of FIR No.636/2017 under Sections 147/148/149/326A/341/506 IPC registered at PS Palwal. The said FIR was originally registered at the instance of the daughter of petitioner wherein she had alleged acid attack against her by her in-laws. However, subsequently during investigation, the police opined that the allegations made by the daughter of petitioner are false whereas in the chargesheet the case of the prosecution is that the acid injuries were selfsuffered as it is the petitioner who had thrown acid on her daughter to falsely implicate the complainant/respondent no.2, his sons and other family members. Accordingly, police filed the chargesheet against the petitioner and her daughter in the FIR No.636/2017 under the aforesaid sections. He submits that as per the allegations in the chargesheet the incident is of August, 2017.
5. He submits that the trial in connection with FIR No. 636/2017 is underway and the petitioner is on bail in the said case. He further submits that during the pendency of the case FIR No. 636/2017, a compromise was arrived at between the petitioner and the complainant party, in terms of which the petitioner’s daughter had withdrawn various cases. However, the Court refused to take cognizance of the said compromise.
6. He further submits that this Court in the present case had granted interim protection to the petitioner by directing that no coercive steps be taken against the petitioner vide order dated 30.11.2018 and till date the said interim is continuing. He submits that ever since the passing of said order there is no further supervening circumstance pointed out by the complainant/respondent no.2 in the present case nor the petitioner had ever misused the liberty. Elaborating further, he submits that more than six years have elapsed since the petitioner was granted interim protection and this fact itself shows that the impugned order cancelling the bail of the petitioner has been rendered unsustainable with the elapse of time.
7. Per contra, Mr. Viresh B. Saharya, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant submits that the liberty granted to the petitioner has been misused by him inasmuch as he has further committed offences which led to the registration of FIR No. 636/2017 at PS Palwal.
8. He submits that even subsequent to the order of this court dated 30.11.2018 vide which it was directed that no coercive steps be taken, one more FIR No. 583/2018 has been registered against the petitioner under Sections 468/471 IPC at PS Saket on 23.09.2018. He submits that the allegations in the said FIR are that the petitioner had tendered forged and fabricated army records in the defamation suit filed by him against the complainant/respondent no.2.
9. He further refutes the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that any compromise was arrived at between the petitioner and the complainant party. He, therefore, urges the Court that the present petition of the petitioner may be dismissed.
10. I have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and have perused the record.
11. There are two supervening circumstances which have been referred to in the impugned order while cancelling the bail granted to the petitioner. The first supervening circumstance is the registration of Non-Cognizable Report which records the threat call made by an Ex-Minister MLA of Haryana. It must be noted that mere registration of said NCR does not show involvement of petitioner in the said call.
12. Insofar as FIR No.636/2017 under Sections 147/148/149/326A/341/ 506 IPC registered at PS Palwal is concerned, the allegations in the same are though of August, 2017 i.e. after the petitioner was granted bail on 27.06.2017 but the same is much prior to the protection from coercive action granted to the petitioner by this Court on 30.11.2018.
13. Likewise, the FIR No. 583/2018 was though registered on 23.09.2018 under sections 468/471 IPC on the complaint of complainant Satish Sharma against the Petitioner, his wife and one Arun and Mr. B.S. Rathore but the allegation in the said FIR is that petitioner has filed certain documents which are alleged to be forged and fabricated in the defamation suit. Evidently, the FIR and the incident alleged therein are prior to the grant of order of protection from coercive action, which order is of 30.11.2018.
14. As noted above, the incidents in the two FIRs and the NCR referred to above, are post-grant of bail to the petitioner in FIR 49/2016 but this Court cannot be unmindful of the fact that this Court vide order dated 30.11.2018 passed in the present petition, had directed that no coercive action be taken against the petitioner and the said order is still continuing. The respondents have not been able to point out any supervening circumstance after the grant of protection to the petitioner. Thus, during these 06 years and 04 months the petitioner has not misused the liberty granted to him.
15. Further, on a query posed by the Court, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant/respondent no.2 fairly concedes that the petitioner is already on bail in the two FIRs which are stated to be the supervening circumstances.
16. The law is well settled that the bail once granted, is not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner unless any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying concession of bail during trial. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary when directing cancellation of bail which has already been granted. Reference in this regard may be had to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dolat Ram and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana 1995 (1) SCC 349. In the said decision the Hon’ble Apex Court also delineated various grounds on which the bail already granted could be cancelled. The relevant part of the decision reads as under:
absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial. These principles, it appears, were lost sight of by the High Court when it decided to cancel the bail, already granted. The High Court it appears to us overlooked the distinction of the factors relevant for rejecting bail in a non-bailable case in the first instance and the cancellation of bail already granted.” (emphasis supplied)
17. As there is not a single instance of misuse of liberty by the petitioner ever since he was granted interim protection vide order dated 30.11.2018 by directing that no coercive action be taken against him, the very basis of cancellation of petitioner’s bail has paled into insignificance with the passage of time.
18. Further, this Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that the present FIR is an offshoot of a marital discord of the petitioner’s daughter with her husband.
19. Having regard to the totality of circumstances, this Court finds the impugned order has been rendered unsustainable by elapse of time. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 27.08.2018 is set aside and the order dated 27.06.2017 granting bail to the petitioner is restored.
20. The petition is disposed of in the above terms along with pending applications.
VIKAS MAHAJAN, J MARCH 25, 2025/N.S.ASWAL