Dr. V.B.Bhatia & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.

10. Since the thrust of the argument of the petitioner is regarding the territorial jurisdiction about the criminal proceedings initiated by respondent No.2 - wife, it is desirable to refer the relevant provisions of law.

11. Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short „the Code‟) deals with jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts in inquiries and trials. Section 177 to 179 are relevant which are as follows:-

177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.--Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

178. Place of inquiry or trial.--(a) when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.

179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues.-- When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.”

12. From the above provisions, it is clear that the normal rule is that the offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by the Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. However, when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed or where the offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another or where an offence is a continuing one, and continuous to be committed in more than one local areas and takes place in different local areas as per Section 178, the Court having jurisdiction on any of such local area is competent to inquire into and try the offence. Section 179 makes it clear that if anything happens as a consequence of the offence, the same may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.

13. Keeping the above provisions in mind, let us examine the judgments cited by the parties for the purpose to find out as to whether the Court of Rohtak has territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance and proceed with the matter.

14. Petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Y. Abrahim Ajith (supra). The fact which arose before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was that the respondent had filed a complaint in the Court of the Magistrate alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the matter in the context of cause of action and part thereof, and considered any cause of action within the jurisdiction of the court concerned which may authorize him to take cognizance in the matter. The complaint petition itself disclosed that after 15th April, 1997, the respondent left Nagercoil and came to Chennai, where she settled. All the allegations which was per se without any dispute took place, according to the complainant petition at Nagercoil and, therefore, the courts at Chennai did not have the jurisdiction to take cognizance and it was alleged that no cause of action had taken place within the limit of Chennai Court and as such there is no justification for taking cognizance by Chennai Court. In that context the court examined the provisions of Sections 177 and 178 of the Code and also examined meaning of cause of action. The court also considered that ordinarily when the offence is limited to a particular place and when there is no allegation of continuation of offence, in that circumstances the real test will be cause of action and part thereof and the court gave its view that wherever the offence has been committed in context of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, the Court in whose jurisdiction the offence has been committed or part thereof will have jurisdiction and no complaint petition by the complainant will be entertained where she was ordinarily residing subject to the condition that no part of cause of action has taken place in the jurisdiction of the court taking cognizance. In this connection, the following paragraphs of the said judgment will be relevant for the proper consideration:- “12. The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code, it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence, it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused.

13. While in civil cases, normally the expression "cause of action" is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression "cause of action" is therefore not a stranger to criminal cases.

14. It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise.

15. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in “cause of action”. The court after applying the legal principles concluded that no part of cause of action arose in Chennai and directed to return the complaint petition and to file the same before the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.

15. In another judgment relied upon by the petitioner in the case of Bhura Ram (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the authority of taking cognizance by the Court where the cause of action and part thereof has taken place. In this case also the jurisdiction of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate was challenged on the ground that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try the offence as the cause of action has not accrued within the jurisdiction of Court. The matter travelled up-to Hon'ble Supreme Court. It was argued before the court that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code being a continuing offence the complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction. It was argued that offence of cruelty being continuing offence will travel along with the complainant and where she was residing. The court followed the earlier judgment in the case of Y. Abraham Ajith and held that the facts mentioned in the complaint petition disclosed that all cause of action has taken place outside the jurisdiction of Court of Ganganagar and it was found that all cause of action has taken place in the State of Punjab and no part of cause of action arose in the State of Rajasthan and following the earlier judgment, allowed the appeal with a direction to return the complaint petition to the complainant and if so desire she may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.

16. It is pertinent to note that the concept of continuing offence and fall out that has taken place in another place was not under consideration in the above cases. In Manish Ratan & Ors. v. State of M.P. and Anr., (2007) 1 SCC 262 also, it was found that the cause of action has arisen at Datia Court, hence complaint was ordered to be transferred to competent Court of jurisdiction.

17. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, relied upon Sunita Kumari Kashyap v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2011) 11 SCC 301, wherein the wife had filed the complaint at Gaya alleging ill treatment and cruelty at the hands of her husband and relatives at matrimonial home in Ranchi and that she was forcibly taken to her parental home at Gaya by her husband with a threat of dire consequences in case their dowry demands were not met. It was held that as the offence was a continuing one and episode at Gaya was only consequence of continuing offence of harassment and illtreatment meted out to the complainant, Magistrate at Gaya has the jurisdiction to proceed with criminal case instituted therein.

18. Hon‟ble Supreme Court also referred to an earlier decision rendered in Sujata Mukherjee vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC 30 in which similar issue was considered by Hon‟ble Supreme Court and found that Clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code is attracted and the Magistrate at wife's parents' place has also jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. In the said decision, wife was the Appellant and the Respondents were the husband, parents-in-law and two sisters-in-law of the Appellant Sujata Mukherjee. The gist of the allegation of the Appellant, Sujata Mukherjee was that on account of dowry demands, she had been maltreated and humiliated not only in the house of her in-laws at Raigarh but as a consequence of such events, the husband of the Appellant had also come to the house of her parents at Raipur and assaulted her. On behalf of the Respondents therein, it was contended before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur that the criminal case was not maintainable before the said learned Chief Judicial Magistrate because the cause of action took place only at Raigarh which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate at Raipur. A prayer was also made to quash the summons issued by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate while entertaining the said complaint of Smt Mukherjee. As the Chief Judicial Magistrate was not inclined either to quash the summons or to transfer the criminal case to the competent court at Raigarh, the criminal revision petitions were filed before the High Court, one by all the five Respondents and another by four of the Respondents excluding the husband presumably because there was specific allegation against the husband that the husband had also gone to Raipur and had assaulted the Appellant and as such the husband could not plead want of territorial jurisdiction. Both the said criminal revision cases were disposed of by a common order dated 31.08.1989 by the High Court holding that the case against the husband of the Appellant alone is maintainable and in respect of other Respondents related to the incidents taking place at Raigarh, hence, the criminal case on the basis of complaint made by the Appellant is not maintainable at Raipur. The said order of the High Court was challenged by the Appellant-Sujata Mukherjee before Hon‟ble Supreme Court. It was submitted that it will be evident from the complaint that the Appellant has alleged that she had been subjected to cruel treatment persistently at Raigarh and also at Raipur and incident taking place at Raipur is not an isolated event, but consequential to the series of incidents taking place at Raigarh. Therefore, it was contended that the High Court was wrong in appreciating the scope of the complaint and proceeding on the footing that several isolated events had taken place at Raigarh and one isolated incident had taken place at Raipur. Hon‟ble Supreme Court basing reliance on Section 178 of the Code, in particular Clauses (b) and (c), found that in view of allegations in the complaint that the offence was a continuing one having been committed in more local areas and one of the local areas being Raipur, the learned Magistrate at Raipur had jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case instituted in such court. Ultimately, accepting the stand of the Appellant, this Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as under: “7.....We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the Appellant and it appears to us that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the Appellant in the hands of all the accused Respondents and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the Respondents had taken part and on other occasion, one of the Respondents had taken part. Therefore, Clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clearly attracted.”

19. In Y. Abrahim (supra) itself reference was made to this authority and was distinguished as in that case there was no allegation of continuing offence.

20. In State of M.P. v. Suresh Kaushal and Anr., (2003) 11 SCC 126, again in a similar circumstance, considering the provisions of Section 179 with reference to the complaint relating to the offences under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC, it was held as under: “6. The above Section contemplates two courts having jurisdiction and the trial is permitted to take place in any one of those two courts. One is the court within whose local jurisdiction the act has been done and the other is the court within whose local jurisdiction the consequence has ensued. When the allegation is that the miscarriage took place at Jabalpur it cannot be contended that the court at Jabalpur could not have acquired jurisdiction as the acts alleged against the accused took place at Indore.”

21. In Rajesh Kumar Pandey (supra) relied upon by the petitioner, reference was made to the case of Arun Khanna v. The State of Bihar and Another, 1994(1) PLJR 513 where the challenge was made that Dhanbad Court has no territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence which had taken place at Amritsar. The Court has considered the definition of cruelty which has been embodied in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and the Court also considered the consequences of the act committed by the accused persons which led to mental agony at Dhanbad. In other words, offence was treated to be continuing, considering the definition of cruelty in context of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and was given an extended meaning. The Court has held that if the woman continues to suffer the mental agony or torture as a result of the acts done to her by the husband or his relatives forcing her to leave the matrimonial home, it must be said that the cruelty is continuing. While construing the question of jurisdiction with respect to offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, the Court has held that social background and the object for which the said offence has been created has to be taken into consideration. If victim lady would be compelled to file a complaint only at the place where the act was committed, that is, at the place where the husband/in-laws reside, she might not be able to prosecute the complaint properly which will not serve the desired object and on consideration of the aforesaid aspect of the matter it was held that Dhanbad Court has rightly taken cognizance as the consequences of torture which was perpetrated to her in the State of Punjab continues to operate or it would have a fallout at the place where the complainant was residing.

22. We have already adverted to the details made by respondent No.2 in the complaint. The complainant has levelled allegations of cruelty and ill-treatment at the hands of the petitioners and stated facts and incidents with respect to the same. Hence cause of action is evident from the complaints. Admittedly in view of the above, part of cause of action also arose in the territorial jurisdiction of Haryana. The complainant in her second and third complaint has clearly specified her husband’s (petitioner No.3) visit to Rohtak and the illtreatment meted out to her and her parents at the behest of the petitioner and also the threats given by Petitioner No.1 during his visits to the Women Cell. These incidents constitute a part of the FIR. Moreover, in view of Section 178 and Section 179 of the Cr.P.C., the offence in this case was a continuing one, having been committed in more local areas and one of the local areas being Rohtak, the FIR was registered at Haryana. Therefore, the act of cruelty meted by the petitioners is a continuing offence and continues both in Delhi and Rohtak and therefore, the offence is triable by both the Courts in whose territorial jurisdiction the act of continuing offence of cruelty and ill-treatment has been committed.

23. The petitioner has also relied upon Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. (supra) and Alchemist Ltd. (supra) for submitting that for the purpose of deciding whether the facts averred by the petitioner would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such facts constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. Even if a small fraction of cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Nevertheless, it must be a “part of cause of action”, nothing less than that. However, these authorities have no application to the present case as the facts stated by the complainant in the complaints refers to the incidents alleged to have taken place at Rohtak and constitute an essential and integral “part of cause of action” and are not irrelevant as submitted by the petitioner.

24. In Niraj Trivedi (supra), relied upon by the petitioner, it was found that the concerned Court has no territorial jurisdiction to try the case. The complainant wife had either lived at Delhi or U.S.A. where the alleged atrocities took place as such, it was held that the Court at Patna (where her parents were living) had no jurisdiction but things are entirely different in the instant case as seen above. In Neelu Chopra (supra) and Lakhwinder Singh (supra), FIR was quashed since the allegations were vague. In Shipra Raj (supra) and Ajay Mishra (supra), FIR was quashed as it did not disclose any cause of action.

25. As regards the submission that there is misuse of police power since the complaint was initially sent to the Commissioner of Police, Delhi due to lack of territorial jurisdiction but subsequently on the same complaint, FIR was registered at Rohtak. As held in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2014) 2 SCC 1, it is mandatory to register FIR on receipt of information disclosing a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is required in such a situation.

26. Learned counsel for the respondent has also advanced the argument that jurisdictional aspect becomes relevant only when the question of inquiry or trial would arise. It is, therefore, a fallacious thinking that only a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case has the power to take cognizance of the offence. If he is a Magistrate of the First Class his power to take cognizance of the offence is not impaired by territorial restrictions. After taking cognizance, the Magistrate may have to decide as to whether the Court has jurisdiction to enquire into or try the offence and that situation would reach only during the post cognizance stage and not earlier. In Rajesh Kumar Pandey v. State of Bihar, 2013(1)PLJR34, relied upon by the petitioner himself, reliance was made to Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal and Others, AIR 1999 SC 3499, where Hon‟ble Supreme Court has considered Section 177, 178 and 179 of the Code and while considering Section 179 of the Code, the Court has tested the jurisdiction on the touch stone of cause of action and part thereof and also the consequences which have been ensued to the other place. There Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that there is nothing in Chapter-XIV which prohibits the Magistrate to take cognizance with regard to the allegation that has taken place outside the territorial jurisdiction and the Court has further held that the jurisdictional aspect becomes relevant only when the question of enquiry or trial would arise. In that connection, it will be relevant to quote the following portion of the said judgment:- “13.........Therefore, when there is nothing in Chapter-XIV of the Code to impair the power of a Judicial Magistrate of First Class taking cognizance of the offence on the strength of any territorial reason, it is impermissible to deprive such a Magistrate of the power to take cognizance of an offence of course, in certain special enactments special provisions are incorporated for restricting the power of taking cognizance of offences falling under such acts. But such provisions are protected by non obstante clauses. Anyway that is a different matter.”

27. During the course of arguments, it has come to our knowledge that the charge sheet has already been submitted before the learned Magistrate at Rohtak and an application for transfer has already been moved therein. Under the circumstances, it will be open to the Magistrate concerned to decide the application uninfluenced by any observation made in this order.

28. It was further submitted by petitioner that in the charge sheet filed by the police at Rohtak three complaints made by respondent Nos. 2 dated 7th September, 2012, 28th September, 2012 and 18th October, 2012 does not form part thereof. It goes without saying that court has ample power to call for the three complaints reference of which was made in complaint dated 16th November, 2012. In any case, this aspect of the matter is required to be considered by the concerned Magistrate.

29. With respect to the powers of High Court under Article 226 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in quashing of an FIR, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 relied upon Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., (2007) 13 SCC 165, where Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to number of judgments rendered earlier and observed:-

34. Reliance was also placed on State of MP v. Awadh Kishore Gupta & Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 691, where it was held that when an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the Informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings.

35. In view of the legal proposition enunciated above, so far as the first relief sought by the petitioner regarding quashing of FIR registered at Police Station Citi Rohtak, Rohtak, Haryana on the ground that no cause of action arose at Rohtak, charge sheet has already been submitted and the concerned Magistrate is seized of the matter before whom the application for transfer has already been moved. Under the circumstances, it will be open to the Magistrate to dispose of the application uninfluenced by any observations made in this matter.

36. As regards the plea taken in the petition that the allegations made in the complaint are false, that goes to the merits of the case and cannot be decided in this petition.

37. As regards, the relief seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus of transferring FIR from police station City Rohtak, Rohtak, Haryana, and investigation be conducted at Delhi, the same has become infructuous as the investigation is already complete and charge sheet has already been submitted at Rohtak.

38. The third relief seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus for admitting petitioners to anticipatory bail in the aforesaid FIR, the same has also become infructous as the petitioners have already been released on bail.

39. With these observations, the petition is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.

JUDGE MAY 06, 2014 rs