Pal Singh v. Kishore

1. This petition challenges an eviction order dated 9.11.2012, whereby the petitioner/tenant‟s application under Section 25B(5) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short „the Act‟) has been rejected and an eviction order has been passed with respect to the tenanted premises, i.e., a shop on the ground floor of property No.662-A, Patparganj Road, Jheel Khurenja, Delhi-110051. The respondent/eviction-petitioner/landlord had sought the property for his bona fide need for starting a grocery shop from it by his only son -- Sandeep Chauhan, who was stated to be unemployed. The landlord stated that he had no alternate suitable accommodation to fulfil his bona fide need. It was his case that his father Shri Ganga Sahai had purchased property No.662A, Patparganj Road, Jheel Khurenja, Delhi-110051 and constructed numerous shops on the 2014:DHC:2436 ground floor and a residential accommodation on the first floor. The eviction-petitioner‟s father inherited only two (2) shops out of the eleven (11) shops in the said property and the remaining nine (9) shops were inherited by the eviction-petitioner‟s uncles and are now occupied by their respective legal heirs. It was the case of the eviction-petitioner/landlord that the tenant was inducted at a monthly rent of Rs.200/- and by way of an oral partition with his brother after the demise of his father, the tenanted shop came to the share of the eviction-petitioner. It is not in dispute that the tenant had paid the rent to the eviction-petitioner for some time but for the last five (5) years had stopped paying the rent.

2. The tenant sought leave to contest the eviction petition on the ground that the eviction-petitioner had failed to show any ownership of the tenanted premises by way of a Succession Certificate or any Partition Deed to evidence his inheritance. He also doubted the very existence of any son of the evictionpetitioner and alleged that the latter had ten (10) additional accommodations, from one of which the latter was running a business under the name & style of “M/s. Royal Band”. Hence, he had no bona fide need.

3. The aforesaid objections were refuted by the eviction-petitioner.

4. The Trial Court found that the tenant had neither expressly nor impliedly denied that the eviction-petitioner‟s grandfather was the owner of the entire property No.662A, Patparganj Road, Jheel Khurenja, New Delhi-110051, nor that the two shops in it came to the share of the eviction-petitioner‟s father. Therefore, prima facie the eviction-petitioner had succeeded in establishing that the tenanted shop was inherited by the father of the eviction-petitioner and subsequently by the latter through an oral partition.

5. The factum of rent having been paid to the eviction-petitioner‟s father and subsequently to him had neither been expressly nor impliedly denied by the tenant. In DR No.274/12, the tenant had admitted that the eviction-petitioner‟s father was his original landlord since 1986. He had also admitted that the evictionpetitioner and his brother Anand were the only surviving LRs of the deceased father. A copy of the money order receipt dated 28.5.2012 filed by the tenant, sent to the eviction-petitioner, as rent of the tenanted premises was also taken into account by the Trial Court to conclude that the respondent/tenant had accepted the eviction-petitioner as the landlord after the demise of the latter‟s father. The Trial Court concluded that, even otherwise, the eviction-petitioner would have to be assumed as one of the landlords of the respondent/tenant being a co-owner of the tenanted premises in view of the tenant‟s own admission that after the demise of the landlord his two sons, i.e. Anand and the eviction-petitioner were the surviving legal heirs. Accordingly the eviction-petitioner was held to be the owner and the respondent in the eviction petition as his tenant and further that once this relationship had been established, it was held that the tenant was estopped under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, from challenging the ownership of the petitioner qua the tenanted premises. Hence, the question and need of a Succession Certificate after the demise of the original landlord was held to be irrelevant and untenable. Indeed, for the sake of argument the Trial Court assumed that if the non-filing of the partition deed or any other ownership document by the petitioner was fatal to the eviction-petitioner‟s claim of owning the tenanted shop, even then, the said omission would not bestow any benefit to the tenant because he had already admitted that the Legal Representative (LRs) of the original landlord were the co-owners-cum-joint landlord of the tenanted shop. Hence the tenant had sufficiently acknowledged the eviction-petitioner as competent to file and maintain the eviction petition.

6. The Trial Court further concluded that the non-impleadment of the other owner, i.e., the brother of the eviction-petitioner, in the absence of any partition deed or any other document, would not be fatal. The tenant‟s objection regarding the eviction-petitioner running a business under the name & style of “M/s. Royal Band” was unsupported by any documents and hence the argument was rejected as vague. Similarly, the argument regarding ownership of ten (10) other shops in respect of property No.662A and of one other property was rejected as being equally vague because apart from the bald statement, the tenant had not specified as to which other properties were owned by the eviction-petitioner.

7. On the contrary the eviction-petitioner had placed on record various electricity bills and rent agreements pertaining to other shops which evidenced that he had nothing to do with them. This was found as sufficient evidence to repel the contention that the petitioner owned any of the ten (10) shops. For the sake of establishing that Sandeep was his son, the petitioner placed on record the Secondary School Certificate dated 9.4.2012, issued by the National Institute of Open Schooling which showed that he was born on 20.11.1991. The tenant had placed nothing to the contrary. The Trial Court found that in the absence of the eviction-petitioner having any other alternate suitable accommodation, his bona fide need was established. A father had a moral obligation to look after the personal and professional needs of his son and hence the eviction order was passed. In the absence of any triable issue which would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an eviction order, the Court was bound to order the eviction of the tenant.

8. This court in the case of Ramesh Chand v. Uganti Devi, 157 (2009) DLT 450, has held that while exercising jurisdiction under the aforesaid provision, the Court does not act as a Court of Appeal. The Court has to see whether the learned ARC has committed any jurisdictional error and has passed the order on the basis of material available before it. Moreover, a Full Bench of this Court in Mohan Lal v. Ram Chopra and Anr., AIR 1982 Delhi 405, exhaustively dealt with Section 25-B of the Act. On the scope of the proviso to Sub-section (8) of this Section, after examining the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hari Shanker and Ors. v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698 and Bell and Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bom 223, it was laid down as follows: “In our opinion the jurisdiction of the High Court under proviso to Section 25B (8) has to be interpreted, keeping in view the legislative intent. The revision under Section 25B (8) cannot be regarded as a first appeal and nor can it be as restricted as the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. The High Court would have jurisdiction to interfere if it is of the opinion that there has been a gross illegality or material irregularity which has been committed or the Controller has acted in excess of his jurisdiction or has not exercised the jurisdiction vested in him. A finding of fact arrived at by the Controller would not be interfered with by the High Court unless it can be shown that finding has been arrived at by misreading or omitting relevant evidence and this has resulted in gross injustice being caused. If none of the aforesaid circumstances exist the High Court would not be entitled to interfere with the order of the Controller in exercise of its jurisdiction under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act.”

9. Furthermore, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in another case tilted as Chaman Prakash Puri v. Ishwar Dass Rajput and Anr., 1995 Supp (4) SCC 445 has held with regard to High Court‟s power to interfere in revision against the finding as to bonafide requirement of landlord. It has been held that if the Rent Controller finds that landlord was in bonafide need of premises, the High Court in revision was not entitled to re-appreciate evidence and reverse the finding. The same court in Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani & Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 141 at para 12 has held as follows: “It is no doubt that the scope of a revision petition under Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act is a very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court could examine the facts available in order to find out whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the matters or record to decide the case. Pure findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but (sic if) in a given case, the finding of fact is given on a wrong premise of law, certainly it would be open to the revisional court to interfere with such a matter.”

10. In this revision petition the arguments raised in the leave to defend are reiterated on behalf of the petitioner/tenant. However none of them are triable issues as has already been demonstrated in the reasoning of the Trial Court. The landlord-tenant relationship has been accepted by the petitioner, he has failed to show that the respondent landlord has any suitable alternate accommodation to satisfy his bona fide need and his bald contentions in this regard, unsupported by any material or specifics, were rightly rejected. He failed to show any reason which would prevent the issuance of the eviction order. On the other hand, the landlord had shown that the need for the tenanted premises was for helping his unemployed and only son to start earning his livelihood through a grocery shop. It is the moral duty of a landlord-father to establish his dependents. He had also shown that he had no other property to fulfil his need. In the circumstances, it was inevitable that the eviction order should follow. This Court finds that insofar as each of the arguments have been duly dealt with in the impugned order, the reasoning for and the conclusions arrived at are based on record and it does not call for any interference. The petition is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed. MAY 07, 2014 NAJMI WAZIRI, J. b’nesh