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RC.REV. 160/2012
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 12.05.2014
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 12.05.2014
RC.REV. 160/2012, CM No.6759/2012
PHOOL CHAND GUPTA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. O.P. Verma, Adv.
PHOOL CHAND GUPTA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. O.P. Verma, Adv.
VERSUS
RAM KISHAN GROVER ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. S.D. Dixit, Adv.
Through: Mr. S.D. Dixit, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI (Open Court)
This petition is against the
This petition is against the
JUDGMENT
dated 9.12.2010 whereby the eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25 B of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act) was allowed and the petitioner herein has been directed to be evicted from the tenanted premises i.e.
Shop No.J-III, 208, J.J. Colony, Wazirpur, Delhi-52. The leave to defend was not granted since the Trial Court did not find any triable issue. The objections raised against the eviction proceedings were: i) that there was no bonafide requirement ii) the person for whose benefit the eviction petition has been filed had yet to attain majority iii) that the tenant-
2014:DHC:2524 landlord relationship was in dispute iv) the landlord had other three properties available with him, each of which would disentitle him from an eviction order under Section 14 (1)(e) i.e. in summary proceedings under
Section 25 B of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that accordingly, leave to defend ought to have been granted and matter ought to have been tried.
It is not in dispute that the landlord had filed a petition for the intended beneficiary i.e. his son who was 17 years, 9 months and 20 days old at the time of filing of the petition. The father was preparing for the property to be made available to the son when the latter would attain majority in a couple months’ time. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that every prudent father would want to settle his son as far as and as soon as possible. He submits that in the present case i) landlord’s son was to attain majority in the very imminent future and, ii) that property No.208 was the suit property whereas property Nos. 209 and
210 were owned by the brother and wife of the landlord. Therefore, neither of the latter two properties could be considered as being available to the landlord, nor could be they considered as triable issues.
Consequently, neither of the said properties could be considered as an alternate accommodation available to the landlord.
However, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a distinction has to be drawn between desire and need. He submits that it was only the landlord’s desire to settle his son immediately upon attainment of latter’s majority and that event was to occur much later. This Court is not persuaded by the said argument. As recorded earlier, the attainment of majority was to occur in the very near future merely two months and 28 days later. Therefore, the need for accommodation for the son was imminent and a prudent father would logically seek vacation of the tenanted premises. Furthermore, the two properties belonging to the landlord’s brother and wife could not be taken into consideration as being available to him as alternate accommodation.
It is also settled law that the tenant is the best judge about the suitability of the tenanted property for his bonafide need (Sarla Ahuja vs. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. (1998) 8 CSS 119). No tenant or Court can substitute its opinion with respect to the suitability of the property for the bonafide need which the landlord may make out (Shamshed Ahmad &
Ors. vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (deceased) 152 (2008) DLT 301 SC). In so far as the landlord deemed property no.208 to be suitable for his purposes, the issue became final. The Court would accordingly not substitute its opinion instead. The Trial Court’s reasons for and conclusion arrived at are just.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The petition is dismissed as being without merit.
NAJMI WAZIRI, J MAY 12, 2014
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act) was allowed and the petitioner herein has been directed to be evicted from the tenanted premises i.e.
Shop No.J-III, 208, J.J. Colony, Wazirpur, Delhi-52. The leave to defend was not granted since the Trial Court did not find any triable issue. The objections raised against the eviction proceedings were: i) that there was no bonafide requirement ii) the person for whose benefit the eviction petition has been filed had yet to attain majority iii) that the tenant-
2014:DHC:2524 landlord relationship was in dispute iv) the landlord had other three properties available with him, each of which would disentitle him from an eviction order under Section 14 (1)(e) i.e. in summary proceedings under
Section 25 B of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that accordingly, leave to defend ought to have been granted and matter ought to have been tried.
It is not in dispute that the landlord had filed a petition for the intended beneficiary i.e. his son who was 17 years, 9 months and 20 days old at the time of filing of the petition. The father was preparing for the property to be made available to the son when the latter would attain majority in a couple months’ time. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that every prudent father would want to settle his son as far as and as soon as possible. He submits that in the present case i) landlord’s son was to attain majority in the very imminent future and, ii) that property No.208 was the suit property whereas property Nos. 209 and
210 were owned by the brother and wife of the landlord. Therefore, neither of the latter two properties could be considered as being available to the landlord, nor could be they considered as triable issues.
Consequently, neither of the said properties could be considered as an alternate accommodation available to the landlord.
However, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a distinction has to be drawn between desire and need. He submits that it was only the landlord’s desire to settle his son immediately upon attainment of latter’s majority and that event was to occur much later. This Court is not persuaded by the said argument. As recorded earlier, the attainment of majority was to occur in the very near future merely two months and 28 days later. Therefore, the need for accommodation for the son was imminent and a prudent father would logically seek vacation of the tenanted premises. Furthermore, the two properties belonging to the landlord’s brother and wife could not be taken into consideration as being available to him as alternate accommodation.
It is also settled law that the tenant is the best judge about the suitability of the tenanted property for his bonafide need (Sarla Ahuja vs. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. (1998) 8 CSS 119). No tenant or Court can substitute its opinion with respect to the suitability of the property for the bonafide need which the landlord may make out (Shamshed Ahmad &
Ors. vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (deceased) 152 (2008) DLT 301 SC). In so far as the landlord deemed property no.208 to be suitable for his purposes, the issue became final. The Court would accordingly not substitute its opinion instead. The Trial Court’s reasons for and conclusion arrived at are just.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The petition is dismissed as being without merit.
NAJMI WAZIRI, J MAY 12, 2014