Khem Chand v. Union of India & Anr

1. Appellant‟s land ad measuring 8 bighas and 16 biswas forming part of khasra no. 92/22, situated in the Village Kakrola, New Delhi was acquired by the Government vide Notification No. F10(6)/88 L&B dated 6th June, 1991 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short hereinafter referred to as „the Act‟). Vide Award No. 1/93-94 dated 2nd April, 1993 Land Acquisition Collector assessed the market price of acquired land as `96,875/- per bigha in respect of Block „A‟, `38,000/- per 2014:DHC:3352 bigha in respect of Block „B‟ and `32,000/- per bigha in respect of Block „C‟.

2. Dissatisfied by the quantum of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector appellant filed a Reference Petition under Section 18 of the Act which was referred to the Reference Court. On the basis of evidence adduced by the parties and placing reliance on the judgments of this Court learned Reference Court, vide judgment dated 24th January, 2007, has assessed the market value of appellant‟s land as `1,09,500/- per bigha.

3. Dissatisfied by the rate fixed by the Reference Court, present appeal has been filed by the appellant on 6th March, 2013. There is a delay of 2465 days, that is, more than six years in filing the present appeal.

4. By this application, appellant has prayed for condonation of delay of 2465 days in filing the appeal on the ground that he learnt from his covillagers in the Panchayat that Supreme Court had dismissed the Special Leave Petition of some of the villagers against the judgment of Delhi High Court. Thereafter, he enquired from the villagers regarding procedure to be followed for getting enhancement and he was advised to approach High Court. Accordingly, he contacted his counsel and filed this appeal.

5. The grounds taken by the appellant are vague and general in nature and not sufficient to justify the delay of 2465 days. Every litigant is supposed to approach the Court within the prescribed period of limitation. In any case he has to approach the Court without any undue delay and in case he approaches the Court belatedly he has to explain the delay by sufficient reasons. Indubitably, Court has not to adopt a hyper technical approach while scrutinising the reasons furnished for the delay but at the same time some cogent and justifiable reasons have to be offered. The delay cannot be condoned merely on the asking of a party. It is also well settled that ignorance of law cannot be taken as an excuse, inasmuch as, in this case, appellant cannot be permitted to claim ignorance about the legal procedure to be followed in such like matters, since he had already pursued the legal remedy available to him under Section 18 of the Act against the Award with the assistance of a lawyer.

6. Merely because some relief had been granted by the court to some other villagers, by itself, cannot be a good ground to explain the delay. In Basawaraj vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer 2013 (6) Supreme 144, Apex Court has held as under:- “14. In P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC 1856, this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701.

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

7. In Mewa Ram (Deceased) by His LRs & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana Through the Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon (1986) 4 SCC 151, petitioner had approached the Supreme Court after about three years, in view of the fact that in two other cases compensation was enhanced. Apex Court held thus: “merely because this Court in the two cases of Paltu Singh and Nand Kishore enhanced the rate of compensation to `17.50 per square yard, could not furnish a ground for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act”. In State of Karnataka and Ors. vs. S.M. Kotrayya and Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 267, Apex Court rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and latches on the ground that petitioner filed the petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case. It was held that the said ground cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and latches. It was further observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay and latches.

8. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that no sufficient and cogent reasons have been furnished by the appellant to explain the delay of more than six years. Accordingly, application is dismissed.

9. Since application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, appeal is also dismissed as time barred. A.K. PATHAK, J. JULY 18, 2014 ga