Full Text
15th July , 2014 SMT. NAFEESA & ORS. ......Appellants
Through: Mr. Ajay Bahl, Advocate.
Through:
To be referred to the Reporter or not? VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
CM No.11152/2014 (for preponement of date of hearing)
Application for preponement is allowed.
CM stands disposed of.
RC.Rev. 453/2013
JUDGMENT
1. This petition under Section 25(B)(8) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 has been filed against the impugned judgment of the Additional Rent Controller dated 6.8.2013 by which the eviction petition for bonafide necessity has been decreed by dismissing the application for leave to defend. 2014:DHC:3275
2. The only ground urged before this Court on behalf of the petitioner/tenant is that the need for which the bonafide necessity petition was filed was for the business of the son of the respondent/landlord, but since the son is already involved in various criminal cases, there would be no immediate need of the suit premises. It is prayed that therefore the leave to defend ought to be granted.
3. When the counsel for the petitioner was put a query whether this ground was taken in that application for leave to defend, the counsel had no option but to concede that no such ground was urged in the leave to defend application filed. Supreme Court in the case of Prithipal Singh Vs. Satpal Singh (dead) through LRs (2010) 2 SCC 15 has held that the period of 15 days for filing of leave to defend application under Delhi Rent Control Act is sacrosanct and that there cannot be filing of leave to defend application after the statutory 15 days period alongwith the application for condonation of delay. What has been thus effectively held in Prithipal Singh’s case (supra) is that if the leave to defend application is permitted after 15 days the same would destroy the sanctity period of 15 days as provided under Section 25B which is an exhaustive procedure with respect to leave to defend application. If the application for leave to defend cannot be filed after 15 days, fresh grounds not found in the leave to defend application cannot be taken with consideration, otherwise, the same would be effectively allowing consideration of grounds which have been pleaded after 15 days though it could have been pleaded within 15 days only.
4. In view of the above, there is no merit in the petition and the same is therefore dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. JULY 15, 2014 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J. ib