Nanak Chand v. Delhi Development Authority

1. The appellant, Nanak Chand, has impugned the judgement and order of the learned Single Judge passed on 17.12.2013, which, by a writ of mandamus directed the DDA to “allot a flat of equivalent size preferably in the same area, i.e. Dwarka, New Delhi, at the price prevalent on the date of the order within a period of twelve (12) weeks”. 2014:DHC:4024-DB

2. The appellant contends that the difference between the price prevalent on the date of filing the writ petition (20.12.2012) and the date of its disposal (17.12.2013) is substantial. He submits that the price has increased by Rs.7-8 lakhs, hence, he would be irretrievably prejudiced if he is asked to pay the higher price prevalent on the date of the impugned order. He contends that the learned Single Judge, in an earlier case, had directed a flat to be allotted to the petitioner at the price prevalent on the date of filing of the writ petition. He relied upon a judgement of this Court in LPA No.743/2013 titled Delhi Development Authority Vs. Mahinder Pal Sikri (Deceased) Through LRs decided on 28.11.2013 and on another judgement in LPA No.628/2013 titled Dev Raj Vs. Delhi Development Authority decided on 19.2.2014. Both the judgements held, in similar circumstances, that the flat should be allotted at the price obtaining on the date the writ petition had been filed.

3. The petitioner submits that in Mahinder Pal Sikri (supra) the Court held that the petitioner cannot be faulted because of delay in disposal of the writ petition on the basis of the established principle that, in terms of the price to be paid, the clock stops at the time of approaching the Court for the appropriate remedy, because thereafter the matter rests with the Court and not in the hands of the aggrieved petitioner. Dev Raj (supra), dealt with the issue of the allotment letter not being sent to occupational/permanent address of the applicant/petitioner after its being received back from his residential address. The Court directed that the effective date for determining the price of the flat would be the date of filing the writ petition. Being equally placed, the appellant seeks to be treated equally, in terms of the aforesaid judgements.

4. In the present appeals the learned Single Judge held, that admittedly the allotment letter was not sent to the petitioner at his occupational/official address hence it had not discharged its obligation of intimation to the appellant/allottee, in its entirety. He reasoned:

5. In Mahinder Pal Sikri (supra) this Court relied upon the principle of Hirdayapal Singh v. DDA, 2007 (94) DRJ 741, which held that: “the respondent, who had waited for the flat for so long, ought not to be deprived thereof for her default in intimating the change of address. The exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge is not interfereable in appeal unless found to be perverse. No perversity is found in the present case. On the contrary with the respondent expressing willingness to pay the cost of the flat of the year 2011, the interest of the appellant DDA stands sufficiently protected.” The Court went on to hold that:

6. In Dev Raj (supra) this Court held that it was obligatory on the DDA to attempt to serve the appellant about allotment of the flat at his permanent address as given in the application form especially when the letter to the current address came back unserved. To arrive at this conclusion the Court relied upon the judgement of the Division Bench of this Court in LPA 137/2013 titled DDA vs. Banwari Lal Arya decided on 3.3.2013, wherein it was held as under:

7. We notice that the learned Single Judge had fixed the date of passing of the impugned order as the cut-off date on which the price prevalent would be applicable. This was premised on the counsel for the petitioner offering his no objection in accepting the allotment on that basis. We also note that the query was put by the Court, but the question remains: would it be fair to put a query to the petitioner‟s counsel which could compromise the petitioner‟s legal rights? This court is of the view that where the allotment was delayed on account of fault of DDA as has been held in Mahinder Pal Sikri (supra), Dev Raj (supra) and Ms. Prem Bhatnagar (supra) the applicant/petitioner cannot be burdened with the cost prevailing on the day when the writ petition was disposed off. Instead the price payable ought to be one as on the day the doors of the court were knocked at.