Upras Vidyalaya and Anr v. The Director of Education and Anr

Delhi High Court · 24 Dec 2014 · 2014:DHC:7469
G. S. Sistani
W.P.(C)No.6288/2012
2014:DHC:7469
administrative appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court quashed the administrative takeover of a private school management for arbitrariness and lack of natural justice, holding that management disputes must be resolved by civil courts and not by the Directorate of Education.

Full Text
Translation output
W.P.(C)NOS.6288/2012, 4308/2012 & 3643/2013
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 6288/2012 & CM.Nos.16809, 19865, 19469/2012, 3152, 3706, 3572/2013 & Crl.M.A.No.8090/2013
JUDGMENT
dated 24th December, 2014 UPRAS VIDYALAYA AND ANR ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Mukesh Kher, Mr.Priyank Kher and Mr.Niraj K. Mishra, Advocates
versus
THE DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION AND ANR..... Respondent
Through: Ms.Ruchi Sindhwani and Ms.Bandana Shukla, Advs. for respondents.
W.P.(C) 4308/2012
UPRAS VIDYALAYA AND ANR ..... Petitioners
versus
W.P.(C) 3643/2013
UPRAS VIDYALAYA AND ANR ..... Petitioners
versus
2014:DHC:7469
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI G.S.SISTANI, J.

1. By a common judgment three writ petitions, all pertaining to the petitioner school, are being decided.

2. W.P.(C)4308/2012 has been filed by the petitioners with a prayer to set aside the order dated 12.7.2012 passed by respondent no.1 and letter dated 13.7.2012 issued by respondent no.2. By the letter dated 12.7.2012, the Director of Education has directed that the bank accounts of the school shall not be operated by anyone without prior permission of the Deputy Director, South-West-A, and the letter dated 13.7.2012 is a letter addressed by the bank to the Principal of the School that the Bank would not permit operation of the bank account by anyone without prior permission of the Deputy Director.

3. W.P.(C)3643/2013 has been filed by petitioners to quash the letter number 6931 dated 18.2.2013 by which the Additional Director of Education has informed the petitioners of a special inspection under Section 180(3) of Delhi School Education Act, 1973.

4. W.P.(C)6288/2012 has been filed by the petitioners seeking to quash the order dated 26.9.2012 passed under Section 20(3) of Delhi School Education Act for take-over of the management of the petitioner school.

5. The basic facts in all the three writ petitions are substantially similar and for the sake of convenience, since the challenge in this writ petition is to the order of taking over of management of the school, the facts as stated in WP(C)No.6288/2012, are being noticed. It may also be noticed that the final order in the WP(C)No.6288/2012 will have a direct bearing on WP(C)No.4308/2012 and WP(C)No.3643/2013.

6. The necessary facts to be noticed for disposal of this writ petition and as stated in the petition are that petitioner no.1 is a Senior Secondary Private/ Unaided School affiliated to the CBSE up to standard XII. The school was established in the year 1985 and is governed by the Delhi School Education Act and Rules 1973.

7. According to the petition, the Uttar Pradesh Samaj is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 bearing registration No.S-752. The elections of the Kendriya Karya Samiti of Uttar Pradesh Samaj were held on 25.9.2011 under the supervision of Sh.Kaushal Kishore, SDM Chankya Puri, New Delhi which is for the term period 2011-2016. Kendriya Karya Samiti is the supreme body which has been created through the process of election under the bye laws of the Samaj/ Society. Prior to the election dated 25.9.2011 the last election of the Executive Committee was held on 16.7.2006 (for the period of 2006-2011) whereupon Sh.R.K. Singh was appointed as Executive President of the Uttar Pradesh Samaj and Mr.Janardan Rai held the post of Manager of Upras Vidalaya, Vasant Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi-110 057. On the expiry of the tenure and in accordance with the constitution of the society, fresh elections of the „Kendriya Karya Samiti‟ / the KKS for the period 2011-2016 was held on 25.9.2011 under the supervision and control of Sh.Kaushal Kishore SDM Chankya Puri and after the election the Kendriya Karya Samiti convened a meeting on 13.10.2011 at Upras Vidalaya, Vasant Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi and formed the new Management Board for the said school.

8. A copy of the list of office bearers of the Kendriya Karya Samiti duly appointed in the elections for the period 2011-16 has been extracted in the writ petition. Certificate issued by the SDM, Chankyapuri of the result of elections has also been filed along with the writ petition. It is also stated in the writ petition that the Kendriya Karya Samiti formed the new management board in its meeting held on 13.10.2011. List of the office bearers has also been extracted in the writ petition. As per the writ petition on 4.7.2012, the Kendriya Karya Samiti was re-constituted and the list of members has been filed along with the writ petition.

9. It is also stated that on 27.9.2011, Sh.Janardan Rai, the ex-Manager, who was removed from the management of the school for his immoral and unconstitutional activities/ mis-appropriation of funds and against whom allegations of were also alleged, filed a petition in the Delhi High Court being writ petition (Civil)No.7187/2011. It is also the case of the petitioner that in the writ petition it was concealed that the fresh elections had been held on 25.9.2011; and pursuant to the elections, a fresh board of management had been formed on 13.10.2011, wherein Sh.Janardan Rai was replaced by Dr.R.K. Rai, as the Manager. In the aforesaid writ petition on 13.10.2011, the following order was passed: “This Court does not wish to express any opinion on the merits of the rival contentions of the parties. The question of maintainability of the writ petition is also not being decided at this stage. It is however necessary to ascertain the factual position, with the assistance of the DOE, which has a statutory role to perform in terms of Section 24 DSEA. Accordingly, this Court considers it appropriate, at the present stage, to direct the DOE in the first instance to depute at least two senior level officers to visit the School in question and inspect its records to ascertain whether the books and accounts of the School are being maintained in accordance with the provisions of the DSEA and the Delhi School Education Rules’, 1973 (DSER). They will prepare a report, inter alia, on whether the decisions of the EC of the Society and MC of the School are being properly minuted in terms of the DSEA and DSER………….”

10. Pursuant to the order dated 13.10.2011 passed by the Delhi High Court nominees of respondent no.1 visited school on 18.10.2011 and 19.10.2011 and subsequent to the same a committee was formed by the Director of Education nominees wherein serious financial irregularities were discovered of the ex-manager, Sh.Janardan Rai, and the earlier management whose term was till 13.10.2011. It is highlighted that the financial irregularities pertained to the period when the former Managing Committee in which Sh.Janardan Rai was the Manager and the Sh.Baleshwar Rai was the Chairman and no financial irregularity related to the period of the present management.

11. It is the case of the petitioner that the present management has brought immense development and progress in the school which was brought to the notice of the respondent. It is also pointed out that the new board of management took over the charge of the school on 13.10.2011 examined the records and found that the ex-management under the President-ship of Sh.R.K. Singh, the ex- Executive President of Uttar Pradesh Samaj and Sh.Janardan Rai, the Ex-Manager of Upras Vidalaya, Vasant Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi-110 057 in conspiracy with each other and other persons misused their position and dishonestly and fraudulently committed various acts of omissions and commission and misappropriated huge funds of the society and the school; relevant documents were also stolen by them, so that their misdeeds could not be traced.

12. In the writ petition pending, the Director of Education filed a detailed report qua the functioning of the ex-management, which would show the irregularities and mis-appropriation of funds by the ex-management. Some of the observations of the Committee have been reproduced in the writ petition and the same read as under: “Accounts and records of the Upras Vidyalaya, Upras Nursery School for the year (2010-11) and 2011-12 (up to September

2011) have been test checked and following discrepancies observed:

1. All the payments are released by manager, Principal and Treasurer and no approval of the Chairman of MC was obtained for all kind of expenditure incurred during last two years.

2. Manual Cash Book is not maintained. Account is maintained in computerized tally system and not print out of the petty cash book are taken out and not duly authenticated by the authorized person.

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3. Office Assistant handled the cash which is kept in almirah and safe chest duly imbedded in wall.

4. The Account has not audited by the CA for the year 2010-11.

5. Salary to the staff is being paid upto 07th of the preceding month whereas it should be paid on last working day of the month.

6. Facility of re-imbursement of medical claim and LTC is not provided to the staff.

7. The development fees collected was Rs.16,26,00/whereas the depreciation was only Rs.5,64,620/- and the balance of the development fund as on 31.3.2010 was Rs.1,96,64,843/-. Thus in excess of the actual requirement.

8. The balance in bank as on 31.3.2010 was Rs.2,54,83,228/-, it should be kept in the form of FDR so that the interest could be earned. Thus it is a financial mis-management.

9. As per section 10 (1) of DSEA & R 1973 the pay and allowances of employees of unaided/recognised schools should be at part with their counterpart in the Govt Schools but appropriate grade pay has not been allowed in the following cases as per details below:- (a) Smt. Mutawali Tiwari, TGT was allowed grade pay of Rs.4200/- instead of Rs.4600/- admissible to the post of TGT. (b)Smt. Annu Bamrara, TGT was also given grade pay of Rs.4200/- instead of Rs.4600/- admissible to the post of TGT.

(c) Smt Pravati Rath, has been allowed grade pay of

Rs. 2800/- instead of Rs. 4200/- admissible to the post of primary teacher. (d)Smt. Amita Dass Gupta, PGT is being paid grade pay of Rs. 4800/- and she has been granted ACP wef January 2011 and is entitled to grade pay of Rs.5400/-. She was allowed ACP wef January 2011 instead of due date July 2007. (e) Smt. Yashoda Sharma is being paid grade pay of Rs.4800/- as she has been granted ACP in the scale of PGT wef Jan 011, she should have been allowed grade pay of Rs.5400/- and date of grant of ACP should have been Jul 2004. (f) Sh. Ranunuj Rai, Peio is a 12th pass and should be allowed grade pay of Rs.1800/- wef 01st January 2006 whereas he is drawing grade pay of Rs 1300/-. (g)Sh. Raj Kumar, Sweeper being a non-matriculate should be sent for training and after the training be allowed grade pay of Rs.1800/-.

10. Sh.Hari Lal Ex-Security Supervisor was paid Rs.1,85,049/- vide cheque no.107515 dated 07.06.2011 but not voucher and orders of any competent authority was provided by the school. It is also not known that on what account this amount was paid by the manager and Treasurer without anybody‟s approval.”

13. Taking into consideration the acts of omissions and commissions, the General Secretary of the Samaj/ Society in discharge of its official duties filed a Criminal Complaint with the Police Station Vasant Vihar against Sh.Janardan Rai, ex-Manager and the present Members-in-charge, liable for causing wrongful loss to the petitioner no.1 and the society on 28.10.2011. Since no action was taken, a criminal complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket, Delhi for registration of the FIR. By an order dated 3.2.2012 the learned Metropolitan Magistrate directed registration of the FIR (FIR No.47/2012). Sh.Vinod Rai, relative and associate of the ex- Manager, Sh.Janardan Rai, as a counter-blast to the FIR No.47/2012, filed a complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and pursuant to the orders of the learned ACMM, FIR No.85/2012 was also registered.

14. On 29.2.2012 the respondent no.1 issued a show cause notice for taking over the school. It is the case of the petitioner that the show cause notice contained irregularities committed by the earlier management and no irregularity was pointed out during the period, the present management was formed i.e. on 13.10.2011. In response to the show cause notice, the petitioners pointed out that all defects of the earlier management were duly removed and rectified; and in the reply of 12.3.2012 the following points were highlighted: “The present management committee is maintaining manual cashbook and other records manually where the concerned employee is authenticated. Office Assistant is now handling the cash in Hard cash Box fixed in the wall of a room which is at very safe place under heavy locks and key and security supervision. The accounts have now been audited by C.A. for the year 2010-11 which was not even touched by the ex-manager Sh.Janardan Rai and his family MC /EC team. The present management since it taken over i.e. from 13th Oct., 2011 is paying the salary of staff on the last day of the due month itself. Not only this, all the dues of the staff which were not paid by the Ex.-Manager, Janardan Rai and former MC of school has now been paid. Facilities of re-imbursement of medical claim and LTC are now provided by the present management to the staff. The development fund have been used for the developmental activities of the school. That due to the financial mismanagement done by the Ex- Manager Sh.Janardan Rai, an FIR has been lodged by the present EC of the Samaj and MC of the school vide FIR No.47/12 of P.S. Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. The amount of Rs.2,55,11,228/- was accumulated by the former MC particularly Sh.Janardan Rai, Ex-Manager by not paying the dues of the staff, illegal deduction salary of staff, noinfrastructural development, non-payment of security deposit of the students, etc. which have now been made transparent and regularized and maintained and expenditure made in their respective heads in the all-round development of the school and there is no payment of any kind of dues of the staff or otherwise. As per section 10(1) of DSEA&R 1973, the pay and allowances of employees which was not paid by the exmanager Sh.Janardan Rai has now been paid to all namely: Smt.Muktawali Tiwari, TGT grade pay of Rs.4600/- was regularized instead of Rs.4200/- Smt.Annu Bamrara was also paid as TGT Grade of Rs.4600/- Smt.Pravati Rath has been paid PRT grade of Rs.4200/-. Smt.Amita Dasgupta, PGT ACP was allowed and paid from July, 2007. Smt.Yashoda Sharma, ACP granted with due date. Sh.Ramanuj Rai grade has been regularized. The case of Sh.Raj Kumar, Sweeper has been proceeded and needful has been done. Sh.Hari Lal, Ex-Security supervisor was paid Rs.1,85,049/vide cheque No.107515 dated 7.6.2011 by Sh.Janardan Rai, Ex-Manager to hushup the case of attempt to rape which he has committed with the wife of Sh.Hari Lal Yadav which is under investigation and an FIR is pending registration against Sh.Janardan Rai and his associates including his real son and son-in-law. All the seven teachers whose names have been mentioned have got their dues of 60% the arrears of 6th Pay Commission.”

15. It was also brought to the notice of the respondents vide letter dated 12.3.2012 that the staff also expressed their satisfaction with the present management with regard to salaries, renovation of staff room, new furniture, water dispenser, oil heaters, new lockers for teachers etc. Another reply was sent on 24.3.2012 and the petitioner was under the impression that the respondents were satisfied with the replies and after a period of six months the impugned order was passed.

16. It is the case of the petitioner that the allegations made in the impugned order of take over were not part of the show cause notice. It has also been mentioned in the writ petition that on 28.5.2012 Mr.Vinod Rai, relative of Sh.Janardan Rai, Ex-Manager of the school filed a suit in the Delhi High Court being CS(OS)No.1679/2012 for declaration, mandatory and permanent injunction and rendition of accounts, declaring that the elections held vide order dated 25.9.2011 are fictitious and bogus. Together with the suit, two applications for interim relief were filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and under Order 40 Rule 1 for appointment of a receiver being I.A.Nos.10773-04/2012, with the prayer to restrain the defendants to operate the account, however, no interim orders have been passed till date.

17. It is also submitted that on 11.7.2012 the Deputy Director of Education (SW-A) on instructions of respondent no.1 vide letter dated 11.7.2012 informed the petitioner no.1 about an inspection to be conducted on 12.7.2012 at 11:00 a.m. citing baseless reasons including harassment of employees and financial irregularities. However, without conducting any inspection, the respondent no.1 passed an order on 12.7.2012 by which it was ordered that the bank account of the petitioner no.1 would not be operated by anyone without prior permission of the Deputy Director of Education (SW-A), on the ground of pendency of an FIR No.85/2012 under Sections 406/420/120-B IPC and pendency of Writ Petition bearing No.7187/2011 in respect of some disputes between the management and the school. The order also mentions that different parties were staking claim to the management of the school, hence, relying on section 24(3) of Act, 1973, read with Rules 43, 181, 182, 185 of the Rules, 1983, respondent no.1 passed the impugned order.

18. It may be noticed that the challenge to the aforesaid order was made by filing writ petition No.4308/2012 which is also being decided along with the present writ petition. It may also be noticed that while issuing notice in WP(C) 4308/2012, certain interim orders were passed on 20.7.2012.

19. On 16.8.2012 in W.P.(C)7187/2011, filed by Ex. Manager, Sh.Janardan Rai, a learned Single Judge of this Court passed an order of taking over the petitioner no.1 school and observed that there are two management committees which are competing with each other and there are claims and counter claims, allegations and counter allegations made by the said two management committees against each other. The learned Single Judge also took note of certain purported illegalities and irregularities committed by the Managing Committee, and order dated 16.8.2012 was passed directing the respondent no.1 to take over the management of the school till the claims and counter claims of the two management committees are settled in a civil court/ tribunal, where evidence can be led to prove who is right and who is wrong.

20. On 28.8.2012 aggrieved by the order dated: 16.8.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Hon‟ble Court, the petitioners herein, filed an LPA bearing No.597 of 2012 inter-alia seeking quashing of the order dated: 16.8.2012 being without jurisdiction and arbitrary. Vide order dated 4.9.2012 the Division Bench-I of this Hon‟ble Court disposed of the said LPA with observation that “ having regard to these facts, the Director of Education has itself recommended and the Hon’ble Lt. Governor as an administrator has to take the decision in the matter, it is not necessary to deal with this appeal. Needless to mention that if the Lt. Governor passes an order taking over the management of the school, it would be open to the appellant to challenge the order in accordance with law. We only expect that the Lt. Governor shall take, whatever decision is to be taken immediately.”

21. It is also the case of the petitioner that despite the statement made before the Division Bench, the respondents have passed the impugned order by placing reliance on the order dated 16.8.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge and without taking into account the order of the Division Bench. It is also pointed out that after the order dated 4.9.2012 passed by the Division Bench, the respondent no.1 ordered inspection for 15.10.2012 vide letter dated 18.9.2012. However, no inspection was carried out but the impugned order was passed.

22. It is contended by Mr.Kher, counsel for the petitioners that the impugned order passed for taking over the management of the petitioner, school for three years is unwarranted and uncalled for, it is against all cannons of justice and principles of natural justice have not been complied with. The order is arbitrary, bad in law and filed at the behest of the ex-Management and more particularly a person who has been closely associated with the Directorate of Education in a very senior position; and it is not in the interest of justice, nor in the interest of the school. It is contended that the present management cannot be punished for the irregularities committed by the earlier management during its tenure which ended on 13.10.2011 and in the inspection carried out on 18.10.2011 and 19.10.2011 there is not even a whisper about the present management which was formed on 13.10.2011.

23. It is submitted that the respondents were fully satisfied with the detailed replies dated 12.3.2012 and 24.3.2012, which is evident from the fact that no action was taken for seven months and after seven months without any cogent reasons passed the impugned order. It is strongly urged before this court that the grounds raised in the impugned order were not part of the show cause notice and the order of take-over cannot be passed without giving an opportunity to show cause and hearing.

24. It is also argued that the impugned order shows non-application of mind, as the respondents have failed to consider that all the defects and deficiencies of the earlier management as stated in the show cause notice dated 29.2.2012 were removed and rectified by the new management and the respondents were informed of the same. The respondents failed to take into consideration that the entire staff members (teaching and non/teaching) expressed their satisfaction with the present management, who are running the school peacefully and as per the Act and Rules, salaries are being paid to the staff as per the 6th Pay Commission regularly and renovations etc., has been carried out.

25. It is further pointed out that the order passed by the respondent No.1 smacks of arbitrariness which is also evident from the fact that in the order reference is made to FIR No.85/2012, which was registered as a counter blast to an earlier FIR No. 47/2012 by the petitioners, however, respondents did not consider that an earlier FIR was registered at the instance of the petitioners against the complainant of FIR No.85/2012 which is a counter-blast. The respondents also did not detail as to which parties are staking claim to the management of the school and also did not consider the pendency of the suit for declaration bearing CS(OS)No.1679/2012, where no interim orders were passed. It is also contended that the respondents could not have granted relief to certain disgruntled sections, who were not granted relief even by the High Court.

26. Reliance is placed on section 24 of the Delhi School Education Act, to show that the Director has the power to conduct the inspection of the school and also give a direction/opportunity to the management to rectify any defect or deficiency found at the time of inspection or otherwise in the working of the school and in case the management fails to comply with any direction, the Director may take such action as deem fit including stopping of aid and withdrawal of recognition.

27. It is argued by Mr.Kher, that the impugned order has been passed without directing any inspection or for non-compliance of any direction to the Manager. It is also submitted that although an order for inspection dated 18.9.2012 was passed, but before the inspection was fixed, the impugned order was passed.

28. Mr.Kher further contends that the respondent no.1 in the impugned order dated 26.9.2012 alleged that the money is being withdrawn illegally even without the approval of the Principal of the school. It is pertinent to mention that the petitioner no.1 apprised the bank vide letter dated 3.10.2011 about the provision/Rule 174 of the Delhi School Education Rules 1973 that according to the said provision, it is mandatory that no withdrawal from the school fund can be made without the joint signatures of the head of the school i.e. Principal and Manager of such school / authorized member of the managing committee. However, the Bank vide letter dated 13.10.2011 informed the petitioner no.1 that operation of the bank account shall be allowed only as per the old mandate / scheme of management approved by the Director of Education. The signature of Principal is not mandatory as per scheme of management however signature of treasurer is mandatory as per scheme of management. Even though the petitioner no.1 vide letter dated 10.12.2011 requested the respondent no.1 for necessary amendment in the approved scheme of management of the petitioner no.1 in the meeting of Kendriya Karya Samiti of the Samaj held on 13.10.2011 however, the respondent no.1 has not replied the abovesaid letter till date.

29. Counsel for the petitioner contends that though merely because different parties are staking claims to the management of the school cannot be a ground for taking over, as the school is a private un-aided school and the Director of Education cannot interfere, nor perform the duties of the Court in deciding disputed questions of fact and side with anyone group; moreover, when a civil suit was pending in the Delhi High Court, wherein no interim orders were passed in favour of the said plaintiff.

30. It is submitted that even otherwise, the impugned order could not have been passed, as the High Court was seized of the matter in the Writ Petition No.4308/2012 and the High Court had declined to pass any interim order in favour of the petitioner, but a working arrangement was made.

31. Reply affidavit has been filed by respondent no.1. In the reply, a preliminary objection has been raised with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that against the order passed under Section 20 of Delhi School Education Act for taking over the management of the school a remedy under Section 20(4) of the Delhi School Education Act is provided by means of filing an appeal to the Lieutenant Governor. Having failed to exhaust the alternate remedy available, it is contended by learned counsel for respondent no.1 that the writ petition should be dismissed.

32. It is further contended by learned counsel for respondent no.1 that in the year 2011, Sh.Janardan Rai, Manager of Upras Vidyalaya, had filed W.P.(C)7187/2011, inter alia, challenging the Office Order of the Chairman of the Managing Committee dated 10.9.2011 wherein the said Sh.Janardan Rai was asked not to continue functioning as a Manager, pending a proposed inquiry on charges of irregularities. In the aforesaid writ petition, vide Order dated 13.10.2011, the Director of Education was directed in the first instance to depute at least two senior level officers to visit the school, in question, and inspect its records to ascertain whether the books and accounts of the school were being maintained in accordance with the provisions of Delhi School Education Act and Rules. It was further directed that a report, inter alia, on whether the decision of the EC of the society and MC of the school are properly minuted in terms of Delhi School Education and Rules. Officers were directed to visit the school between 15.10.2011 and 27.10.2011. Thereafter the report was to be placed on record by way of an affidavit. Reliance is placed on paras 7 to 10 of the Order dated 16.8.2011 passed in W.P.(C) 7187/2011, which read as under:

“7. At present there are two Management Committees. There are claims and counter-claims, allegations and counter-allegations, which can be adjudicated in a Civil Court/Tribunal, where evidence can be led to prove, who is right and who is wrong. Therefore, instant petition cannot be adjudicated under Article 226. 8. The main concern of the Court is that education of the children should not be disturbed and this could be possible only if the Management of the School is running smoothly. In view of the report mentioned above, the School is not functioning smoothly. 9. In these circumstances, Director of Education is directed to take over the Management of the School till the claims and counter- claims of the petitioners/respondents are settled. 10. I here make it clear that the Director of Education shall take over the administration of the School as per the Delhi Education School Act and Rules.”

33. LPA No.597/2012 filed by the petitioners herein was also disposed of on 4.9.2012 wherein the following order was passed:

“4. When this appeal came up for hearing on 31.8.2012, we were informed that de hors the direction of the learned Single Judge, in any case, the Directorate of Education had already issued show cause notice to the Management Committee and the Management Committee had given its reply as well. 5. In view of this, we had directed the learned counsel for the Directorate of Education to find out what further action is taken on the said show cause notice. Today, Ms. Zubeda Begum, appearing for the Directorate of Education, informs that reply was considered by the Department who found the same to be unsatisfactory and there is a proposal already mooted to take over the Management of the School and file has been put up before the Hon ble Lt. Governor, GNCTD for passing appropriate orders thereupon. 6. Having regard to these facts, when the Directorate of Education has itself recommended and the Hon‟ble Lt.Governor as an Administrator has to take the decision in the matter, it is not necessary to deal with this appeal. Needless to mention that if the Lt. Governor passes an order taking over the Management of the School, it would be open to the appellant to challenge that order in accordance with law. We only expect that the Lt. Governor shall take, whatever decision is to be taken, immediately. The appeal stands disposed of.”

34. Ms.Sindhwani, learned counsel for respondent no.1, contends that a show cause notice dated 29.2.2012 was issued to the School Management under Section 20 of the Delhi School Education Act whereby the school was asked to show cause as to why the school should not be taken over under the Delhi School Education Act. Reply dated 12.3.2012 was received wherein the Principal had detailed the improvements made by the present management. It was also informed that the election of the parent body of Uttar Pradesh Samaj was held on 25.9.2011 and a new Managing Committee of the school was constituted on 13.10.2011. The reply received was not found to be satisfactory. Another reply was received on 24.3.2012 addressed to the Director of Education. Meanwhile, letters/complaints were received by the Director of Education signed by two Managers i.e. Sh.Janardan Rai and Sh. R.K. Rai. Complaints were received with regard to misappropriation of school funds, which were placed before the Director of Education. The Director of Education issued directions for inspection of the school, which was conveyed to the school vide letter dated 11.7.2012. On the same day, the Principal of the school informed the Deputy Director that the Manager of the School was out of station and would be available after ten days. Thirty days‟ time was sought to prepare for the inspection. Hence the inspection could not be conducted. It is clarified in the counter affidavit that routine annual inspections are carried out at least once a year and as per the order dated 7.9.2012 the school was to be inspected and the letter dated 19.9.2012 in respect of the inspection had no connection with the process of taking over of the school for which show cause notice had already been issued on 29.2.2012.

35. It is also the case of respondent no.1 that despite the stand of the petitioner that a new managing committee had been appointed the disputes between the two groups continued, which were affecting the working of the school, students and staff. The Director of Education was also not given any intimation about the proposed elections. It is also pointed out that dispute with regard to the management of the school still remains unresolved and a suit has been filed by Sh.Vinod Rai challenging the elections. There are complaints between the management, teachers and employees and also complaints with regard to rustication of one Master Abhishek Kumar Singh of Class IX on the ground that his mother had misbehaved with the Principal of the school. The said Master Abhishek Kumar Singh is the son of the lab assistant, who is working in the school, although he has been suspended. In view of the complaints regarding embezzlement of funds and misuse/siphoning of crores of rupees from the bank accounts of the school, the respondent no.1 issued an order dated 12.12.2012 directing that the bank account of the school shall not be operated by anyone without prior approval of Deputy Director (SW-A). The aforesaid order was challenged by filing W.P.(C) 4308/2012. While issuing notice in the said writ petition, interim directions were also issued by this Court.

36. It is further the case of respondent no.1 that considering the various complaints received against the management of Upras Vidyalaya alleging mismanagement, embezzlement of funds and misuse/siphoning of crores of rupees from the bank accounts of the school, various irregularities observed during the inspection of the school and in view of the fact that different parties were staking claim for management of the school, the Lieutenant Governor in exercise of powers conferred under Section 20 of Delhi School Education Act was pleased to order the Director of Education to take over the management of the school for a period of three years.

37. An application [CM.No.18263/2012] has been filed under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC by the Ex-Manager, Sh.Janardan Rai, seeking intervention in this writ petition.

38. Although, Mr.Khanna, counsel appearing for the applicant was heard, but no formal order of impleadement was passed in favour of the appellant. It may be noticed that the applicant has filed a substantive Civil Suit, which is pending adjudication on the original side of this court. It may be noticed that this civil suit was instituted as far back as in the year 2012. File of this suit was called and it revealed that the plaintiffs have shown little or no interest in pursuing said matter, which was evident from the fact that since the year 2012 till date the matter remains pending before the Joint Registrar and no efforts have been made even to argue the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC.

39. Counsel for the applicant has supported the arguments raised by Ms.Sindhwani, counsel appearing on behalf of the Directorate of Education. While relying on Central Academy Sr. Secondary School Vs. Lieutenant Governor and Ors., reported at 66 (1997) DLT 25 (DB), it has been urged before this court that the High Court is not a court of appeal and moreover there is no legal infirmity in the impugned order of taking over of the school. It has also been argued that the department has followed the principles of natural justice, as a show cause notice was issued to the school and the reply filed by the school was considered.

40. It is also the case of the respondents as also the applicant that the petitioner has not availed of an alternate remedy of appeal provided under Section 20(4) of the Act.

41. In the case of Central Academy Sr. Secondary School (supra), a request was made by the school for closing down. The department did not deem it appropriate to accept the same, but issued a show cause notice for taking over. The Division Bench observed that it was for the authorities to consider having regard to the locality where the school is functioning and the needs of the residents of the area or having regard to the plight of the children and teachers to decide whether the management could be permitted to close down the school. The Division Bench has also noticed the result of the inspection which was carried out and also that the school was directed to remove the defects and furnish a compliance report. The Division Bench considered the response of the school, which had denied most of the accusations. A second inspection was carried out to verify the facts in reply to the show cause notice and it was noticed that the deficiencies had not been cured. It was also found that the enrolment of the students had been drastically gone down, new admissions had been deliberately avoided, resultantly the final order was passed.

42. There is no quarrel with regard to the proposition laid down by the Division Bench in Central Academy Sr. Secondary School (Supra)). No doubt in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the Court cannot sit over the order as if it was a court of appeal, although, when an order of taking over which is a drastic order and which entails serious consequences, is to be passed, grant of personal hearing would surely be in the interest of the staff and the children more particularly in a private unaided school. But merely because no personal hearing was granted, cannot by itself be a ground to set aside the impugned order, if other principles of natural justice have been followed and if the court or in this case the Lieutenant Governor is satisfied on the basis of the material placed on record that the school was required to be taken over.

43. Ms.Sindhwani and Mr.Khanna are also right in their submissions that administrative authorities are not required to record reasons as elaborately as in an order passed by a court. But surely what is required upon reading of the order must show application of mind to the relevant facts and reasons howsoever short they may be, should have to be recorded. The case of Central Academy Sr. Secondary School (Supra) sought to be relied upon by the counsel for the Directorate of Education and the applicant, in my view is not applicable at all to the facts of the present case.

44. It may be noticed that in the present case, in reply to the show cause notice the petitioners made categorical assertions that the deficiencies which were pointed out pertained to the period of the earlier management. With regard to the deficiencies and the issues raised in the show cause notice of the non-payment of dues, non-payment of salaries as per the 6th Pay Commissioner and other complaints of the staff, the present management of the school in response to the show cause notice categorically stated that all deficiencies stand cured, all payments made and action taken against the previous management, including by filing an FIR against the Manager, to show the seriousness and the effort to run the school smoothly. Statements of all the teachers were also enclosed with the reply to the show cause notice, all of which it seems was not taken note of, as it is not reflected in the final order.

45. The final order refers to an FIR which was in fact registered subsequently against the present management by the earlier management, but the order has not referred to an FIR registered earlier in point of time by the present management against the Ex-Manager, which is a surprising factor. During the course of argument, a pointed question was asked to the counsel for the Directorate of Education, as to who was paying the salary to the staff, who was operating the bank accounts and carrying out the day-to-day functioning of the school. It was not denied that it is only the present management, who is carrying out the day-to-day functioning of the school and the teachers and staff are being paid by the present management. The bank account is also being operated by the present management.To say that the school should be taken over on account of disputes between the two managements is a statement which may be factually correct because no doubt there is a dispute [a suit is pending], but what the ex management could not achieve directly cannot be permitted to be achieved indirectly and that also through an independent body, being the Directorate of Education, also the dispute seems to be now only on paper, as is evident from the fact that the ex-management, who have instituted a suit in the Delhi High Court have taken no steps to pursue the same.

46. It may be noticed that the dispute between the two managements is to be resolved in a civil suit upon evidence, neither it can be resolved in writ proceedings, much less by the Directorate of Education, who has no power to do so. In fact the Directorate of Education should have taken note of the fact that despite the former management having approached the High Court they were unable to obtain any order of injunction or any favourable order.

47. It has been repeatedly held that wherever an alternate remedy is available, a writ petition should not be entertained. It has also been repeatedly held that this is not an absolute rule, whenever the order so impugned is illegal, perverse and there is error apparent on the face of the order, there is no absolute bar against entertaining a writ petition.

48. In the case of U.P. State Cooperative Land Development Bank Vs. Chandra Bhan Dubey & Ors., reported at (1999) 1 SCC 741 a question came up for consideration as to whether the U.P. State Cooperative Land Development Bank would be amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, wherein it was held that the power of the High Court under Article 226 is wide and vast and the High Court would be well within its rights to grant protection be it a wrong done by the State, an instrumentality of the State, a company or a cooperative society, or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or even an individual. Right that is infringed may be under Part III of the Constitution or any other right which the law validly made might confer upon him. But then the power conferred upon the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution is so vast, this Court has laid down certain guidelines and self-imposed limitations have been put there subject to which the High Courts would exercise jurisdictions. In my view, the present case falls well in the exception where a writ petition would be maintainable.

49. Copies of the inspection held on 18.10.2011 and 19.10.2011 have been placed on record. The inspection report comprises of various columns under different heads, which include office procedure, management of school, academics, facilities in school, financial and miscellaneous. It may be noticed that with regard to 20 columns pertaining to the academics of the school no infirmity or irregularity was found in the inspection under this heading. With regard to the management of the school out of the six columns the infirmity pointed out was primarily that a stationery shop was being run in the premises of the school and also that the managing committee was interfering in the day-to-day functioning of the school. Some lapses were found in the office procedure, however, in the column with regard to the facilities of the school all conditions were found to be satisfactory. Since one of the main reasons for taking over of the school was financial irregularities the entire report with regard to the columns titled „Financial‟ is being reproduced verbatim: FINANCIAL

1. Whether the school has transferred any fund to any Society or Trust, and if so, the details along with the name of Society/Trust, amount, date, etc. Yes, Rs.1904623/-. RS Nineteen Lakhs four thousand six hundred three only, has illegally transferred from school funds to society details mentioned in P.No.-123-126 during the month of June 2011. As per inspection report dated 28/10/12, Sh. Hari Lal Ex. Security supervisor was paid RS185049/- vide cheque no- 107515 dated 07/06/11 but no voucher and orders of any competent authority was provided by the school. In this the school authority intimate letter dated 16/11/12 the said cheque was issued in favour of Sh. Hari Lal by the Ex Manager towards compensation for molesting and an attempt to rape. A copy is enclosed. P.No.- 120-122.

2. Whether the school is maintaining all vouchers of major expenditure items may be physically checked to find whether expenditure items were justified and geniuses of vouchers are looked into. Maintained and found in satisfactory condition and same were incorporated into Audit Report, Audited by Chartered Accountant.

3. Whether school has given any loans/advances to society/any other institution? No, It is also certified by the school authority vide letter dated 16/11/12 P.No.-119

4. Whether the school has raised/charged fee and other dues from students which are not consistent with the deptt. Instructions and the provisions contained in the DSEAR 1973? (Refer Order dated 16/4/2010). As per rule with prior approval of PTA Association Copy P.No.-112-118

5. Whether the school management has maintained its accounts as per provisions of Rules of Rules 173 & 175 of DSEAR, 1973? Maintained and found in satisfactory condition school account operated by the Principal and Manager, as per P.No.-110-111.

6. Whether the school is regularity fling the statement of the fees to be levied by such school during the ensuring academic session as per the provision of Section 17 of DSEAR, 1973 since the date of its recognition? (Copy of acknowledgement of the same for the last three years be also furnished along with the inspection report). Yes, enclosed with the annual return P.No.-30-109

7. Whether the school is regular filling the annual return under section 180(i) of DSEAR 1973, Since date of its recognition? (Financial returns for last three year be also furnished along with the Inspection report? Yes, copy annexed as P.No.-30-

8. Whether the school management is paying salary to the teachers and staff as per the recommendations of 6th Pay Commission or whether it is violating provision of section 10(1) of DSEAR, 1973? Yes, But in some case the pay fixation of the school staff is seems to be incorrect due to wrong rounding of the amount. However the grade pay in respect of employees mentioned in Report dated 28/10/11 vide para 9 has been rectified. 60% arrear of VICPC has been paid 13/03/12 by the present management in r/0 left out (7 cases) according to last inspection report i.e. 28/10/11.

9. Whether money collected by the school is utilized for the development activities Yes, certified by the School Authority P.No.-11/29, but does not seems to be justified and needs verification by the and/or for augmenting the existing facilities, providing safely (sic. Safety) measures, etc. of the school. District authorities.

10. Whether the managing committee of the school is financially viable to manage affairs of the school? Yes

11. Whether donations in any form are demanded by the school management at the time of admissions to the school or when results are declared by the school? No

50. The genesis of these writ petitions [WP(C)No.6288/2012, WP(C)No.4308/2012 and WP(C)No.3643/2013] is a dispute with the ex- Manager of the school (Mr.Janardan Rai). As per the writ petitions [WP(C)No.6288/2012, WP(C)No.4308/2012 and WP(C)No.3643/2013], Mr.Janardan Rai was removed from the management of the school on account of immoral, unconstitutional activities, misappropriate of funds and allegations of attempt to rape. A writ petition was filed by Mr.Janardan Rai being WP(C)No.7187/2011. In the aforesaid writ petition on 13.10.2011 a Single Judge of this Court directed the Directorate of Education, to depute two senior level offices, to visit the school, inspect its record to ascertain whether the books of accounts of the school were being maintained in accordance with the provisions of Delhi School Education Act. It was also directed that a report be prepared on the followings: “(i) Whether the books and accounts of the school are being maintained in accordance with the provisions of DSEA and DSER,

1973.

(ii) Whether the decision of the EC of the society and the MC of the school are being properly minuted in terms of DSEA and DSER, 1973.

(iii) Whether any decision was taken by the EC of the society or

(iv) Whether the letter dated 9th September, 2011 written by the respondent No.4 to the petitioner was as a result of such decision of the EC of the society or the MC of the school.

(v) Whether the decision was purportedly taken by the EC of the society on 9th October, 2011 removing respondent no.4 as the Chairman of the MC and whether such decision was properly minuted; and

(vi) Whether the affairs of the school are being run in accordance with the scheme of the Management of the school.”

51. The report of the Committee was placed before the Court. By an order dated 16.8.2012 the writ petition was disposed of. The Single Judge directed the Directorate of Education to take over the management of the school till the claims and counter claims of the petitioners and respondents are settled. While passing the order, the Court extracted the observations made by the Committee.

52. Aggrieved by the order dated 16.8.2012 the management of the school, petitioner herein filed an LPA No.597/2012, which was disposed of by an order dated 4.9.2012. The Division Bench while disposing of the LPA had passed the following orders:

“1. The respondent no.1 who was working as Manager of the appellant School has filed WP(C) 7187/2011 seeking various reliefs which include relief relating to issuance of mandamus directing the appellant School not to restrain him
from discharging statutory duties as Manager of the School and to quash the show cause notice issued to him proposing to terminate his services.
2. During the hearing of the said writ petition, the learned Single Judge found that there are two Management Committees which are competing with each other and there are claims and counter claims, allegations and counter allegations made by the said two Management Committees against each other. The learned Single Judge also took note of certain purported illegalities and irregularities committed by the Managing Committees and influenced by these considerations, order dated 16.8.2012 was passed directing the Directorate of Education to take over the Management of the School till the claims and counter claims of the two Management Committees are settled in a Civil Court/Tribunal, where evidence can be led to prove who is right and who is wrong.
3. Challenging this order, present appeal is filed and it is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there are no two Management Committees and the appellant Committee, duly constituted, has the right to run the school. It is further contended that in any case the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue such direction to the Directorate of Education to take over the Management of the School.
4. When this appeal came up for hearing on 31.8.2012, we were informed that de hors the direction of the learned Single Judge, in any case, the Directorate of Education had already issued show cause notice to the Management Committee and the Management Committee had given its reply as well.
5. In view of this, we had directed the learned counsel for the Directorate of Education to find out what further action is taken on the said show cause notice. Today, Ms. Zubeda Begum, appearing for the Directorate of Education, informs that reply was considered by the Department who found the same to be unsatisfactory and there is a proposal already mooted to take over the Management of the School and file has been put up before the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor, GNCTD for passing appropriate orders thereupon.
6. Having regard to these facts, when the Directorate of Education has itself recommended and the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor as an Administrator has to take the decision in the matter, it is not necessary to deal with this appeal. Needless to mention that if the Lt. Governor passes an order taking over the Management of the School, it would be open to the appellant to challenge that order in accordance with law. We only expect that the Lt. Governor shall take, whatever decision is to be taken, immediately. The appeal stands disposed of.”

53. In this backdrop, a detailed show cause notice as to why the school be not taken over by the Directorate of Education, was issued to the petitioner, school on 29.2.2012, after the committee had inspected the school on 18.10.2011 and 19.10.2011. In the show cause notice the directions passed in the writ petition No.7187/2011 were referred to, and reference was also made to the inspection conducted on 18.10.2011 and 19.10.2011. A detailed reply to the show cause notice was given on 12.3.2012 by the school. The school pointed out that the principal body /Uttar Pradesh Samaj and Board of Management of Upras Vidalaya had been constituted on 25.9.2011 and 13.10.2011. Sh.Janardan Rai had been removed and moreover, all the illegalities, financial irregularities, misuse of power were only due to him.

54. It was also informed that after the formation of new Board of Management on 13.9.2011 the picture of the school had completely changed. All employees, teaching and non-teaching staff were being paid salary, grades had been fixed legally, all staff members were being paid salary as per law within time, arrears of 6th Pay Commission had been paid and the financial issues were in conformity with the provisions of Delhi School Education Act and Rules 1973. Statements of staff members to the effect that they had no grievance left with the management, were annexed. Regarding accounts and records it was explained that they were mis-managed by the Mr.Janardan Rai, Ex Manager and were now being regularized and maintained by the present management. Accounts had been audited for the year 2010-2011. A full explanation with regard to the teachers, who had not been paid, as detailed in the show cause notice, were given in the reply running into 21 pages; an additional reply was also issued thereafter on 24.3.2012 that all defects, deficiencies pointed out in the show cause notice had been removed and rectified. After the reply to the show cause notice there was complete silence on the part of the respondent till a final order was passed on 26.9.2012 for taking over of the school. This order of taking over is the subject matter of the writ petition No.6288/2012. This order has been assailed as being illegal, as the grounds of taking over did not form part of the show cause notice. Mr.Kher submits that the order so passed is against all cannons of justice and without following the principles of natural justice. It is contended that the order is bad in law and moreover, the present management and the children of the school cannot be punished for the irregularities committed by the earlier management during their tenure.

55. It is also the case of the petitioner that no opportunity of hearing was granted and there is not even a whisper as to why the reply to the show cause notice was not found to be satisfactory, as defects and irregularities, if any, stood cured and rectified and details were furnished to the respondent in reply to the show cause notice. Statement of the employees and teachers were submitted to the authorities to show that all irregularities stood rectified and the teachers and staff had no grievance against the present management. Mala fides have been alleged against department to the extent that reference has been made to a later FIR filed at the instance of Janardan Rai, however, in the order dated 26.9.2012, no reference to an earlier FIR registered at the instance of the petitioner against Janardan Rai was made and without taking into consideration that the FIR sought to be relied upon was a mere counter blast to the FIR filed by the petitioner herein against Sh.Janardan Rai. The order of 26.9.2012 is also assailed on the ground that a categorical statement was made before the Division Bench that de hors the directions of the Single Judge, the Directorate of Education had already issued a show cause notice to the Management Committee and the Management Committee had taken its reply which was found to be unsatisfactory and the Directorate of Education has itself recommended taking over of the school. In view thereof LPA was disposed of.

56. It is worthwhile to notice that before the Division Bench in LPA No.597/2012 the challenge was that there are no two management committees and only the appellant had the right to run the school. It was also submitted before the Division Bench that the Single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a direction to the Directorate of Education, to take over the management of the school. Since the entire issue revolves around the order dated 26.9.2012, I deem it appropriate to reproduce the order: “GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI DIRECTORATE OF EDUCAITON OLD SECTT, DELHI-54 No.F.DE/54/DDE/SWA/2011-12/4653 Date: 26.09.2012 ORDER Whereas various complaints were received against the management of Upras Vidyalaya, a recognized school functioning in Vasant Vihar, New Delhi alleging mismanagement, embezzlement of funds and misuse/siphoning of crores rupees from the bank account of the school etc. Whereas, it is observed that a court case bearing No.WPC 7187/2011 titled as Sh. Janardan Rai Vs. Director of Education & Ors. was also filed by the Manager of the school against the Chairman of the school and the Hon‟ble High Court vide order dated 13.10.2011 in the aforementioned case gave directions to the Directorate of Education to depute at least two senior officers to visit Upras Vidyalaya, Vasant Vihar and inspect its record to ascertain the following:

1. Whether the books and accounts of the school are being maintained in accordance with the provisions of DSEA and DSER 1973.

2. Whether the decision of the EC of the society and the MC of the school are being properly minuted in terms of DSEA and DSER, 1973.

3. Whether any decision was taken by the EC of the society or MC of the school concerning the petitioner counting as the Manager of the school.

4. Whether the letter dated 9th September, 2011 written by the respondent No.4 to the petitioner was as a result of such decision of the EC of the society or the MC of the school.

5. Whether the decision was purportedly taken by the EC of the society on 9th October, 2011 removing respondent No.4 as the Chairman of the MC and whether such decision was properly minuted.

6. Whether the affairs of the school are being run in accordance with the Scheme of the Management of the school. Whereas, as per the directions of the Hon‟ble High Court a Committee of senior officers was constituted which after inspecting the records of the school found the following irregularities-

1. There are financial issues which are not in conformity with the provisions of DSEA and DSER,1973.

2. No decision was taken by the EC of the society or MC of the school concerning the petitioner continuing as the Manager of the school. It is only the decision of the Chairman of the MC of the school.

3. The letter dated 09.10.2011 written by the respondent No.4 to the petitioner was not as a result of such decision of the EC of the society of MC of the school.

4. No decision was purportedly taken by the EC or the General Body of the Society on 9.10.2011 removing respondent no.4 as the Chairman of the MC.

5. The affairs of the school are not being run in accordance with the Scheme of Management of the school. Whereas, the report of the Committee was examined and a Show Cause Notice was issued to the school on 29.02.2012 as to why the Upras Vidyalaya should not be taken over by the Directorate of Education in view of the serious irregularities pointed out. Whereas, the school authorities submitted as reply vide letter dated 12.03.2012 which has been considered and not found satisfactory by the department. Whereas, this Directorate was in receipt of a number of complaints from different corners in respect of alleged embezzlement of funds and misuse/siphoning of crores of rupees from bank accounts of the school. It was alleged that the money is being withdrawn illegally even without the approval of the Principal of the school. It was also reported that an FIR being No.85/2012 under Section 420/406/120B of I.P.C. was lodged in P.S. Vasant Vihar in this regard. Whereas, in view of the alleged serious complaints regarding financial irregularities and in view of the facts that different parties were staking claim to the management of the school, the Director (Education) in exercise of powers conferred under Section 24(3) of the DSEAR, 1973 read with Rules 43, 181, 182 and 185 passed an order dated 12.7.2012 barring the school management from operating the bank accounts of the school without prior permission of Deputy Director, District (South West A) until the outcome of the Court case or till further orders, whichever is earlier. Whereas, the Hon‟ble High Court in WPC. No.7187/2011 vide order dated 16.08.2012 directed the Director of Education to take over the management of school till the claims and counter claims of the petitioners / respondents are settled. Whereas, the facts and records of the matter and the reply submitted by the school authorities vide letter dated 12.3.2012 has been duly considered by the Lt. Governor, Delhi. Now, therefore, in exercises of the powers conferred under sub section (1) of section 20 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, the Lt. Governor is pleased to order the Dte. of Eduction to take over the management of Upras Vidyalaya, Vasant Vihar for a period of three years with immediate effect. The Lt. Governor of NCT of Delhi is also pleased to direct under sub Section (3) of Section 20 of the Act that the school shall be managed through the Director of Education or by an officer duly authorized by him. Hence, DDE (South West –A) is hereby appointed as authorized officer of the school. The managing committee / manager of the school shall deliver possession of the entire school properties, equipment, school funds, records and other related documents etc. to the DDE (South West- A) immediately.”

57. A perusal of the order shows that the first paragraph refers to various complaints received leading mis-management, embezzlement of funds, misuse, siphoning of crores of rupees from the bank account of the school; second paragraph refers to observations of the Single Judge in Writ Petition No.7187/2011 and the irregularities pointed out by the Committee appointed by the High Court. The second and third paragraph of this order clearly relies on the order of the Single Judge and the observations of the Committee, thus for the respondent to say that they issued a show cause notice uninfluenced by the order of the Single Judge is factually incorrect.

58. The next paragraph in the order refers to the show cause notice issued to the school on 29.2.2012, while the next paragraph reads as under: “Whereas, the school authorities submitted as reply vide letter dated 12.03.2012 which has been considered and not found satisfactory by the department.”

59. It may be noticed that the show cause notice issued to the school runs into six pages; one reply filed by the school runs in 21 pages and the second reply which has also not even been considered also runs into six pages.

60. The impugned order finds the reply unsatisfactory but no reasons at all are mentioned in the order. It was important for the Directorate of Education to at least give some reasons, may be not in detail, which would show application of mind on his part as to why the response was unsatisfactory, as firstly the management had been changed, and the school had categorically given replies with respect to each irregularity pointed out including books of accounts, installation of cash box, accounts having been audited for the year 2010- 2011, paying of salary on time, reimbursement of medical claim, LTC being provided, development fund for being used for the development activities; for previous financial irregularities, FIR had been lodged, pay and allowances of the employees which was not paid had not been paid to the persons named in the show cause notice i.e. Smt.Muktawali Tiwari, Smt.Annu Bamrara, Smt.Pravati Rath, Smt.Amita Dasgupta, Smt.Yasoda Sharma, Sh.Ramanuj Rai, Sh.Raj Kumar (sweeper), Sh.Hari Lal (Ex-security supervisor). All seven teachers, who had not got of 60% arrears of 6th Pay Commissioner had been paid; all other details were also furnished in the reply as also in the additional reply dated 24.3.2012. The order further goes on to state that the Director of Education had received a number of complaints, alleging embezzlement of funds, money being illegally withdrawn and FIR having been lodged and in view of serious complaints, Director of Education by an order dated 12.7.2012 barred the school management from operating the bank account. Thereafter this order dated 26.9.2012 goes on to state: “Whereas, the Hon‟ble High Court in WPC No.7187/2011 vide order dated 16.08.2012 directed the Director of Education to take over the management of school till the claims and counter claims of the petitioners/ respondents are settled.”

61. What can be understood upon reading of this order is that the management of the school had been taken over on the basis of inspection carried out under the Order of the High Court. But the inspection report does not show embezzlement of funds or siphoning of crores of rupees from the bank account of the school. The observations of the inspection committee relied upon in the order itself does not mention the same. No such show cause notice was issued that crores of rupees have been embezzled and there is not a whisper in the order as to how such a finding had been reached.

62. The short question which comes up for consideration, at this stage, would be whether the order which has far reaching consequences with regard to the taking over of a private unaided school, can be termed as a reasoned order.

63. In the case of Kranti Associates Private Limpid and Others v. Masood Ahmed Khaan and Others, reported at (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Apex Court has highlighted the necessity of giving reasons by a body or authority in support of its decision. The Supreme Court also took into account that initially the Court recognised a somewhat demarcation between the administrative orders and quasi judicial orders but with the passage of time the Supreme Court recognised the fact that the distinction between the two got blur and almost vanished. The Supreme Court also held that an order passed by a quasi judicial body or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of the parties must be a speaking order.

64. Para 14 to 47 of the Kranti Associates Private Limpid and Others (supra) read as under:

“14. The expression „speaking order‟ was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of Writ of Certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. (See 1878-97 Vol. 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the report). 15. This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the „inscrutable face of a Sphinx‟. 16. In the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala and others, AIR 1961 SC 1669, the question of recording reasons came up for consideration in the context of a refusal by Harinagar to transfer, without giving reasons, shares held by Shyam Sunder. Challenging such refusal, the transferee moved the High Court contending, inter alia, that the refusal is mala fide, arbitrary and capricious. The High Court rejected such pleas and the transferee was asked to file a suit. The transferee filed an appeal to the Central Government under Section 111 Clause (3) of Indian Companies Act, 1956 which was dismissed. Thereafter, the son of the original transferee filed another application for transfer of his shares which was similarly refused by the Company. On appeal, the Central Government quashed the resolution passed by the Company and directed the Company to register the transfer. However, in passing the said order, Government did not give any reason. The company challenged the said decision before this Court. 17. The other question which arose in Harinagar (supra) was whether the Central Government, in passing the appellate order acted as a tribunal and is amenable to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court. 18. Even though in Harinagar (supra) the decision was
administrative, this Court insisted on the requirement of recording reason and further held that in exercising appellate powers, the Central Government acted as a tribunal in exercising judicial powers of the State and such exercise is subject to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court. Such powers, this Court held, cannot be effectively exercised if reasons are not given by the Central Government in support of the order (AIR pp. 1678-79, Para 23).
19. Again in the case of Bhagat Raja vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1967 SC 1606, the Constitution Bench of this Court examined the question whether the Central Government was bound to pass a speaking order while dismissing a revision and confirming the order of the State Government in the context of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, and having regard to the provision of Rule 55 of Mineral and Concessions Rules. The Constitution Bench held that in exercising its power of revision under the aforesaid Rule the Central Government acts in a quasi-judicial capacity (See para 8 page 1610). Where the State Government gives a number of reasons some of which are good and some are not, and the Central Government merely endorses the order of the State Government without specifying any reason, this Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136, may find it difficult to ascertain which are the grounds on which Central Government upheld the order of the State Government (See para 9 page 1610). Therefore, this Court insisted on reasons being given for the order.
20. In Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar vs. State of U.P and others, AIR 1970 SC 1302, while dealing with U.P. Sugar Dealers License Order under which the license was cancelled, this Court held that such an order of cancellation is quasi-judicial and must be a speaking one. This Court further held that merely giving an opportunity of hearing is not enough and further pointed out where the order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reason is even greater. The learned Judges held that the recording of reasons in support of a decision on a disputed claim ensures that the decision is not a result of caprice, whim or fancy but was arrived at after considering the relevant law and that the decision was just. (See SCC. 768, para 7: AIR p. 1304, para 7).
21. In the case of M/s. Travancore Rayons Ltd. vs. The Union of India and others, AIR 1971 SC 862, the Court, dealing with the revisional jurisdiction of the Central Government under the then Section 36 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, held that the Central Government was actually exercising judicial power of the State and in exercising judicial power reasons in support of the order must be disclosed on two grounds. The first is that the person aggrieved gets an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons are erroneous and secondly, the obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the executive authority invested with the judicial power (See SCC p. 874, para 11: AIR pp. 865-66, para 11).
22. In Woolcombers of India Ltd. vs. Woolcombers Workers Union and another, AIR 1973 SC 2758, this Court while considering an award under Section 11 of Industrial Disputes Act insisted on the need of giving reasons in support of conclusions in the Award. The Court held that the very requirement of giving reason is to prevent unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching conclusions. The second principle is based on the jurisprudential doctrine that justice should not only be done, it should also appear to be done as well. The learned Judges said that a just but unreasoned conclusion does not appear to be just to those who read the same. Reasoned and just conclusion on the other hand will also have the appearance of justice. The third ground is that such awards are subject to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court and in the absence of reasons, it is difficult for this Court to ascertain whether the decision is right or wrong (See SCC pp. 320-2, para 5: AIR p. 2761, para 5).
23. In Union of India vs. Mohan Lal Capoor and others, AIR 1974 SC 87, this Court while dealing with the question of selection under Indian Administrative Service/Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion Regulation) held that the expression "reasons for the proposed supersession" should not be mere rubber stamp reasons. Such reasons must disclose how mind was applied to the subject matter for a decision regardless of the fact whether such a decision is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. This Court held that the reasons in such context would mean the link between materials which are considered and the conclusions which are reached. Reasons must reveal a rational nexus between the two (See SCC pp. 853-54, paras 27-28: AIR pp. 97-98, paras 27-28).
24. In Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. vs. The Union of India and another, AIR 1976 SC 1785, this Court held that it is far too well settled that an authority in making an order in exercise of its quasi-judicial function, must record reasons in support of the order it makes. The learned Judges emphatically said that every quasi- judicial order must be supported by reasons. The rule requiring reasons in support of a quasi- judicial order is, this Court held, as basic as following the principles of natural justice. And the rule must be observed in its proper spirit. A mere pretence of compliance would not satisfy the requirement of law (See SCC. 986, para 6: AIR p. 1789, para 6).
25. In Smt. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 597, which is a decision of great jurisprudence significance in our Constitutional law, Chief Justice Beg, in a concurring but different opinion held that an order impounding a passport is a quasi-judicial decision (Para 34, page 612). The learned Chief Justice also held when an administrative action involving any deprivation of or restriction on fundamental rights is taken, the authorities must see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done as well. This principle would obviously demand disclosure of reasons for the decision.
26. Y.V. Chandrachud J (as His Lordship then was) in a concurring but a separate opinion also held that refusal to disclose reasons for impounding a passport is an exercise of an exceptional nature and is to be done very sparingly and only when it is fully justified by the exigencies of an uncommon situation. The learned Judge further held that law cannot permit any exercise of power by an executive to keep the reasons undisclosed if the only motive for doing so is to keep the reasons away from judicial scrutiny. (See para 39 page 613).
27. In Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran vs. State of Kerala and Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1918, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer speaking for a three-Judge Bench held that the functioning of the Board was quasi-judicial in character. One of the attributes of quasi- judicial functioning is the recording of reasons in support of decisions taken and the other requirement is following the principles of natural justice. Learned Judge held that natural justice requires reasons to be written for the conclusions made (See para 14 page 1922).
28. In Gurdial Singh Fijji vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1979) 2 SCC 368, this Court, dealing with a service matter, relying on the ratio in Capoor (supra), held that "rubber-stamp reason" is not enough and virtually quoted the observation in Capoor (supra) to the extent that reasons "are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions." (See para 18 page 377).
29. In a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt etc. etc. vs. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Dept. and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1, while giving the majority judgment Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud referred to Broom's Legal Maxims (1939 Edition, page 97) where the principle in Latin runs as follows: "Ces-sante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex"
30. The English version of the said principle given by the Chief Justice is that: (H.H. Shri Swamiji case (1979) 4 SCC 642) "Reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself."
31. In M/s. Bombay Oil Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1984 SC 160, this Court held that while disposing of applications under Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act the duty of the Government is to give reasons for its order. This court made it very clear that the faith of the people in administrative tribunals can be sustained only if the tribunals act fairly and dispose of the matters before them by well considered orders. In saying so, this Court relied on its previous decisions in Capoor (supra) and Siemens Engineering (supra), discussed above.
32. In Ram Chander vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 1173, this Court was dealing with the appellate provisions under the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 condemned the mechanical way of dismissal of appeal in the context of requirement of Rule 22(2) of the aforesaid Rule. This Court held that the word "consider" occurring to the Rule 22(2) must mean the Railway Board shall duly apply its mind and give reasons for its decision. The learned Judges held that the duty to give reason is an incident of the judicial process and emphasized that in discharging quasi-judicial functions the appellate authority must act in accordance with natural justice and give reasons for its decision (Para 4, page 1176).
33. In M/s. Star Enterprises and others vs. City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and others, (1990) 3 SCC 280, a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that in the present day set up judicial review of administrative action has become expansive and is becoming wider day by day and the State has to justify its action in various field of public law. All these necessitate recording of reason for executive actions including the rejection of the highest offer. This Court held that disclosure of reasons in matters of such rejection provides an opportunity for an objective review both by superior administrative heads and for judicial process and opined that such reasons should be communicated unless there are specific justification for not doing so (see Para 10, page 284-285).
34. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education vs. K.S. Gandhi and others, (1991) 2 SCC 716, this Court held that even in domestic enquiry if the facts are not in dispute non-recording of reason may not be violative of the principles of natural justice but where facts are disputed necessarily the authority or the enquiry officer, on consideration of the materials on record, should record reasons in support of the conclusion reached (see para 22, pages 738-739).
35. In the case of M.L. Jaggi vs. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Limited and others, (1996) 3 SCC 119, this Court dealt with an award under Section 7 of the Telegraph Act and held that since the said award affects public interest, reasons must be recorded in the award. It was also held that such reasons are to be recorded so that it enables the High Court to exercise its power of judicial review on the validity of the award. (see para 8, page 123).
36. In Charan Singh vs. Healing Touch Hospital and others, AIR 2000 SC 3138, a three-Judge Bench of this Court, dealing with a grievance under CP Act, held that the authorities under the Act exercise quasi-judicial powers for redressal of consumer disputes and it is, therefore, imperative that such a body should arrive at conclusions based on reasons. This Court held that the said Act, being one of the benevolent pieces of legislation, is intended to protect a large body of consumers from exploitation as the said Act provides for an alternative mode for consumer justice by the process of a summary trial. The powers which are exercised are definitely quasi-judicial in nature and in such a situation the conclusions must be based on reasons and held that requirement of recording reasons is "too obvious to be reiterated and needs no emphasizing". (See Para 11, page 3141 of the report).
37. Only in cases of Court Martial, this Court struck a different note in two of its Constitution Bench decisions, the first of which was rendered in the case of Som Datt Datta vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1969 SC 414, Mr. Justice Ramaswami delivering the judgment for the unanimous Constitution Bench held that provisions of Sections 164 and 165 of the Army Act do not require an order confirming proceedings of Court Martial to be supported by reasons. The Court held that an order confirming such proceedings does not become illegal if it does not record reasons. (Para 10, page 421- 422 of the report).
38. About two decades thereafter, a similar question cropped up before this Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984. A unanimous Constitution Bench speaking through Justice S.C. Agrawal confirmed its earlier decision in Som Datt (supra) in para 47 at page 2000 of the report and held reasons are not required to be recorded for an order confirming the finding and sentence recorded by the Court Martial.
39. It must be remembered in this connection that the Court Martial as a proceeding is sui generis in nature and the Court of Court Martial is different, being called a Court of Honour and the proceeding therein are slightly different from other proceedings. About the nature of Court Martial and its proceedings the observations of Winthrop in Military Law and Precedents are very pertinent and are extracted herein below: "Not belonging to the judicial branch of the Government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the Army and Navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives."
40. Our Constitution also deals with Court Martial proceedings differently as is clear from Articles 33, 136(2) and 227(4) of the Constitution.
41. In England there was no common law duty of recording of reasons. In Marta Stefan vs. General Medical Council, (1999) 1 WLR 1293, it has been held, "the established position of the common law is that there is no general duty imposed on our decision makers to record reasons". It has been acknowledged in the Justice Report, Administration Under Law (1971) at page 23 that "No single factor has inhibited the development of English administrative law as seriously as the absence of any general obligation upon public authorities to give reasons for their decisions".
42. Even then in the case of R vs. Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte Cunningham reported in (1991) 4 All ER 310, Lord Donaldson, Master of Rolls, opined very strongly in favour of disclosing of reasons in a case where the Court is acting in its discretion. The learned Master of Rolls said: (All ER p. 317) "... „... It is a corollary of the discretion conferred upon the board that it is their duty to set out their reasoning in sufficient form to show the principles on which they have proceeded. Adopting Lord Lane CJ's observations (in R vs. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p Khan (Mahmud) [1983] 2 All ER 420 at 423, (1983) QB 790 at 794-795), the reasons for the lower amount is not obvious. Mr. Cunningham is entitled to know, either expressly or inferentially stated, what it was to which the board were addressing their mind in arriving at their conclusion. It must be obvious to the board that Mr. Cunningham is left with a burning sense of grievance. They should be sensitive to the fact that he is left with a real feeling of injustice, that having been found to have been unfairly dismissed, he has been deprived of his just desserts (as he sees them)".
43. The learned Master of Rolls further clarified by saying: "..thus, in the particular circumstances of this case, and without wishing to establish any precedent whatsoever, I am prepared to spell out an obligation on this board to give succinct reasons, if only to put the mind of Mr. Cunningham at rest. I would therefore allow this application."
44. But, however, the present trend of the law has been towards an increasing recognition of the duty of Court to give reasons (See North Range Shipping Limited vs. Seatrans Shipping Corporation, (2002) 1 WLR 2397). It has been acknowledged that this trend is consistent with the development towards openness in Government and judicial administration.
45. In English vs. Emery Reimbold and Strick Limited, (2002) 1 WLR 2409, it has been held that justice will not be done if it is not apparent to the parties why one has won and the other has lost. The House of Lords in Cullen vs. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, (2003) 1 WLR 1763, Lord Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Steyn, on the requirement of reason held: (WLR p. 1769, para
7) "7.... First, they impose a discipline... which may contribute to such decisions being considered with care. Secondly, reasons encourage transparency... Thirdly, they assist the Courts in performing their supervisory function if judicial review proceedings are launched."
46. The position in the United States has been indicated by this Court in S.N. Mukherjee (supra) in paragraph 11 at page 1988 of the judgment. This Court held that in the United States the Courts have always insisted on the recording of reasons by administrative authorities in exercise of their powers. It was further held that such recording of reasons is required as "the Court cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the considerations underlying the action under review". In S.N. Mukherjee (supra) this court relied on the decisions of the U.S. Court in Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Chenery Corporation, (1942) 87 Law Ed 626 and John T. Dunlop vs. Walter Bachowski, (1975) 44 Law Ed 377 in support of its opinion discussed above.
47. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds: a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or `rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737). n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process".
65. I have quoted in detail the judgment passed by the Supreme Court of India as the Supreme Court has taken into consideration various judgments passed from time to time, which have explained in detail the purpose, aim and objective of passing of speaking orders.
66. In the absence of any reasons in the order of taking over a private unaided school by the respondents, in my view, has far reaching consequences not only on the management but even on the staff and the students of the school. Besides, the petitioner school, which is being run by the present Management, who claims that all the shortcomings stand removed and cured by them, and remedial steps taken with supporting documents including acknowledgement by the staff and the teachers was placed before the respondents but the speaking order does not show that the respondent either verified these facts and found the same not to be in order. The so called order does not show application of mind. More so, when after reply to the show cause notice there was a silence on the part of respondents for seven months. What prompted the Department to take this action after seven months is also unclear, though learned counsel for the petitioner has made a strong allegation against the Department that the order has been passed at the behest of the former management, which comprised of a person, who was associated closely with the Directorate of Education. I reserve my comments on the same.
67. Another ground, which has persuaded me to set aside the impugned order, is that the impugned order, which has been passed, was founded on the grounds, which were at variance from the show cause notice. It is wellsettled that one of the requirements of the principles of natural justice is that a person should be informed the reasons for the proposed action to be taken and he should be aware of the precise charge, which he is required to meet.
68. In the case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab, reported at (2001) 6 Supreme Court Cases 260, the Supreme Court of India has held that there is a clear violation of the principles of natural justice where the impugned order was founded on the grounds which were at variance from the one in the show cause notice. Para 13 of the judgment reads as under:
“13. The show-cause notice alleged only this much that the Municipal Council had purchased a fogging machine of which payment was to be made but the appellant (as President of the Municipality) instructed the Executive Officer not to make the payment and this resulted in the working of the Municipal Council having been obstructed. The finding arrived at in the impugned order dated 1.10.1999 is different. There is no finding arrived at that the working of the Municipal Council was in any manner obstructed by the appellant having instructed the Executive Officer not to make the payment. The specific stand taken by the appellant in his reply was that the machine had certain inherent defects and was not working properly and hence it was on the advice of the Municipal Council that the appellant had desired the payment not to be made. The finding as to abuse of power is based mainly on the fact that the Executive Officer had prepared a cheque and signed the same on 20.11.1998 and yet the cheque was not presented to the bank resulting in delayed payment to the supplier of the fogging machine. The impugned order also states that the cheque was kept by the appellant in his custody for over two months. These events are subsequent to the date of the show cause notice, i.e. 19.8.1998 as also to the date of appellants reply i.e. 8.9.1998. Thus, briefly stated, the content of abuse of power, as stated in the notice dated 19.8.1998 was-asking the Executive Officer not to make payment
while the order dated 1.10.1999 is founded on a subsequent event that in spite of the Executive Officer having prepared and signed the cheque on 20.11.1998, the appellant detained the cheque in his custody for about two months resulting payment being delayed and this amounted to abuse of power. There is no finding recorded in the impugned order that the explanation furnished by the appellant was factually incorrect. A President is supposed to act in the best interests of the Municipality which he is heading. In spite of fogging machine worth lakhs having been found by the Executive Officer to be okay in its trial run, if the President was informed of the machine having certain inherent defects, there was nothing wrong in his asking the Executive Officer not to make the payment unless he was satisfied that the machine was fit for the purpose for which it was being purchased, all the more, when the funds for purchasing the machine were made available to the Municipality by the District Planning Board. Even accepting the allegations made against the appellant, as contained in the show cause notice, to be correct, his decision to withhold the payment may be said to be an erroneous or unjust decision. For this reason alone the appellant cannot be said to be guilty of an abuse of his powers. If any one suffered by delay in payment it was the supplier and not the Municipality. There is nothing in the show cause notice or the ultimate order to hold how the act of appellant had obstructed the working of Municipal Council or was against the interest of council. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that not only the principles of natural justice were violated by the factum of the impugned order having been founded on grounds at variance from the one in the show cause notice, of which the appellant was not even made aware of let alone provided an opportunity to offer his explanation, the allegations made against the appellant did not even prima facie make out a case of abuse of powers of the President. The High Court was not right in forming an opinion that the appellant was persuading the High Court to judicially review like an appellate court the finding arrived at by the competent authority. The present one is a case where the impugned order is vitiated by perversity. A conclusion of abuse of powers has been drawn from such facts wherefrom such conclusion does not even prima facie flow. The impugned order is based on non-existent grounds. It is vitiated by colourable exercise of power and hence liable to be struck down within the well settled parameters of judicial review of administrative action.”

69. Further in the case of Saci Allied Products Ltd. U.P. V. Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut, reported at (2005) 7 Supreme Court Cases 159, The Apex Court has held in paras 16 an 17 as under:

“16. Thus according to the appellate Tribunal, since the dealers in Uttar Pradesh who purchased the goods from Syndet, and independent dealers in other parts of the country to whom the appellants directly sold the goods are different class of buyers, the appellants' price to the independent dealers cannot be taken as the basis for assessing the appellants' sales to Syndet in Uttar Pradesh. This finding of the appellate Tribunal is based on first proviso to Section 4(1)(a) of the Act. While the show cause notice and the order of the Collector proceeded on the basis of the invocation of third proviso to Section 4(1)(a) of the Act, the appellate Tribunal for the first time in the impugned order has sustained the proceedings on the basis of first proviso to Section 4(1)(a) of the Act. It was argued that the first proviso to Section 4(1)(a) of the Act was never invoked by the Department either in the show cause notice or in the impugned order and it was for the first time that the appellate Tribunal in the impugned order has sought to sustain the impugned order by invoking the first proviso to Section 4(1)(a) of the Act. It is thus seen that the Tribunal has gone totally beyond the show cause notice and the order of the Collector, which is impermissible. The appellate Tribunal cannot sustain the case of the Revenue against the appellants on a ground not raised by the Revenue either in the show cause notice or in the order. 17. In this context, we may usefully refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Reckitt & Colman of India Ltd. vs. CCE, 1996 (88) ELT 641(SC). This Court held that it is beyond the competence of the Tribunal to make out in favour of the Revenue a case which the Revenue had never convassed and which the appellants had never been required to meet.”

70. Another ground raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that respondent no.1 has failed to comply with Section 24 (3) of Delhi School Education Act. It has been contended that under Section 24 of the Act, the Director has the power to conduct inspection of the school and also to give a direction to the Manager to rectify any defect or deficiency found at the time of inspection or otherwise in the working of the school and if the manager failes to comply with any direction, the Director may take such action as deem fit including stoppage of aid or withdrawal of recognition of a school. It is, thus, contended that under Section 20 the Administrator has power to take over the management of the school after giving reasonable opportunity to the Managing Committee.

71. In response to this submission of counsel for the petitioner, counsel for respondent no.1 has submitted that the power of Administrator/Lieutenant Governor under Section 20 of the Act are distinct from the power of the Director of Education under Section 24 of the Act. It is further contended that compliance of Section 24(3) is not mandatory before issuance of show cause notice under Section 20 of the Act.

72. In support of this submission, learned counsel for respondent no.1 has placed reliance on Managing Committee Vidya Bhawan Girls Sr. Sec. School Vs. Director of Education & Anr., reported at 198 (2013) DLT 355 (DB), more particularly para 14, which reads as under:

“14. This takes us to the challenge to the order of taking over on merits. It is true that on an earlier occasion, this Court vide orders dated 20.7.2010 directed the respondent to pass a detailed order. It is the contention of the petitioner that in spite of the said direction, an order without reason has been passed. Further, it is the contention that the order relies upon certain irregularities/malpractices on the basis of subsequent events for which the petitioner school was not given any opportunity. It is the further contention that in any event, the irregularities/malpractices are not supported by any inspection under Section 24 of the Act. Since the challenge is on the basis of violation of principles of natural justice and failure of the Director to conduct inspection, the scope of inspection under Section 20(4) of the Act and the consequence thereof could be mentioned once again. As already observed that one should not mix up the power of administrator with the management enshrined under Section 20 of the Act with the power of the Director to stop the aid, withdrawing the
recognition or taking over the management of the school under Section 24 of the Act. Section 24(1) of the Act relates to inspection of a school. In the event, either on the basis of inspection carried on under Section 24(1) or a special inspection is carried under Section 24(2) of the Act, any defects or deficiencies are noted, the Manager of the school is entitled for an opportunity to rectify such defects or deficiencies. In the case of failure to rectify the defects or the deficiencies, the Direction is not complies with, the Director may stop the aid or withdraw the recognition of the school. We are concerned about the taking over of the school under Section 20 of the Act. It is true that Clause (c) of sub-Section (4) of Section 24 of the Act contemplates taking over of the school. As against the power to order stoppage of the aid and withdrawal of the recognition, the Director cannot pass order taking over the school invoking Clause (c) of sub-Section (4) of Section 24 of the Act, since such order could be passed only in terms of Section 20 of the Act by the administrator. The inspection contemplated under Section 24 of the Act is also relevant for the purpose of making a report to the administrator as to the failure on the part of the Manager to rectify any defects or deficiencies found at the time of inspection. The report shall be the basis for the administrator to satisfy himself as to whether provisions of Section 20(1) of the Act should be invoked or not. For the purpose of violation of principles of natural justice, it is to be noticed that after the inspection was carried on and in case of deficiency or defect was noticed, an opportunity is contemplated to the school as the Director will give opportunity to the Manager to rectify deficiency or defect under sub-Section (3) of Section 24 of the Act. In this context, we refer that a show cause notice dated 23.7.2010 was issued to the school earlier with regard to certain irregularities and on the said date, there was no inspection as the inspection was carried on only on 26.7.2010. Nevertheless, deficiency/defect noted in the inspection was communicated to the school on 31.7.2010. The school also replied to the said show cause notice dated 07.8.2010. The school had an opportunity to explain the irregularities/malpractices. The report was made available to the administrator and the same has been referred to by him in the impugned order dated 07.9.2012 wherein the administrator had applied his mind to the earlier show cause notice dated 23.7.2010 and the reply of the school dated 07.8.2010. The administrator has also referred to the subsequent reply of school dated 07.10.2010 as well. As against an opportunity provided under Section 24 of the Act, we do not find any opportunity is contemplated under Section 20 of the Act. Of course, the provision of sub-Section (1) of Section 20 of the Act requires the administrator to satisfy himself that the Managing Committee or the Manager or school has failed to perform any of the duties imposed on it by or under this Act or any rule made thereunder and such satisfaction should be supported by materials. On the date when the first show cause notice dated 23.7.2010 was issued, there were irregularities as could be seen from the very show cause notice itself. Relevant materials were available before the Administrator as to the various irregularities referred to in the said show cause notice, which were vital and serious. To this extent, there is no controversy. In fact, the petitioner school had the opportunity to send a reply dated 07.8.2010. Hence, the petitioner school cannot have any grievance as to non-compliance of principles of natural justice.”

73. I find force in the submission made by learned counsel for respondent no.1 that the powers of the Administrator/Lieutenant Governor under Section 20 of Delhi School Education Act are distinct from the power of the Director of Education under Section 24 of the Act. Section 24 of the Act relates to the inspection of the school and if during the inspection carried out under Section 24(1) or any special inspection carried out under Section 24(2) of the Act any defects or deficiencies are noted opportunity to rectify such defects is liable to be given and in the absence of compliance either the recognition may be withdrawn or the aid may be stopped.

74. In my view the judgment of the Division Bench, relied upon by learned counsel for respondent no.1, is applicable to the facts of this case on all force.

75. In view of the above discussion (i) order dated 26.9.2012 passed by respondents no.1 and 2, directing to take over the management of the school, is quashed; (ii) order dated 12.7.2012 passed by respondents no.1, by which respondent no.1 stayed operation of the Bank account of the petitioner no.1 by anyone without prior permission of Dy. Director Education (SW-A); and letter dated 13.7.2012 issued by respondent No.2, by which respondent no.2 intimated the petitioner no.1 about the order passed on 12.7.2012, are quashed; and (iii) letter no.6931 dated 18.2.2013 issued by respondents, by which request for conducting special investigation under Rule 180(3) of Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 in respect of Upras Vidyalaya, Vasant Vihar, District South West-A, was made, is also quashed. Rule is made absolute. G.S.SISTANI, J DECEMBER 24th, 2014 msr /ssn