U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Shahida & Ors.

Delhi High Court · 28 Jan 2015 · 2015:DHC:832

G. P. Mittal

MAC APP No.325/2013

2015:DHC:832

civil appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court upheld negligence of the bus driver but reduced compensation by disallowing future prospects addition due to lack of evidence, reaffirming binding precedents on future prospects in motor accident claims.

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MAC APP No.325/2013 $- 10 HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 28th January, 2015

MAC.APP. 325/2013
U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION ..... Appellant
Through: Ms. Garima Prashad with Ms. Salonee Agarwal, Advocates.

VERSUS

SHAHIDA & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Pankaj Kumar Doval with Mr. Ashish Kumar & Ms. Anjana Sirohi, Advocates for R-1 to 6.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.P.MITTAL G. P. MITTAL, J. (ORAL)

JUDGMENT

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 7.01.2013 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (the Claims Tribunal) whereby compensation of Rs.12,61,570/- was awarded in favour of Respondents no.1 to 6 for the death of Shaukat Ali who died in a motor vehicular accident which occurred on 28.5.2010.

2. During inquiry before the Claims Tribunal, it was pleaded that deceased Shaukat Ali was supplying milk and earning Rs.10,000/- per month. The Claims Tribunal in the absence of any evidence with regard to the business carried on by the deceased, took the minimum wages of a matriculate (as per deceased’s qualification); added 30% towards future prospects in view of decision in Santosh Devi vs. National Insurance Company Limited & Ors.: II(2012) ACC 377 (SC); 2015:DHC:832 deducted 1/4th towards personal and living expenses considering the number of dependents to be six and computed the loss of dependency as Rs.11,31,570/-. The Claims Tribunal further awarded a sum of Rs.1,30,000/- towards non-pecuniary expenses to award the overall compensation of Rs.12,61,570/-.

3. The following contentions are raised on behalf of the Appellant U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (UPSRTC):-

(i) There was no negligence on the part of the driver of UPSRTC bus or in any case there was contributory negligence on the part of deceased Shaukat Ali; and

(ii) Addition towards future prospects was not permissible in the absence of any evidence with regard thereto. Reliance is placed on Sarla Verma (Smt.) & Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 121 and Reshma Kumari & Ors. v. Madan Mohan & Anr., (2013) 9 SCC 65.

4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Respondents/claimants submits that since the deceased was aged 37 years at the time of his death, addition towards future prospects to the extent of 50% ought to have been made. It is further urged that compensation awarded towards non-pecuniary damages is on the lower side.

NEGLIGENCE

5. I have the trial court record before me. The Claims Tribunal appraised the evidence of Shokeen (an eye-witness of the accident), PW-2 and Manoj Kumar, R1W[1], driver of the offending bus and the documents placed on record to opine that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of Bus No.UP 11 T 0928 by bus driver Manoj Kumar. I fully agree with the conclusion arrived at by the Claims Tribunal with regard to the issue of negligence and discarding of the testimony of driver of the bus in view of the fact that the testimony of Shokeen, PW-2, stood corroborated from the attested copy of the site plan which clearly depicted that the motor-cyclist was going on the correct side, that is, left side of the road, whereas the bus driven by driver Manoj Kumar and owned by the Appellant came on the wrong side of the road and hit the motor-cyclist at point A. In a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the Claims Tribunal/court has to decide negligence on the touchstone of preponderance of probability which has been sufficiently done by the Respondents/claimants in this case. The finding of negligence, therefore, cannot be faulted.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

6. As far as addition towards future prospects is concerned, the issue has been examined at great length by this Court in HDFC ERGO General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Lalta Devi & Ors., MAC. APP. 189/2014 decided on 12.01.2015. Paras 9 to 21 of the report in Lalta Devi are extracted hereunder:-

“9. The learned counsel for the Claimants has referred to a three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Rajesh & Ors. v. Rajbir Singh & Ors., (2013) 9 SCC 54 to contend that the future prospects have to be added in all cases where a

person is getting fixed wages or is a seasonal employee or is a student.

10. It is urged by the learned counsel for the Claimants that the law laid down in Sarla Verma (Smt.) & Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 121 was extended in Rajesh & Ors. v. Rajbir Singh & Ors., (2013) 9 SCC 54 to hold that future prospects ought to be extended in all cases.

11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Insurance Company refers to a three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Reshma Kumari & Ors. v. Madan Mohan & Anr., (2013) 9 SCC 65 wherein while approving the ratio with regard to future prospects in Sarla Verma (Smt.) & Ors. (supra) and relying on General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 176; Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav, (1996) 3 SCC 179 and Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General, Geological Survey of India & Anr., 2003 (3) SCC 148, the Supreme Court held as under:- “38. With regard to the addition to income for future prospects, in Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121: (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002], this Court has noted the earlier decisions in Susamma Thomas [Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas, (1994) 2 SCC 176: 1994 SCC (Cri) 335], Sarla Dixit[(1996) 3 SCC 179] and Abati Bezbaruah [Abati Bezbaruah v. Geological Survey of India, (2003) 3 SCC 148: 2003 SCC (Cri) 746] and in para 24 of the Report held as under: (Sarla Verma case [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121: (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770:

134)

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“24. … In view of the imponderables and uncertainties, we are in favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the actual salary income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years. (Where the annual income is in the taxable range, the words „actual salary‟ should be read as „actual salary less tax‟). The addition should be only 30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years. There should be no addition, where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. Though the evidence may indicate a different percentage of increase, it is necessary to standardise the addition to avoid different yardsticks being applied or different methods of calculation being adopted. Where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary (without provision for annual increments, etc.), the courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death. A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances.”

39. The standardization of addition to income for future prospects shall help in achieving certainty in arriving at appropriate compensation. We approve the method that an addition of 50% of actual salary be made to the actual salary income of the deceased towards future prospects where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years and the addition should be only 30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years and no addition should be made where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. Where the annual income is in the taxable range, the actual salary shall mean actual salary less tax. In the cases where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary without provision for annual increments, the actual income at the time of death without any addition to income for future prospects will be appropriate. A departure from the above principle can only be justified in extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases.”

12. The learned counsel for the Insurance Company relies upon a Constitutional Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2005) 2 SCC 673; Safiya Bee v. Mohd. Vajahath Hussain @ Fasi, (2011) 2 SCC 94; and Union of India & Ors. v. S.K. Kapoor, (2011) 4 SCC 589 to contend that in case of divergence of opinion in judgments of benches of co-equal strength, earlier judgment will be taken as a binding precedent.

13. It may be noted that in Reshma Kumari & Ors. v. Madan Mohan & Anr., (2013) 9 SCC 65; the three Judge Bench was dealing with a reference made by a two Judge Bench (S.B. Sinha and Cyriac Joseph, J.J.). The two Hon‟ble Judges wanted an authoritative pronouncement from a Larger Bench on the question of applicability of the multiplier and whether the inflation was built in the multiplier. The three Judge Bench approved the two Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (Smt.) & Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 121 with regard to the selection of multiplier. It further laid down that addition towards future prospects to the extent of 50% of the actual salary shall be made towards future prospects when the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years and addition of 30% should be made if the age of the deceased was between 40-50 years. No addition towards future prospects shall be made where the deceased was self-employed or was getting a fixed salary without any provision of annual increment.

14. Of course, three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in its later judgment in Rajesh relying on Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors., 2012 (6) SCC 421 observed that there would be addition of 30% and 50%, depending upon the age of the deceased, towards future prospects even in the case of self-employed persons. It may, however, be noted that in Rajesh, the three Judge Bench decision in Reshma Kumari (supra) was not brought to the notice of their Lordships.

15. The divergence of opinion was noted by another three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Verma v. Haryana Roadways, (2014) 3 SCC 210. In paras 14 and 15, the Supreme Court observed as under:-

“14. Certain parallel developments will now

have to be taken note of. In Reshma

Kumari v. Madan Mohan [(2009) 13 SCC

422 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 143 : (2010) 1

SCC (Cri) 1044] , a two-Judge Bench of this

Court while considering the following

questions took the view that the issue(s)

needed resolution by a larger Bench: (SCC

p. 425, para 10) “(1) Whether the multiplier specified in the Second Schedule appended to the Act should be scrupulously applied in all the cases? (2) Whether for determination of the multiplicand, the Act provides for any criterion, particularly as regards determination of future prospects?” 15. Answering the above reference a three- Judge Bench of this Court in Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan [(2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826] (SCC p. 88, para 36) reiterated the view taken in Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] to the effect that in respect of a person who was on a fixed salary without provision for annual increments or who was self- employed the actual income at the time of death should be taken into account for

determining the loss of income unless there are extraordinary and exceptional circumstances. Though the expression “exceptional and extraordinary circumstances” is not capable of any precise definition, in Shakti Devi v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2010) 14 SCC 575:

(Cri) 848] there is a practical application of the aforesaid principle. The near certainty of the regular employment of the deceased in a government department following the retirement of his father was held to be a valid ground to compute the loss of income by taking into account the possible future earnings. The said loss of income, accordingly, was quantified at double the amount that the deceased was earning at the time of his death.”

16. Further, the divergence of opinion in Reshma Kumari & Ors. v. Madan Mohan & Anr., (2013) 9 SCC 65 and Rajesh & Ors. v. Rajbir Singh & Ors., (2013) 9 SCC 54 was noticed by the Supreme Court in another latest judgment in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pushpa & Ors., CC No.8058/2014, decided on 02.07.2014 and in concluding paragraph while making reference to the Larger Bench, the Supreme Court held as under:- “Be it noted, though the decision in Reshma (supra) was rendered at earlier point of time, as is clear, the same has not been noticed in Rajesh (supra) and that is why divergent opinions have been expressed. We are of the considered opinion that as regards the manner of addition of income of future prospects there should be an authoritative pronouncement. Therefore, we think it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench.”

17. Now, the question is which of the judgments ought to be followed awaiting answer to the reference made by the Supreme Court in Pushpa & Ors. (supra).

18. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2005) 2 SCC 673 in para 12, the Supreme Court observed as under:-

“12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties and having examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms: (1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength. (2) [Ed.: Para 12(2) corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./21/2005 dated 3-3-2005.] A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness

of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted. (3) [Ed.: Para 12(3) corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./7/2005 dated 17-1-2005.] The above rules are subject to two exceptions: (i) the abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and (ii) in spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of the Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh [(1989) 2 SCC 754] and Hansoli Devi [(2002) 7 SCC 273].”

19. Similarly, in Safiya Bee v. Mohd. Vajahath Hussain @ Fasi, (2011) 2 SCC 94 in para 27, the Supreme Court observed as under:-

“27. However, even assuming that the decision in WP No. 35561 of 1998 did not operate as res judicata, we are constrained to observe that even if the learned Judges who decided WP No. 304 of 2001 did not agree with the view taken by a coordinate Bench of equal strength in the earlier WP No. 35561 of 1998 regarding the interpretation of Section 2(c) of the Act and its application to the petition schedule property, judicial discipline and practice required them to refer the issue to a larger Bench. The learned Judges were not right in overruling the statement of the law by a coordinate Bench of equal strength. It is an accepted rule or principle that the statement of the law by a Bench is considered binding on a Bench of the same or lesser number of Judges. In case of doubt or disagreement about the decision of the earlier Bench, the well-accepted and desirable practice is that the later Bench would refer the case to a larger Bench.”

20. In Union of India & Ors. v. S.K. Kapoor, (2011) 4 SCC 589 while holding that the decision of the Coordinate Bench is binding on the subsequent Bench of equal strength, held that the Bench of Co-ordinate strength can only make a reference to a larger Bench. In para 9 of the report, the Supreme Court held as under:-

“9. It may be noted that the decision in S.N. Narula case [(2011) 4 SCC 591] was prior to the decision in T.V. Patel case [(2007) 4 SCC 785 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 98] . It is well settled that if a subsequent coordinate Bench of equal strength wants to take a different view, it can only refer the matter to

a larger Bench, otherwise the prior decision of a coordinate Bench is binding on the subsequent Bench of equal strength. Since, the decision in S.N. Narula case [(2011) 4 SCC 591] was not noticed in T.V. Patel case [(2007) 4 SCC 785: (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 98], the latter decision is a judgment per incuriam. The decision in S.N. Narula case [(2011) 4 SCC 591] was binding on the subsequent Bench of equal strength and hence, it could not take a contrary view, as is settled by a series of judgments of this Court.”

21. This Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Harpal Singh & Ors., MAC APP.138/2011, decided on 06.09.2013, went into this question and held that in view of the report in S.K. Kapoor (supra), the three Judge Bench decision in Reshma Kumari & Ors. (surpa) shall be taken as a binding precedent.”

7. In the instant case, in the absence of any evidence with regard to deceased’s profession, the Claims Tribunal took the minimum wages of a matriculate to compute the loss of dependency. In absence of any evidence with regard to future prospects, addition of 30% could not have been made. Thus, the loss of dependency comes to Rs.8,70,480/- (Rs.6448 x ¾ x 12 x 15).

8. In view of the judgment in Rajesh & Ors. v. Rajbir Singh & Ors., (2013) 9 SCC 54, the Respondents are further entitled to a sum of Rs.[1] lakh each towards loss of love and affection and loss of consortium, Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses and Rs.10,000/towards loss to estate.

9. The overall compensation is thus, recomputed as under:- S.No. Head of Compensation Compensation granted by this Court)

1. Loss of Dependency Rs. 8,70,480/-

2. Loss of Love and Affection Rs.1,00,000/-

3. Loss of Consortium Rs.1,00,000/-

4. Loss to Estate Rs.10,000/-

5. Funeral Expenses Rs.25,000/- Total Rs.11,05,480/-

10. The excess compensation of Rs.1,56,090/- (Rs.12,61,570/- less Rs.11,05,480/-) along with proportionate interest shall be refunded to the Appellant insurance company. The amount payable shall be disbursed/held in fixed deposit in terms of order passed by the Claims Tribunal.

11. The appeal stands disposed of.

12. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.

13. Statutory amount of Rs.25,000/-, if any, shall also be refunded to the Appellant.

JUDGE JANUARY 28th, 2015 srb

U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Shahida & Ors.

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