Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 1164/2020 & CM APPL. 24598/2025
AABI BINJU .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. K.L. Manhas, Adv.
Through: Mr. Shoumendu Mukherji, Senior Panel Counsel
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL
JUDGMENT
25.04.2025 C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1. Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. The application stands disposed of.
REVIEW PET. 239/2025
3. This petition seeks review of judgment dated 28 February 2025 passed by this Court in WP (C) 1164/2020.
4. We have heard Mr. K.L. Manhas, learned Counsel for the petitioner, at some length.
5. Mr. Manhas urges two issues on which he seeks a review of our judgment.
6. We deal with them, sequentially, thus.
7. The first submission of Mr. Manhas is that the Court has not passed any order on the consequential relief by way of notional promotion, seniority, etc., which may enure to the petitioner as a result of our judgment.
8. This cannot, in our view, constitute a ground for review, for a very simple reason.
9. Paras 8 and 13 of the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal[1] read thus:
“the Tribunal”, hereinafter
13. To reassure ourselves as to whether we have omitted any point argued earlier, we asked Shri S.K. Gupta, learned counsel who is present in the Court. In all fairness, he stated that all the points that were raised by him were dealt with and no aspect argued by him, was left by the Tribunal. It is the wisdom of the applicant to raise different pleas before different fora. The result is that the valuable time of the Courts is wasted and that is only adding to the pendency of cases.”
10. Further, the Tribunal, in para 25 of its judgment, recorded thus:
11. Thus, the only aspect which was argued before the Tribunal was with respect to the correctness of the remarks entered in the Annual Confidential Reports[2] of the petitioner for the years 2005-06 and 2006-07.
12. We have also, therefore, examined the correctness of the judgment of the Tribunal with respect to the remarks entered in the petitioner’s ACRs for the said years.
13. There being no other issue argued before the Tribunal, including the entitlement of the petitioner for consequential relief, it cannot be said that, in not returning any finding in that regard, our judgment dated 28 February 2025 suffers from any error apparent on the face of the record. “ACRs”, hereinafter
14. However, we clarify that our judgment would not preclude the petitioner from pursuing any remedies which may be available to him in law, with respect to any consequential relief, if he is entitled to any such relief, on the basis of the judgment passed by us. We may note that we have already reserved the right of the petitioner in this regard in para 67 of our judgment under review.
15. In case any representation has been made by the petitioner in that regard, it would be appropriate if the respondents’ takes a decision thereon expeditiously.
16. The second ground of review, asserted by Mr. Manhas, is that, though there were adverse remarks in the petitioner’s ACRs for the years 2005-06 and 2006-07, they were not communicated to him.
17. Mr. Manhas submits that the aspect of non-communication was specifically pleaded in the OA filed before the Tribunal.
18. We have already noted that, to a specific query from the Tribunal, the learned Counsel who appeared on behalf of the petitioner acknowledged that he was only questioning the aspect of the correctness of the remarks entered in the petitioner’s ACRs for the said years, and was arguing no other point.
19. We have perused the entire judgment of the Tribunal and we do not find that any submission was advanced by the petitioner before the Tribunal on the aspect of communication of the ACRs or the necessity thereof.
20. It is for this reason that we have also demurred from returning any finding in that regard in our judgment, of which review is sought.
21. We may reproduce, in this regard, para 93 of the judgment of the Seven Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v UOI[3], in which it is specifically stated that the High Court cannot act as a Court of first instance on any aspect of the matter, which has to be first addressed before the Tribunal:
93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.” (Emphasis supplied)
22. We, therefore, do not find this, either, to be a ground for reviewing in our decision.
23. Accordingly, subject to the limited caveat entered in paras 14 and 15 supra, we find no merit in the present review petition which is, accordingly, dismissed.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.