South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. IFCILTD

1. LPA No.78/2015 which laid a challenge to the substantive decision dated November 18, 2014 in W.P.(C) No.4436/2010, which has been followed in various writ petitions filed by the respondent in the appeal was dismissed by this Bench on February 18,2015 giving reasons as under:- "

1. Having heard learned counselfor the appellant and the respondents we dismiss the appeal in liminefor the reason we concur with the core reasoning ofthe learnedSingle Judge that at best the approvalgranted by the Supreme Courtfor apolicy to regulate advertisements by the Supreme Court did not empower the appellant to issue an executive instruction levying penalty.

2. It is trite that the three statutory Municipal Corporations in Delhi function under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957and thus exercise delegatedpowers. LPA Nos.84,85,87to 90of2015 Page 3of[5] 'z

3. Though notreferred to by the learnedSingle Judge, Section 99 ofthe DMC Act, 1957 contemplates the constitution ofa municipalfund in which allfunds and moneys realized by the Corporations in Delhi are credited which would includefines which are levied under the Act or under any rule, regulation or bye-law made thereunder, vide clause(f)ofsub-Section 1 ofSection 99.

4. It is case ofthe appellant in appeal that under the policy fines were being imposed. The appellant concedes thatsuch a fine is neither contemplated by the Act nor under any rule, regulation or bye-law made by the Corporation or the Central Government.

5. While granting approval to the policy placed before the Supreme Court regulating advertisements, it may be true that the appellants broughtto the notice ofthe Supreme Courtthatit would be levyingafine. Whereas it may befurther true thatthe Supreme Court considered the policy placed before it, but we do notfind the Supreme Courtaccorded its seal ofapproval to start levying thefine. We borrow the expression used by the Supreme Court in its order dated October 12, 2007. It is to be foundinparagraph 3. The expression usedis:'MCD would be atliberty to go ahead with thepolicy and thepersons whofeels aggrieved...'.

6. The go ahead signal by the Supreme Court only meant that the Supreme Court was satisfied with the proposed measures adoptedto be taken. Itdidnot mean thatthe three corporations couldstartlevying thefines by issuing an executive order. The reason is thatfines can be levied by the Corporation either under the DMCAct, 1957or under any rule, regulation or byelaws made under the Act. The appellant concedes that no provision under the Act empowers it to levy the fines. The appellant concedes that there is neither a rule nor a regulation nor a bye-law empowering it to do so.

7. The order ofthe Supreme Court would therefore have to be understoodto mean thatthe three statutory Corporations could LPA Nos.84,85,87to 90of2015 Page 4of[5] haveframed either bye-laws or rules or regulations or could have called upon the Central Government topromulgate rules or regulationsin saidregard.

8. Itis trite that undera delegatedlegislation the delegatee can exercise onlysuchpowersasare delegatedto itandifthere isa mannerprescribedfor exercise ofthe delegatedpower;strictly in accordance therewith.

9. We do not deal with the issues whether the levy was a regulatoryfee or not because thepositive stand taken before us in appealis thatthe levy was by way ofafine.

10. The appeal is accordingly dismissed in limine advising the appellant to give effect to itspolicy by eitherframing bye-laws ora rule ora regulation in saidregard.

11. No costs".

2. For the reasons recorded in the decision dated February 18, 2015 dismissing the LPA No.78/2015 the instant appeals are also dismissed. CM No.2858/2015 in LPA 84/2015 CM No.2862/2015 in LPA 85/2015 CM No.2873/2015 in LPA 87/2015 CM No.2879/2015 in LPA 88/2015 CM No.2883/2015 in LPA 89/2015 CM No.2888/2015 in LPA 90/2015 Dismissed as infructuous. CAV 172/2015 in LPA 87/2015 Dismissed as infructuous.