Upras Vidyalaya v. Padmini Singla

1. This is a contempt case filed by the petitioners against the respondents under Section 12 r/w Section 3 ofthe Contempt ofCourts Act, 1971 for wilful disobedience of the order of the court dated 24.12.2014.

2. The grievance of the petitioner in the present contempt petition is that vide order dated 24.12.2014, the writ petition of the petitioner was allowed with the following operativeportion ofthe judgment. 2015:DHC:10857 "In view of the above discussion (i) order dated 26.9.2012 passed by respondents no.l and 2, directing to take over the management of the school, is quashed; (ii) order dated 12.7.2012 passed byrespondents no.l, bywhich respondent no.l stayed operation of the Bank account of the.P.(C)NOS.6288/2012, 4308/2012 & 3643/2013 petitioner no.l by anyone without priorpermission of Dy. Director Education (SW- A); and letter dated 13.7.2012 issued by respondent No.2, by which respondent no.2 intimated the petitioner no.l about the order ^ passed on 12.7.2012, are quashed; and (iii) letter no.6931 dated 18.2.2013 issued by respondents, by which request for conducting special investigation under Rule 180(3) of Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 in respect of Upras Vidyalaya, VasantVihar, District South West-A, -O was made, is also quashed. Rule is made absolute."

3. A perusal of the aforesaid paragraph would show that vide order dated 24.12.2014, the order dated 12.07.2012 which was passed by the respondent No.l staying the operation of the bank account of the petitioner No.l by anyone without the prior permission of the / Deputy Director, South-West-A and the letter dated 13.07.2012 issued by the respondent No.2 intimating the petitioner No.l about orderpassed on 12.07.2012, were quashed.

4. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that since the order dated 12.07.2012 by virtue of which the operation of the bank account of the petitioner No.l was freezed by the respondents has been quashed, the respondents were under an obhgation to have sent a communication to the bank intimating them that the petitioner No.l be permitted to operate the account. It has been stated by Mr. Kher that a notice was also sent to the respondents intimating that they should communicate to the bank that the order has been quashed and thepetitioners bepermitted to operate the account butdespite this no order has been either passed or sent to the bank permitting the operation of the account and thus this constitutes wilful disobedience if of the order passed by the court for which the respondents deserve to be proceeded against.

5. The learnedcounsel for the respondents has statedthat although no formal notice of this contempt petition has been issued to the respondents, but the fact of the matter remains that the respondents have applied for certified copy of the judgment, but it has still not been made available to them and the moment certified copy of the judgment is made available to them, they will take necessary steps either to assail thejudgment or comply withthe same. In any case, it has been stated by them that before any action for contempt is \ initiated, thepetitioners are under an obUgation to show thatnot only there is disobedience, but the said disobedience is wilful, deliberate and contumacious and since the petitioners have not been able to show the same, therefore, the present contempt petition is totally misconceived and premature.

6. I havecarefully considered the respective submissions and gone 'Y through the record.

7. I find myself in agreement with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the filing of the present contempt petition is totally premature. Apart from this, there is no case at this point oftime made out which would warrant an action or issuance of notice to the respondents to show cause as to why contempt action be not initiated against them. This is because of the reason that the judgment itself has been passed on 24.12.2014 that is almost two and a halfmonths ago. It is not the case of the petitioners that after the judgment was passed, they had approached with a certified copy of the order dated 24.12.2014 to their banker seeking permission to operate the account and that the banker.had refiised them the operation ofthe account. Ifthat had been the case, the initiation of 7: contempt action against thebanlcer would be maintainable for wilfully disobeying the orders ofthe court.

8. So far as the issuance of letter by the respondents intimating the banker of the petitioner about the outcome of the petition is concerned, obviously it is bound to take sometime. The respondents have stated that they have already applied for a certified copy of the ^ judgment, which has not been made available to them and obviously until and unless the certified copy of the judgment is made available to them, they cannot be expected to send an intimation to banker of -V- the petitioners without reading it.

9. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the judgment could have been downloaded by the respondents from the internet and letter issued by them to the banker of the petitioners. ^ 10. No doubt, that could have been done, but the copy downloaded from internet would not be a certified copy and no officer would like to takea riskofsending any information onthebasis of anuncertified copy without satisfying himself about the exact contents ofthe order.

11. For the reasons given above, I am of the considered opinion that there is no disobedience of the order of the court, much less the same can be said to be wilful and accordingly the present contempt petition is totally premature and the same is dismissed. ^K. SHALI, J MARCH 10, 2015