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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 718/2015
JUDGMENT
Through: Mr. V.K. Sharma, Advocate
Through: Mr. Rajesh Gogna, Central Government Standing Counsel with
Mr. Sameer Sharma and Ms. Nidhi Raman and Ms. Nikhita, Advocates for respondent Nos. 1 to 4.
1. Vide the present writ petition the petitioner has challenged the award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CGIT’) dated 21.01.2013 whereby his claim was dismissed.
2. From the facts of the case, it is evident that initially the dispute was referred for adjudication to the CGIT vide order No.L- 42012/136/98-IR(DU), New Delhi dated 30.11.98 with following 2015:DHC:2486 terms: “Whether the action of the management of Carpet Weaving Training Centre in terminating the services of Shri Charan Singh is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to?”
3. Vide the award dated 02.08.2006, the CGIT, Kanpur formed an opinion that the reference order lacked in material particulars since date of termination was not mentioned therein and thereafter answered the reference as unarticulable. The petitioner again approached the appropriate government and the appropriate government made the fresh reference vide Order No.L-42012/136/98- IR(DU), New Delhi dated 16.01.2007 with following terms: “Whether the action of the management of Carpet Weaving Training Centre in terminating the services of Shri Charan Singh with effect from 01.01.1985 is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to?”
4. The petitioner had filed a statement claim before the CGIT wherein it has alleged that he was appointed as chowkidar on 01.10.1983 after due selection by the respondent. At the time of employment he was also assured vide document dated 01.10.1983 that he would be regularised on the post in due course. He has stated that his wages were paid at the rate of Rs.240/- per month till 31.12.1984 and he rendered continuous service of more than 240 days in a calendar year. The petitioner had challenged his termination being illegal as same in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the I.D.Act’) and had prayed for reinstatement with continuity in service and full back wages.
5. The claim of the petitioner was contested by the respondent by filing a written statement before the CGIT. In the written statement it is contended that the claimant was engaged as a daily wager as per requirement from time to time between September, 1983 and December, 1985 and that he had never completed 240 days of continuous service in a calendar year and the provisions of Section 25-F of the I.D.Act were not applicable to him and thus, he was not entitled for any retrenchment compensation and the act of the respondent was not illegal and the claim was liable to be dismissed.
6. The CGIT had framed the following issues which are reproduced as follows: “(i) Whether there is no privity of contract between the claimant and the management?
(ii) As in terms of reference.
(iii) Relief.”
7. Thereafter the CGIT had recorded the statements of the parties and heard the arguments and gave its findings.
8. It is clear that the CGIT has followed the procedure while arriving at the conclusion.
9. The petitioner has challenged the said award basically on the grounds that since he had completed 240 days of service before the date of his termination, the act of termination of service without payment of retrenchment compensation and the notice pay is in violation of Section 25-F of the I.D.Act.
10. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that in support of his contention of being in continuous employment of the respondent and having been completed 240 days preceding the date of termination, he had filed documents Ex.WW1/M[2] and Ex.WW1/M[3] but the CGIT had wrongly rejected those documents and relied on the documents of the respondents. It is argued that these documents had been issued by the officer of the respondent and therefore, the finding of the CGIT discarding these documents is wrong.
11. I have heard arguments and have perused the record. The trial Court Record was also called in this case and perused.
12. The issue involved in the present case is that whether the petitioner had been in continuous service of the respondent with effect from 01.10.1983 till 31.12.1984 as alleged by him.
13. The findings on this issue is finding of fact and if the tribunal has given due consideration to all the materials on record to reach to a conclusion, then that conclusion cannot be interfered with, unless it is shown that conclusion is based on no evidence, or based on surmises and conjectures and thus perverse. This court cannot substitute its findings on a fact to the findings of the tribunal simply because another interpretation was possible or that the findings do not suit the petitioner. Court in writ jurisdiction does not act as an appellate court. The ground on which this court can interfere by way of writ petition under Article 226 is well settled. In Basappa vs. Nagappa: (1955) SCR 250, it was observed by the Supreme Court that a writ of certiorari is generally granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. It is available in those cases where a tribunal, though competent to enter upon an enquiry, acts in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or violates the principles of natural justice where no particular procedure is prescribed. But a mere wrong decision cannot be corrected by a writ of certiorari as that would be using it as the cloak of an appeal in disguise but a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings based on a clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law or absence of or excess of jurisdiction, when shown, can be so corrected. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. vs. State of Saurashtra: (1957) SCR 152, the Supreme Court has again observed that where the Tribunal having jurisdiction to decide a question comes to a finding of fact, such a finding is not open to question under Article 226 unless it could be shown to be wholly unwarranted by the evidence. Likewise, in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. S. Sree Ram Rao: AIR 1963 SC 1723 the Supreme Court observed that where the Tribunal has disabled itself from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or where its conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person can ever have arrived at that conclusion interference under Article 226 would be justified.
14. From the record it is clear that the petitioner has relied on the documents Ex.WW1/M[2] and Ex.WW1/M[3] in support of this contention. The CGIT has dealt with both these documents in its award in paras 17 & 18 which are reproduced as under:
15. There is nothing on record to show that the findings of the tribunal relating to these documents suffer with any infirmity or error apparent on the face of the record. The tribunal has also considered the document produced by the respondent which are Ex.WW1/M[5] to Ex.WW1/M17 on which the petitioner had admitted his signatures and in para 19 of the award made the following observations: “19. Ex.WW1/M[5] to Ex.WW1/M17 are the documents on which claimant admits his signatures. When these documents are scrutinised, it came to light that these documents were signed by Shri M.K.Jain Signatures of Shri M.K.Jain appearing on these documents are compared with signatures, which appear on Ex.WW1/M[2] and Ex.WW1/M[3]. On comparison, it is observed that signatures, appearing on Ex.WW1/M[1] to Ex.WW1/M[3], were recorded by someone else other than Shri M.K.Jain. In view of above reasons, these documents are discarded from consideration.”
16. Thus, the findings of CGIT on issue whether the petitioner had completed 240 days of the service preceding his date of termination is based on the evidences oral and documentary produced before it.
17. As the legal aspect is concerned, the CGIT has correctly interpreted the provisions of Section 25-F of the I.D.Act relating to the meaning of ‘continuous service of 240 days’. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any infirmity in such finding. He only challenges the application of this law on the facts of this case. Since on the basis of the facts of this case the CGIT has reached to the conclusion that the petitioner had not worked for 240 days prior to the date of his termination, the CGIT had reached to the conclusion that there was no violation of Section 25-F of the I.D.Act. The said finding has been given by the CGIT in para 23 of its award which is re-produced as under:
18. From the above discussion, it follows that the petitioner has failed to give any reason to interfere with the award of CGIT. The writ has no merit and the same is dismissed with no order as to cost.
DEEPA SHARMA, J MARCH 16, 2015 rb