Pradeep Khanna v. Renu Khetarpal

13. The appellant has raised a frivolous objection that rent agreement dated 26th September, 2007 placed on record by the respondent is forged whereas the appellant has clearly admitted the rent agreement placed on record by the respondent before the Trial Court in the written statement. The appellant cannot be permitted to withdraw the admissions made in the written statement.

14. The respondent terminated the appellant’s lease by a notice dated 26th October, 2013. The notice of the termination was sent by the respondent to the appellant by registered AD post as well as courier. The original postal receipt, courier receipt as well as acknowledgement card containing the signature dated 28th October, 2013 of the appellant are on record of the Trial Court. The receipt of the notice is admitted by the appellant in para 26 of the written statement which is reproduced hereunder:

15. There is no merit in appellant’s objection to the validity of the notice of termination dated 26th October, 2013. The termination notice dated 26th October, 2013 is clear and unambiguous. Relevant portion of the termination notice is reproduced hereunder: -

16. The appellant has pleaded that he has spent Rs.[7] lakh on repair work in the suit property and has lawfully adjusted the same against the rent/hire charges. However, there is no written consent of the respondent permitting the tenant to carry out the repairs. That apart, the appellant has not given any notice to the respondent either to request the respondent to carry out the repairs with the particulars of the repairs required or to seek his permission to carry out. The appellant has also not given particulars of the repairs carried out and period during when the repairs were carried out. The appellant has also not placed on record the documents relating to the expenditure on repairs. Under clauses 6 and 12 of the rent agreement, the minor repairs have to be carried out by the appellant and major repairs is the responsibility of the respondent. The appellant has not even pleaded whether repairs were minor or major. If the repairs were major, the rent agreement does not permit the appellant to carry out the repairs. On the other hand, if the repairs were minor, the appellant has to carry out on his own cost. In that view of the matter, the right of the appellant to claim the expenses on repairs from the respondent appears to be doubtful. The appellant has also not filed a counter claim to seek recovery of the expenditure on repairs from the respondent in the suit. Be that as it may, since the respondent’s prayer with respect to the arrears of rent and mesne profits is still pending adjudication before the Trial Court, the appellant’s defence with respect to the Rs.[7] lakh alleged to have been spent by him shall be considered by the learned Trial Court at the appropriate stage. However, the decree for possession cannot be denied to the respondent on the appellant’s plea that there are no arrears of rent/hire charges.

17. The appellant has referred to and relied upon Vijay Syal (supra) in which the Supreme Court observed that serious action should be taken against the litigants who make false statements, conceal the material facts and mislead the Court. This judgment does not support the appellant, inasmuch, as the appellant has made false statements. The appellant, despite clear admission of the rent agreement dated 26th September, 2007 in the written statement, urged at the time of hearing that the rent agreement was forged although no such plea was raised before the Trial Court. Even before the Trial Court, the appellant urged at the time of hearing that the termination notice dated 26th October, 2013 was not received by him despite clear admission of the receipt of the notice in the written statement.

18. The appellant has next relied on T. Arivandandam (supra) in which the Supreme Court held that manifestly vexatious and meritless suit which does not disclose a clear right to sue, should be rejected at the very threshold under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This judgment also does not help the appellant, inasmuch, as the respondent admittedly is the owner of the suit property and has validly terminated the appellant’s lease. The respondent, therefore, has clear cause of action to sue the appellant and therefore, the appellant’s application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been rightly dismissed by the learned Trial Court. On the other hand, the appellant, who has admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant as well as termination notice, has raised frivolous defence to somehow delay and defeat the justice.

19. The appellant has next relied on K.K. Velusamy (supra) in which the Trial Court dismissed two applications, one under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to re-open the evidence and the other under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for recalling the witnesses for further cross-examination. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the application under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the Supreme Court set aside the order passed on the second application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and remanded the matter back to the learned Trial Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law. This judgment does not support the appellant in any manner.

20. The appellant has next referred to and relied upon Bhuneshwar Prasad (supra) in which the landlord continued to accept the increased rent from the tenant after the expiry of the lease which was held to create lease from month to month under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. This judgment also does not help the appellant, in any manner, as the appellant has admittedly not paid any rent to the respondent after the termination of the notice dated 26th October, 2013 and there is no such defence either raised or available to the appellant.

21. The appellant has relied upon Manish (supra) in which the landlord accepted the rent after determination of lease and the notice of termination of 30 days was held to be invalid as the lease was for a manufacturing purpose for which six months’ more notice was mandatory. This judgment also does not help the appellant, inasmuch, as the appellant has neither paid any rent after the termination notice nor the appellant’s lease was for manufacturing purpose.

22. The appellant has next relied upon State Bank of India (supra) in which this Court held that Order XII Rule 6 CPC would apply in case of clear unequivocal, unambiguous and unconditional admissions of the appellant. This judgment also does not help the appellant, inasmuch, as the appellant’s admission with respect to the relationship of landlord and tenant as well as termination notice in the written statement are clear and unambiguous.

23. This case is squarely covered by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Payal Vision (supra), Asha Narang (supra) and by this Court in Sky Land International Pvt. Ltd. (supra).

24. In Payal Vision (supra), the Supreme Court held that in a suit for a recovery of possession the landlord is required to establish the existence of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the termination of the tenancy. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder: “7. In a suit for recovery of possession from a tenant whose tenancy is not protected under the provisions of the Rent Control Act, all that is required to be established by the plaintiff landlord is the existence of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the termination of the tenancy either by lapse of time or by notice served by the landlord under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. So long as these two aspects are not in dispute the court can pass a decree in terms of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC…

8. The above sufficiently empowers the court trying the suit to deliver judgment based on admissions whenever such admissions are sufficient for the grant of the relief prayed for. Whether or not there was an unequivocal and clear admission on either of the two aspects to which we have referred above and which are relevant to a suit for possession against a tenant is, therefore, the only question that falls for determination in this case and in every other case where the plaintiff seeks to invoke the powers of the court under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and prays for passing of the decree on the basis of admission. Having said that we must add that whether or not there is a clear admission upon the two aspects noted above is a matter to be seen in the fact situation prevailing in each case. Admission made on the basis of pleadings in a given case cannot obviously be taken as an admission in a different fact situation….”

25. In Asha Narang (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated the principles laid down in Payal Vision (supra). The Supreme Court further held that if the relationship of tenant and landlord and termination are admitted by the tenant, the decree for possession cannot be denied on the ground that the tenant claims to have spent money on the renovation. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder: “7. The above sufficiently empowers the Court trying the suit to deliver judgment based on admissions whenever such admissions are sufficient for the grant of the relief prayed for. Whether or not there was an unequivocal and clear admission on either of the two aspects to which we have referred above and which are relevant to a suit for possession against a tenant is, therefore, the only question that falls for determination in this case and in every other case where the Plaintiff seeks to invoke the powers of the Court under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure and prays for passing of the decree on the basis of admission. Having said that we must add that whether or not there is a clear admission upon the two aspects noted above is a matter to be seen in the fact situation prevailing in each case….

9. Thus, while determining the issue whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment on the basis of facts admitted in the written statement, the issue whether the defendants have spent money on the renovation or that the notice was defective which has not been explained as to how, have no relevance. Thus, the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of possession on the basis of the admissions in the written statement.”

26. In Sky Land International Pvt. Ltd. (supra), this Court discussed judgments of the Supreme Court under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Relevant portion of is reproduced hereunder: - “19. Decree on Admissions under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 19.[1] Order XII Rule 6(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure is reproduced hereunder:- "ORDER XII ADMISSIONS Rule 6. Judgment on admissions- (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions." 19.[2] In Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria, the Supreme Court held that the person resisting a claim for recovery of possession or claiming a right to continue in possession has to establish that he has such a right. The observations of the Supreme Court are as under:-

plaintiff that period of lease of the property stood extended for another period of one year on same terms, even in that case the period of such extended lease expired on 14.1.1996. 19.[4] MEC India Pvt. Ltd. v. Lt. Col. Inder Maira and Ors., 80 (1999) DLT 679:-

18. The purpose of the enactment of provision of Order

12 Rule 6 CPC is to give the plaintiff a right to speedy judgment. The thrust of amendment is that in an appropriate case a party on the admission of the other party can press for judgment as a matter of legal right. If in a case like the present one, a dishonest litigant is permitted to delay the judgment on the ground that he would show during the trial that he had not received the notice, the very purpose of the amendment in the provision would be frustrated.”

20. False Claims and Defenses 20.[1] In Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria, (supra), the Supreme Court held that false claims and defences are serious problems with real estate litigation, predominantly because of ever escalating prices of the real estate. The Supreme Court held as under:- “False claims and false defences

84. False claims and defences are really serious problems with real estate litigation, predominantly because of ever escalating prices of the real estate. Litigation pertaining to valuable real estate properties is dragged on by unscrupulous litigants in the hope that the other party will tire out and ultimately would settle with them by paying a huge amount. This happens because of the enormous delay in adjudication of cases in our Courts. If pragmatic approach is adopted, then this problem can be minimized to a large extent.” 20.[2] In Dalip Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 2 SCC 114, the Supreme Court observed that a new creed of litigants have cropped up in the last 40 years who do not have any respect for truth and shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. The observations of the Supreme Court are as under:-

xxx

54. While imposing costs we have to take into consideration pragmatic realities and be realistic what the Defendants or the Respondents had to actually incur in contesting the litigation before different courts. We have to also broadly take into consideration the prevalent fee structure of the lawyers and other miscellaneous expenses which have to be incurred towards drafting and filing of the counter affidavit, miscellaneous charges towards typing, photocopying, court fee etc.

55. The other factor which should not be forgotten while imposing costs is for how long the Defendants or Respondents were compelled to contest and defend the litigation in various courts. The Appellants in the instant case have harassed the Respondents to the hilt for four decades in a totally frivolous and dishonest litigation in various courts. The Appellants have also wasted judicial time of the various courts for the last 40 years.

56. On consideration of totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find any infirmity in the well reasoned impugned order/judgment. These appeals are consequently dismissed with costs, which we quantify as Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs only). We are imposing the costs not out of anguish but by following the fundamental principle that wrongdoers should not get benefit out of frivolous litigation.” 23.[2] In Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (supra) the Supreme Court held that heavy costs and prosecution should be ordered in cases of false claims and defences as under:- “85. This Court in a recent judgment in Ramrameshwari Devi and Ors. (supra) aptly observed at page 266 that unless wrongdoers are denied profit from frivolous litigation, it would be difficult to prevent it. In order to curb uncalled for and frivolous litigation, the Courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for uncalled for litigation. It is a matter of common experience that Court's otherwise scarce time is consumed or more appropriately, wasted in a large number of uncalled for cases. In this very judgment, the Court provided that this problem can be solved or at least be minimized if exemplary cost is imposed for instituting frivolous litigation. The Court observed at pages 267-268 that imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs and/or ordering prosecution in appropriate cases would go a long way in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricated documents by the litigants. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessary adjournments by the parties. In appropriate cases, the Courts may consider ordering prosecution otherwise it may not be possible to maintain purity and sanctity of judicial proceedings.” 23.[3] In Padmawati v. Harijan Sewak Sangh, 154 (2008) DLT 411, this Court imposed costs of Rs.15.[1] lakhs and noted as under: “6. The case at hand shows that frivolous defences and frivolous litigation is a calculated venture involving no risks situation. You have only to engage professionals to prolong the litigation so as to deprive the rights of a person and enjoy the fruits of illegalities. I consider that in such cases where Court finds that using the Courts as a tool, a litigant has perpetuated illegalities or has perpetuated an illegal possession, the Court must impose costs on such litigants which should be equal to the benefits derived by the litigant and harm and deprivation suffered by the rightful person so as to check the frivolous litigation and prevent the people from reaping a rich harvest of illegal acts through the Courts. One of the aim of every judicial system has to be to discourage unjust enrichment using Courts as a tool. The costs imposed by the Courts must in all cases should be the real costs equal to deprivation suffered by the rightful person.

7. … The petitioners are, therefore, liable to pay costs which is equivalent to the average market rent of 292 months to the Respondent No. 1 and which comes to Rs.14,60,000 apart from litigation expenses and Counsel’s fee throughout which is assessed at Rs. 50,000/-. The petition is hereby dismissed with costs of Rs.15,10,000/- to be recovered from the petitioners jointly and severally. If any amount has been paid towards user charges, the same shall be adjustable.

9. Before parting with this case, I consider it necessary to pen down that one of the reasons for over-flowing of court dockets is the frivolous litigation in which the Courts are engaged by the litigants and which is dragged as long as possible. Even if these litigants ultimately loose the lis, they become the real victors and have the last laugh. This class of people who perpetuate illegal acts by obtaining stays and injunctions from the Courts must be made to pay the sufferer not only the entire illegal gains made by them as costs to the person deprived of his right and also must be burdened with exemplary costs. Faith of people in judiciary can only be sustained if the persons on the right side of the law do not feel that even if they keep fighting for justice in the Court and ultimately win, they would turn out to be a fool since winning a case after 20 or 30 years would make wrong doer as real gainer, who had reaped the benefits for all those years. Thus, it becomes the duty of the Courts to see that such wrong doers are discouraged at every step and even if they succeed in prolonging the litigation due to their money power, ultimately they must suffer the costs of all these years long litigation. Despite settled legal positions, the obvious wrong doers, use one after another tier of judicial review mechanism as a gamble, knowing fully well that dice is always loaded in their favour, since even if they lose, the time gained is the real gain. This situation must be redeemed by the Courts.” 23.[4] In Punjab National Bank v. Virender Prakash, 188 (2012) DLT 48, this Court ruled that penal costs should be imposed on dishonest tenants who illegally continue to occupy the tenanted premises by raising a frivolous defence. This Court imposed costs of Rs.2,00,000/- on the bank which was upheld by the Supreme Court. The relevant findings of this Court are

8. In view of the gross conduct of the appellant in the present case, I dismiss the appeal with costs of `2 lacs. Since the respondents are not represented, costs be deposited in the account of Registrar General of this Court maintained in UCO Bank, Delhi High Court Branch for being utilized towards juvenile justice, surely a just cause. Costs be deposited within a period of four weeks from today. Obviously, the costs may be peanuts for a huge organization such as the appellant-bank but I hope the spirit of the costs will be understood by the appellant-bank as also all other tenants who refuse to vacate the premises although they have overstayed their welcome in the tenanted premises.” The Supreme Court has dismissed the SLP against the aforesaid judgment. The Supreme Court passed the following order:- “On hearing Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner, and on going through the judgment of the High Court, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. We are also satisfied that that High Court was quite justified in imposing the heavy cost against the petitioner bank. The special leave petition is, accordingly dismissed.”

27. In Sky Land International Pvt. Ltd. (supra), this Court after discussing the relevant judgments, summarized the principles of law which are reproduced hereunder: “26. Summary of the principles of law From the analysis of the above decisions and the provisions with which we are concerned, the following principles emerge:- 26.[1] Upon expiry of the term of the lease or on termination of the monthly lease by a notice to quit, the lessee must vacate the property on his own and not wait for the lessor to bring a suit where he can raise all kinds of contests in order to profit from Court delays. 26.[2] Expiry of lease by efflux of time results in the determination of the relationship between the lessor and the lessee and no notice of determination of the lease is required. Mere acceptance of rent by the landlord from the tenant in possession after the lease has been determined either by efflux of time or by notice to quit would not create a tenancy so as to confer on the erstwhile tenant the status of a tenant or a right to be in possession. 26.[3] Notice of termination of lease under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act sent by registered post to the tenant is deemed to be served under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 26.[4] The object of the termination notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is to communicate the intention of the landlord that he wants the premises back and to give 15 days‟ time to vacate. Such notice is not a pleading but a mere communication of the intention of the recipient. Such notice is to be liberally construed as the tenant‟s only right is to get notice of 15 days to vacate. The tenant is under a statutory obligation to vacate the subject property on the expiry of 15 days of the notice. 26.[5] A suit for ejectment is different from a title suit for possession against a trespasser. In a suit for possession against a trespasser, title can be in dispute but in a suit for ejectment against an erstwhile tenant, ordinarily there is no dispute of title as the tenant is estopped from denying the landlord‟s title under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. The dispute is generally on two counts; one, about the assent to continue after the expiry of the fixed term lease by efflux of time and second, about the valid termination in case of monthly lease. The tenant resisting the claim for possession has to plead with sufficiently detailed pleadings, particulars and documents why he must not be ejected and what right he has to continue in possession. There is really nothing else to be tried in such a suit. A suit of this nature can ordinarily be decided on first hearing itself either on the pleadings and the documents or, if need be, by examining the parties under Order X of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. 26.[6] A suit for ejectment of a lessee is not a type of a case where by forging a postal receipt and falsely claiming the issue of the notice to quit, the plaintiff would gain any particular advantage for he could have always served a notice and filed a suit three weeks later. On the other hand, by serving a selfserving denial, the defendant seeks to get an advantage of dragging the proceedings and continuing to enjoy the property without having to pay the current market rent. Having regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct and probabilities, if a notice which can be issued and served again without loss of opportunity, the probability that a person would file a fake proof of sending is nil. On the other hand, if a notice is of a type which had to be served prior to an event that has already occurred, and by its very nature cannot be remedied by a fresh notice, there may be a possibility of it being faked such as a notice exercising the option to renew lease before its expiry. In that case, the Court will look at it differently. 26.[7] The pleadings are the foundation of litigation and must set-forth sufficient factual details. Experience has shown that all kinds of pleadings are introduced and even false and fabricated documents are filed in civil cases because there is an inherent profit in continuation of possession. In a suit for ejectment, it is necessary for the defendant to plead specifically as to the basis on which he is claiming a right to continue in possession. A defendant has to show a subsisting right to continue as a lessee. No issue arises on vague pleadings. A vague denial of the receipt of a notice to quit is not sufficient to raise an issue. To rebut the presumption of service of a notice to quit, the defendant has to plead material particulars in the written statement such as where after receiving the plaint and the documents, the defendant has checked-up with the Post-Office and has obtained a certificate that the postal receipt filed by the plaintiff was forged and was not issued by the concerned Post Office. 26.[8] A self-serving denial by the defendant and more so in these types of cases, cannot hold back the Court from exercising its jurisdiction to decree a suit under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Raising a plea of non-receipt of notice to quit and seeking an issue on it is obviously to drag on the litigation and keep on holding to the suit property without having to pay the current market rentals, is not sufficient to raise an issue and, therefore, liable to be rejected. 26.[9] If such a plea of denial of notice is treated as sufficient to non-suit the plaintiff, the plaintiff will have serve a fresh notice to quit and then bring a fresh suit where again the defendant would deny the receipt of notice to seek an issue and trial. The process would go on repeating itself with another notice, in fact, repeat ad-infinitum and in this manner, the defendant will be able to effectively stay indefinitely till the plaintiff settles with him for a price. The Court cannot remain a silent spectator and allow the abuse of process of law. The eyes of the Courts are wide enough to see the truth and do justice so that the faith of the people in the institution of Courts is not lost.

26.10 In view the amendment brought about to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by Act 3 of 2003, no objection with regard to termination of tenancy is permitted on the ground that the legal notice did not validly terminate the tenancy by a notice ending with the expiry of the tenancy month, as long as a period of 15 days was otherwise given to the tenant to vacate the property. The intention of Legislature is therefore clear that technical objections should not be permitted to defeat the decree for possession of tenanted premises once the tenant has a period of 15 days for vacating the tenanted premises.

26.11 A suit for possession cannot be dismissed on the ground of invalidity of notice of termination because the tenant is only entitled to a reasonable time of 15 days to vacate the property. Therefore, even if the notice of termination is held to be invalid, service of summons of the suit for possession can be taken as notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure but in that event the landlord would be entitled to mesne profits after the expiry of 15 days from the date of the receipt of summons and not from the date of notice of termination.

26.12 The purpose of Order XII Rule 6 CPC is to give the plaintiff a right to speedy judgment. The thrust of amendment of Order XII Rule 6 is that in an appropriate case a party on the admission of the other party can press for judgment as a matter of legal right. If a dishonest litigant is permitted to delay the judgment on the ground that he would show during the trial that he had not received the notice, the very purpose of the amendment would be frustrated.

26.13 Under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, the lessee is estopped from denying the title of the transferee landlord. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that no tenant of immovable property shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny the title of the landlord meaning thereby that so long as the tenant has not surrendered the possession, he cannot dispute the title of the landlord. Howsoever, defective the title of the landlord may be, a tenant is not permitted to dispute the same unless he has surrendered the possession of his landlord.

26.14 A lease of a immovable property is determined by forfeiture in case the lessee renounces his character by setting up a title in a third person. The effect of such a disclaimer is that it brings to an end the relationship of landlord and tenant and such a tenant cannot continue in possession. Section 111(g)(2) of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is based on public policy and the principle of estoppel.

26.15 There is a flood of litigation unnecessarily burdening the Courts only because obdurate tenants refuse to vacate the tenanted premises even after their tenancy period expires by efflux of time or the monthly tenancy has been brought to an end by service of a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It has become quite common for the tenants whose tenancy has been terminated to continue the occupation to drive the landlords to file suits for possession and mesne profits and thereafter raise false claims and defences to continue the possession of the premises. The motivation of the tenant to litigate with the landlord is that he wants to continue the occupation on payment of rent fixed years ago. The continuation of possession in such cases should therefore be permitted upon payment of market rent. In that case, inherent intent of the unscrupulous tenant to continue frivolous litigation would be reduced to a large extent.

26.16 In all proceedings relating to possession of an immovable property against an erstwhile tenant, the Court should broadly take into consideration the prevailing market rentals in the locality for similar premises and fix adhoc amount which the person continuing in possession must pay or deposit as security. If such amount, as may be fixed by the Court, is not paid or deposited as security, the Court may remove the person and appoint a receiver of the property or strike out the claim or defence. This is a very important exercise for balancing equities. The Courts must carry out this exercise with extreme care and caution while keeping pragmatic realities in mind. This is the requirement of equity and justice.

26.17 In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants have cropped up who do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the Courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.

26.18 False claims and defences are serious problems with real estate litigation, predominantly because of ever escalating prices of the real estate. Litigation pertaining to valuable real estate properties is dragged on by unscrupulous litigants in the hope that the other party will tire out and ultimately would settle with them by paying a huge amount. This happens because of the enormous delay in adjudication of cases in our Courts. If pragmatic approach is adopted, then this problem can be minimized to a large extent.

26.19 Certain tenants, in this country, consider it an inherent right not to vacate the premises even after either expiry of tenancy period by efflux of time or after their tenancy is terminated by means of a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Such tenants feel that they ought to vacate the tenanted premises only when the Courts pass a decree for possession against them. The tenants who illegally continue to occupy the tenanted premises by raising frivolous defences should be appropriately burdened with penal costs.

26.20 Dishonest and unnecessary litigations are a huge strain on the judicial system. The Courts are continued to be flooded with litigation with false and incoherent pleas and tainted evidence led by the parties. The judicial system in the country is choked and such litigants are consuming courts„ time for a wrong cause. Efforts are made by the parties to steal a march over their rivals by resorting to false and incoherent statements made before the Court.

26.21 Truth should be the guiding star in the entire judicial process and it must be the endeavour of the court to ascertain the truth in every matter. Truth is the foundation of justice. Section 165 casts a duty on the Judge to discover truth to do complete justice and empowers him to summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. The Judge has to play an active role to discover the truth. He is expected, and indeed it is his duty, to explore all avenues open to him in order to discover the truth and, to that end, question witnesses on points which the lawyers for the parties have either overlooked or left obscure or willfully avoided. The Court can also invoke Section 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure to ascertain the truth.

26.22 Unless the Courts ensure that wrongdoers are denied profit or undue benefit from the frivolous litigation, it would be difficult to control frivolous and uncalled for litigations. In order to curb uncalled for and frivolous litigation, the Courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for uncalled for litigation. It is a matter of common experience that the Courts‟ scarce and valuable time is consumed or more appropriately wasted in a large number of uncalled for cases. It becomes the duty of the Courts to see that such wrong doers are discouraged at every step and even if they succeed in prolonging the litigation, ultimately they must suffer the costs. Despite settled legal positions, the obvious wrong doers, use one after another tier of judicial review mechanism as a gamble, knowing fully well that the dice is always loaded in their favour, since even if they lose, the time gained is the real gain. This situation must be redeemed by the Courts.

26.23 Imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs and or ordering prosecution would go a long way in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricated documents by the litigants. The cost should be equal to the benefits derived by the litigants, and the harm and deprivation suffered by the rightful person so as to check the frivolous litigations and prevent the people from reaping a rich harvest of illegal acts through Court. The costs imposed by the Courts must be the real costs equal to the deprivation suffered by the rightful person and also considering how long they have compelled the other side to contest and defend the litigation in various courts. In appropriate cases, the Courts may consider ordering prosecution otherwise it may not be possible to maintain purity and sanctity of judicial proceedings. The parties raise fanciful claims and contests because the Courts are reluctant to order prosecution.” Conclusion

28. On careful consideration of the rival contentions of the parties and applying the well settled principles of law, this Court is of the view that there is a clear admission of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties as well as the termination of tenancy by a valid notice dated 26th October, 2013 and, therefore, the respondent is entitled to the decree for possession of the suit property under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no infirmity in the impugned decree for possession passed by the learned Trial Court. This appeal is abuse of the process of law and warrants imposition of costs.

29. There is no merit whatsoever in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/-. However, considering that the appellant did not have the assistance of a counsel and appears to have been misguided with respect to the correct position of law, the costs imposed be refunded if the appellant deposits the costs within 10 days before the Execution Court along with an undertaking to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the respondent by 31st May, 2015. In that event, the Execution Court shall record the undertaking of the appellant and defer the execution of the decree till 31st May, 2015 and upon the appellant handing over of the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the respondent on or before 31st May, 2015, the Execution Court shall refund the costs of Rs.50,000/- to the appellant. J.R. MIDHA, J APRIL 10, 2015 rsk