Full Text
Date of Decision: 06.05.2015 RSA No.14/1995
LALA RAM & ORS. …… Appellants
Through: Mr. B.P. Aggarwal, Adv.
Through: Dr.Ashwani Bhardwaj, Adv. for R-1.
RSA No.15/1995
LALA RAM & ORS. …… Appellants
Through: Mr. B.P. Aggarwal, Adv.
Through: Dr.Ashwani Bhardwaj, Adv. for R-1.
2015:DHC:4135 V.K. SHALI, J (ORAL).
JUDGMENT
1. These are regular second appeals, pending in this Court for the last more than two decades. The appeals had come up for the purpose of admission on 09.02.1995, when notices were directed to be issued to the respondents to show cause as to why the appeals be not admitted. After issuance of the notice, as there were 12 appellants, one or the other appellants unfortunately kept on dying and steps were taken for bringing on record the legal heirs of such deceased appellants. In this whole process more than two decades have gone by.
2. These being the regular second appeals, as a matter of fact, notices could have been issued to the respondents only if the appellants had satisfied the Court that the appeals involve any substantial question of law. Earlier also almost two years back when I was sitting on this roster on 31.10.2013, I had taken note of the fact that the appeals have been pending for almost 18 years and there has been no formulation of any substantial question of law. The matters are fixed for today since Mr.Aggarwal, learned counsel for the appellants was not available yesterday.
3. Mr.Aggarwal, learned counsel for the appellants, prays for an adjournment today also. However, it is not possible to accommodate Mr.Aggarwal as the matters are old and pending in this Court for more than two decades.
4. I have heard Mr.Aggarwal for some time. He has contended that the only substantial question of law, which arises for consideration, is with regard to interpretation of document Ex.D-2 which is an extract from Mutation Register in respect of suit property on the basis of which the suit for possession was filed by the appellants. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned trial Court had decreed the suit in favour of the appellant, however, on appeals being preferred by the respondents, the first Appellate Court has reversed the finding. He has contended that a perusal of the document Ex.D-2, contents of which are reproduced in the trial Court judgments and as well as the first Appellate Court judgment, clearly reflects that the predecessor in interest of the appellant was the owner of the ‘Piao’ and ‘Dharamshala’ and, therefore, the suit was not only maintainable but the appellant was entitled to a decree of possession which was passed initially by the trial Court but reversed by the first appellate Court to the extent that the first Appellate Court has mis-interpreted the entries in the document.
5. I have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant and also gone through the records.
6. It is not in dispute that the appellant first based his claim in the suit for possession on an oral Gift of ownership in respect of the suit property. The document, which the appellant produced to support his ownership through Gift is Ex.D-2. The first Appellate Court has observed that Ex.D-2 as well as the order of the Revenue Officer dated 30th August, 1931 on the basis of which the trial Court had decreed the suit in favour of the appellant do not prove the transfer of ownership/gift in respect of the suit property in favour of the appellant. On the contrary both these documents clearly mention that the appellant was not the co-sharer but only a Manager of the ‘Piao and Dharmshala’. This is reflected by the use of the terminology in Ex.D-2 as the appellant being ‘Mohatamim' (Manager) meaning thereby that he does not have any ownership right of a co-sharer in the common land. Similarly, in the order dated 30.08.1931, i.e., the order of the Revenue Officer has taken note of the fact that Ramji Lal as a ‘Hiseydaar’ (Co-sharer) has the right of ownership while as the appellant’s predecessor in interest was ‘Mohatamim’ (Manager) and does not have any right of ownership.
7. Mr. Aggarwal has also contended that the Ld. Appellate Court while interpreting the entry made in the Column no. 10 of Ex. D-2 has not considered that ‘Piao-Dharmshala’ cannot be construed to be a ‘Donee’ of the suit property.
8. In view of the aforesaid facts, the documents, which are being relied upon by the appellant, are by no stretch of imagination to be construed as documents proving gift of ownership. If that be so there is no question of interpretation of the aforesaid documents much less it can be said that it requires any interpretation of these documents and hence involves substantial question of law.
9. For the reasons mentioned above I am fully satisfied that the present appeals do not raise any question of law much less a substantial question of law so as to warrant any further consideration of the present appeals.
10. Dismissed. V.K. SHALI, J. MAY 06, 2015 ss