Sourav Taneja v. Swati Taneja

Delhi High Court · 04 Aug 2015 · 2015:DHC:6222
Sunil Gaur
CRL.M.C. 3116/2015
2015:DHC:6222
criminal petition_dismissed

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court declined to quash a domestic violence complaint on limitation grounds, directing the trial court to expeditiously decide the pending application for dismissal under Section 468 Cr.P.C.

Full Text
Translation output
CRL.M.C. 3116/2015 Page 1
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: August 04, 2015
CRL.M.C. 3116/2015 & Crl.M.As.11123-24/2015
SOURAV TANEJA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vaibhav Vats, Advocate
VERSUS
SWATI TANEJA ..... Respondent
Through: Nemo
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
JUDGMENT
(ORAL)
Quashing of complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is sought in this petition on merits as well as on the ground of limitation.
At the hearing, learned counsel for petitioner submits that the limitation period for filing the said complaint is one year and the instant complaint has been filed after a delay of 21 months’. It is further submitted that an application under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. for dismissal of the complaint as time barred was filed before the trial court in
December, 2014 and is still pending and despite innumerable opportunities, no reply has been filed by respondent-complainant.
Reliance is placed by learned counsel for petitioner upon decisions of
2015:DHC:6222
CRL.M.C. 3116/2015 Page 2
Apex Court in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty AIR 2007 SC
2762 and Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab & Anr. (2011) 12 SCC
588 to submit that the complaint in question deserves to be dismissed on a short ground of complaint being time barred.
Upon hearing and on perusal of the summoning order and the various orders passed by the trial court, I do find that this matter is pending for the last more than six months for the reply of respondent- complainant to the application under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. and the next date of hearing is 2nd September, 2015.
To entertain this petition on merits would be premature. So far as the ground of limitation is concerned, the same is already sub judice before the trial court. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it would suffice if trial court is directed to expeditiously decide petitioner’s application under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. in the light of Section 473 of
Cr.P.C.
Accordingly, this petition is disposed of while refraining to quash the complaint in question on merits with the direction to trial court to decide petitioner’s pending application within a period of four months from the date already fixed.
Trial court be apprised of this order forthwith.
This petition and the applications accordingly disposed of.
(SUNIL GAUR)
JUDGE
AUGUST 04, 2015 s 2015:DHC:6222