Raivesh Kumar v. CMD, DTC and Anr

1. By the present petition under Article 226 ofthe Constitution ofIndia the petitioner has prayed that the order dated 13.08.2012 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal be quashed and set aside. The petitioner was handed over a letter informing him that his period of probation had not been extended which led to the filing of the OA No.402/2012. An appeal filed by the petitioner to the Appellate authority was also rejected.

2. The petitioner was selected by the Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board as a Driver with the Delhi Transport Corporation with effect 2015:DHC:11556-DB request was not rejected by the Depot Manager,he continued with his treatment and he was discharged on 18.01.2011. The petitioner also claims that when he wanted tojoin his duty,he was not permitted. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Tribunal had failed to take notice that a chargesheet was issued to the petitioner. Thus,his period ofprobation would automatically come to an end. Itis also contended that once the charge sheet was issued it was incumbent upon the respondents to complete the enquiry which would have allowed the petitioner to place his defence and he would have succeeded in showing that he was prevented fromjoining his duties on account ofhis illness. Even otherwise,it is contended thatthe period of probation in the case ofthe petitioner was only one year and thus,the respondent could not have terminated the services of the petitioner without following the due process and even probationers are entitled to protection. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the case of VP.Ahuja Vs. State of Punjab and Ors.reportedin(2000)3SCC239.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the petitioner was on probation atthe relevant period. Counsel submits that period of probation was two years which is evident from the appointment letter, copy of which has been placed on record. Secondly, as per the circular dated 04.12.2007,the period ofprobation has been fixed for two years. Counsel further contends that merely because a chargesheet was issued to the petitioner that by itself would U- X.-' period ofnine months approximately out of which for 44 days he had submitted the medical certificate and forthe balance 177 daysthere was no medical certificate. It is further contended that the aini, objective and purpose offixing a period for probation is to enable an employer to monitor and assess the conduct of an employee and also take into account the suitability of the employee. It is, thus, contended that having regard to the long unexplained absence ofthe petitioner during the period ofprobation was taken into account by the respondent while considering whether he should be confirmed the respondents reached the conclusion that the petitioner was not a fit person for regular employment. It is also contended that the petitioner has not been able to establish the reason for his continued absence from duty.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and carefully examined the order passed bythe Central Administrative Tribunal.

5. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the, probation ofthe petitioner was for a period of one year as has been urged by the petitioner. Para 9 of the letter of appointment of the petitioner reads as under:- "His appointment is purely temporary. He shall be on probation for a period of[2] years from the date of his temporary appointment, consequent upon his submission ofpermanent PSV bad^e. During the period ofhis probation, his services shall be liable to be terminated at any time without notice and without assigning any reason thereof. He shall be considered as having completed the period of probation ■Q -.y

10.

11. From the above, it is clear that the Drivers in DTC, who are on probation, and who attract any of the aforesaid, will be liable to termination.

7. In this OA, the respondents have categorically stated that the work and conduct ofthe applicant was notfoundsatisfactory/upto the mark as he availed as many as 137 leaves withoutpay, andaccordingly the ^y^vices ofthe applicant were terminated w.e.f 28.U[6].ZU11 under Clause 9(A)(i) oftheDRTA (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952 vide order dated28.U[6].2U11." We find that in the facts of the present case the action of the respondent is neither arbitrary, punitive nor the impugned communication is stigmatic.In fact, the conduct of the petitioner of continued absence even during theperiod ofprobation which stands established would show that the action of the respondent was not arbitrary. Resultantly, we find no grounds to entertain the present petition. Thesameiswithoutanymeritandisdismissed. Counsel for the petitioner submits that his appeal has not been decidedandMs.Choudhary submits thatthe appealhas alreadybeen decided. G.S.SISTANI,J