Arun Sachdeva v. State of NCT of Delhi

15. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record.

16. The applicants are not denying the receipt of the amount from the complainants nor is their case that the “Agreement To Sell Without (2022) 13 SCC 675: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1014 Possession’ was not entered into by them with the complainants. It is their case that they had borrowed money from the complainant No. 4 who had, in turn, transferred the money into their accounts on behalf of himself as well as other complainants who are, in fact, his family members. The case of the prosecution, however, is that the said “Agreement To Sell Without Possession” were entered by the applicants and other accused persons knowing very well that they had no clear title of the subject properties at that relevant point of time since the said properties were mortgaged with different financial institutions, and thereafter, they proceeded to sell 3 of the properties by forging the NOCs of the complainants. During the course of the hearing, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants, had drawn attention of this Court to 3 certified copies of the sale deeds which were obtained by them to demonstrate that there were no such NOCs in the said sale deeds. It is submitted that copies of sale deeds obtained by the applicants are dated 11.01.2024 in which there were no such NOCs. It is the case of the applicants that, even in the said sale deeds, there is no mention of NOCs. It is further pointed out that there is nothing on record to show that NOCs were sought by the Sub-Registrar at the time of registration of the sale deed on 03.07.2023. It is pertinent to note that during the course of the hearing, on a pointed query from learned APP for the State, it was submitted that there is neither a statement on behalf of the Sub-Registrar nor any other document to show that such NOCs were asked for by the Sub-Registrar at the time of the registration of the sale deed. It is not the case of the complainants that while filing the objection before the Sub-Registrar the same was under intimation to the applicants. It is, thus, the case of the applicant that, in the absence of any prior requirement of such an NOC or of an objection raised by the Sub-Registrar for filing of such an NOC, they could not have possibly known about the requirement of filing NOC, and thus, no question of forging one arises. It is the case of the complainant that, on 12.03.2023, he had gone to visit the properties where he saw the sticker of HDB Finance placed there, and thereafter, he filed an objection before the Sub-Registrar on 13.03.2023. It is also pointed out that, even after the filing of objection before the Sub- 21.03.2023.

17. When the judgments in the present bail applications were reserved for pronouncement, the complainants have, by way of applications, placed on record the FSL report dated 16.04.2025 which was obtained regarding the NOCs pasted in original in the books of Sub-Registrar, Janak Puri, New Delhi. As per the said FSL report, the specimen signatures of Mahavir Prasad, Complainant No.1, and Rekha, Complainant No.2, on the questioned original NOCs were found not to be of the same persons (respective complainants), whose signatures were sent for examination and regarding the specimen signatures of Rhythm Gautam, Complainant No.6, the FSL report has been sent with remarks that, “Further attempt can be made if admitted genuine signatures of similar model & design as appearing in the questioned signatures are procured & sent for examination.” It is pertinent to note that comparison was of the admitted signatures of the respective complainant(s) with those on NOCs. Perusal of the record further shows that the specimen signatures of the present applicants have not been sent for examination to FSL so far.

18. Undoubtedly, the allegations qua the present applicants are grave in nature, for which they claim to have a defence, as noted in the preceding paragraphs. The veracity of the case of the prosecution as well as the defence will be determined during the course of the trial. The applicants have been in custody since their arrest on 23.12.2023 and have undergone incarceration for more than 1 year 4 months approximately. The prosecution has cited 37 witnesses and the chargesheet comprises of more than 1500 pages along with other relied upon documents. The matter is presently at the stage of consideration on point of charge before the learned Trial Court. The trial is not likely to get completed in near future.

19. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the following judicial precedents in relation to bail: -

19.1. In Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI[9], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: - “Economic offences (Category D)

90. What is left for us now to discuss are the economic offences. The question for consideration is whether it should be treated as a class of its own or otherwise. This issue has already been dealt with by this Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement [P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791: (2020) 4 SCC (Cri) 646], after taking note of the earlier decisions governing the field. The gravity of the offence, the object of the Special Act, and the attending circumstances are a few of the factors to be taken note of, along with the period of sentence. After all, an economic offence cannot be classified as such, as it may involve various activities and may differ from one case to another. Therefore, it is not advisable on the part of the court to categorise all the offences into one group and deny bail on that basis. Suffice it to state that law, as laid down in the following judgments, will govern the field: Precedents

91. P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement [P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791: (2020) 4 SCC (Cri) 646]: (SCC pp. 804-805, para 23)

have a bearing on principle. But ultimately the consideration will have to be on case-to-case basis on the facts involved therein and securing the presence of the accused to stand trial.”

92. Sanjay Chandra v. CBI [Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26: (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397]: (SCC pp. 62-64, paras 39-40 & 46)

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46. We are conscious of the fact that the accused are charged with economic offences of huge magnitude. We are also conscious of the fact that the offences alleged, if proved, may jeopardise the economy of the country. At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the investigating agency has already completed investigation and the charge-sheet is already filed before the Special Judge, CBI, New Delhi. Therefore, their presence in the custody may not be necessary for further investigation. We are of the view that the appellants are entitled to the grant of bail pending trial on stringent conditions in order to ally the apprehension expressed by CBI.” Role of the court

93. The rate of conviction in criminal cases in India is abysmally low. It appears to us that this factor weighs on the mind of the Court while deciding the bail applications in a negative sense. Courts tend to think that the possibility of a conviction being nearer to rarity, bail applications will have to be decided strictly, contrary to legal principles. We cannot mix up consideration of a bail application, which is not punitive in nature with that of a possible adjudication by way of trial. On the contrary, an ultimate acquittal with continued custody would be a case of grave injustice.

94. Criminal courts in general with the trial court in particular are the guardian angels of liberty. Liberty, as embedded in the Code, has to be preserved, protected, and enforced by the criminal courts. Any conscious failure by the criminal courts would constitute an affront to liberty. It is the pious duty of the criminal court to zealously guard and keep a consistent vision in safeguarding the constitutional values and ethos. A criminal court must uphold the constitutional thrust with responsibility mandated on them by acting akin to a high priest.

95. This Court in Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra [Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 2 SCC 427: (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 834], has observed that: (SCC pp. 471-72, para 67)

Court to make such orders as are necessary to give effect to the provisions of CrPC ‗or prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice’. Decisions of this Court require the High Courts, in exercising the jurisdiction entrusted to them under Section 482, to act with circumspection. In emphasising that the High Court must exercise this power with a sense of restraint, the decisions of this Court are founded on the basic principle that the due enforcement of criminal law should not be obstructed by the accused taking recourse to artifices and strategies. The public interest in ensuring the due investigation of crime is protected by ensuring that the inherent power of the High Court is exercised with caution. That indeed is one—and a significant—end of the spectrum. The other end of the spectrum is equally important: the recognition by Section 482 of the power inhering in the High Court to prevent the abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice is a valuable safeguard for protecting liberty. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was enacted by a legislature which was not subject to constitutional rights and limitations; yet it recognised the inherent power in Section 561-A. Post-Independence, the recognition by Parliament [ Section 482CrPC, 1973] of the inherent power of the High Court must be construed as an aid to preserve the constitutional value of liberty. The writ of liberty runs through the fabric of the Constitution. The need to ensure the fair investigation of crime is undoubtedly important in itself, because it protects at one level the rights of the victim and, at a more fundamental level, the societal interest in ensuring that crime is investigated and dealt with in accordance with law. On the other hand, the misuse of the criminal law is a matter of which the High Court and the lower courts in this country must be alive. In the present case, the High Court could not but have been cognizant of the specific ground which was raised before it by the appellant that he was being made a target as a part of a series of occurrences which have been taking place since April 2020. The specific case of the appellant is that he has been targeted because his opinions on his television channel are unpalatable to authority. Whether the appellant has established a case for quashing the FIR is something on which the High Court will take a final view when the proceedings are listed before it but we are clearly of the view that in failing to make even a prima facie evaluation of the FIR, the High Court abdicated its constitutional duty and function as a protector of liberty. Courts must be alive to the need to safeguard the public interest in ensuring that the due enforcement of criminal law is not obstructed. The fair investigation of crime is an aid to it. Equally it is the duty of courts across the spectrum—the district judiciary, the High Courts and the Supreme Court—to ensure that the criminal law does not become a weapon for the selective harassment of citizens. Courts should be alive to both ends of the spectrum—the need to ensure the proper enforcement of criminal law on the one hand and the need, on the other, of ensuring that the law does not become a ruse for targeted harassment. Liberty across human eras is as tenuous as tenuous can be. Liberty survives by the vigilance of her citizens, on the cacophony of the media and in the dusty corridors of courts alive to the rule of (and not by) law. Yet, much too often, liberty is a casualty when one of these components is found wanting.” (emphasis supplied)

96. We wish to note the existence of exclusive Acts in the form of Bail Acts prevailing in the United Kingdom and various States of USA. These Acts prescribe adequate guidelines both for investigating agencies and the courts. We shall now take note of Section 4(1) of the Bail Act of 1976 pertaining to United Kingdom: “General right to bail of accused persons and others.—

4. (1) A person to whom this section applies shall be granted bail except as provided in Schedule 1 to this Act.”

97. Even other than the aforesaid provision, the enactment does take into consideration of the principles of law which we have discussed on the presumption of innocence and the grant of bail being a matter of right.

98. Uniformity and certainty in the decisions of the court are the foundations of judicial dispensation. Persons accused with same offence shall never be treated differently either by the same court or by the same or different courts. Such an action though by an exercise of discretion despite being a judicial one would be a grave affront to Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India.

99. The Bail Act, 1976 of United Kingdom takes into consideration various factors. It is an attempt to have a comprehensive law dealing with bails by following a simple procedure. The Act takes into consideration clogging of the prisons with the undertrial prisoners, cases involving the issuance of warrants, granting of bail both before and after conviction, exercise of the power by the investigating agency and the court, violation of the bail conditions, execution of bond and sureties on the unassailable principle of presumption and right to get bail. Exceptions have been carved out as mentioned in Schedule I dealing with different contingencies and factors including the nature and continuity of offence. They also include Special Acts as well. We believe there is a pressing need for a similar enactment in our country. We do not wish to say anything beyond the observation made, except to call on the Government of India to consider the introduction of an Act specifically meant for granting of bail as done in various other countries like the United Kingdom. Our belief is also for the reason that the Code as it exists today is a continuation of the pre-Independence one with its modifications. We hope and trust that the Government of India would look into the suggestion made in right earnest.”

19.2. In Sanjay Chandra v. CBI10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: -

liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.

23. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.”

19.3. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab11, a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while determining the scope of Section 438 of the CrPC, held as under: -

any particular rules which will bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the court unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was observed that the principle to be deduced from the various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to freedom and every opportunity look after his own case. A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.”

19.4. In Vaman Narayan Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan12, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: -

not detained in custody with the object of punishing him on the assumption of his guilt.”

19.5. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan13, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held as under: -

19.[6] The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee14, while laying down the parameters for granting or refusing the grant of bail, had observed and held as under: - “9. … It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.

[See State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi [(2005) 8 SCC 21: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1960 (2)] (SCC p. 31, para 18), Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi [(2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674], and Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh [(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688].]”

20. After examination of the aforesaid judgments, it can be said that gravity of an offence would be a factor at the time of consideration for grant of bail, but, at the same time, it cannot be the only criteria for denying bail either. As held in the aforesaid precedents, the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative and the same is to secure the presence of the accused at the trial. The applicants had joined the preliminary inquiry for six months before the registration of the FIR and their arrest. The underlying principle in the aforesaid judicial pronouncements is that a person, who otherwise has roots in the society and is satisfying the other general conditions for grant of bail should, after completion of investigation, not be kept in continued judicial incarceration as a matter of punishment, even before the conclusion of trial.

21. In the present case, co-accused Sanjay Sachdeva was granted bail vide order dated 06.08.2024, passed by a Coordinate bench of this Court in BAIL APPLN. 2029/2024. It is a matter of record that an application being CRL.M.A. 9288/2025 was moved by the complainant(s) for recalling of the said order, however, the same was dismissed by the same Bench vide order dated 04.04.2025 passed in the aforesaid bail application. Thereafter, a similar application being CRL.M.A. 32669/2024 seeking same reliefs was also withdrawn as not pressed vide order dated 08.04.2025 passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court in the said bail application.

22. Admittedly, the investigation in the present case in complete and the main chargesheet, as well as the supplementary chargesheet with the FSL report stand filed before the learned Trial Court. The evidence in the present case, primarily, is documentary in nature and all material documents have been recovered and are in the custody of the prosecution. In view of the judicial precedents cited hereinabove, and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the present applications are allowed.

23. The applicants are directed to be released on bail upon their furnishing a personal bonds in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- each alongwith two (2) sureties each of like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court/Link Court, further subject to the following conditions: i. The memo of parties shows that the applicants are residing at 110B, WA Block, Tihar Village, Tilak Nagar S.O. West Delhi, Delhi -

110018. In case of any change of address, the applicants are directed to inform the same to the learned Trial Court/Investigating Officer. ii. The applicants shall not leave India without the prior permission of the learned Trial Court. iii. The applicants are directed to give all their mobile numbers to the Investigating Officer and keep them operational at all times. iv. The applicants shall not, directly or indirectly, tamper with evidence or try to influence the witness in any manner. v. In case it is established that the applicants have tried to tamper with the evidence, the prosecution will be at liberty to apply for cancellation of their bail.

24. Needless to state that, nothing mentioned hereinabove, is an opinion on the merits of the case or pending trial before the learned Trial Court and observations made herein are only for the purposes of the present bail applications.

25. The applications stand allowed and disposed of along with all the pending application(s), if any.

26. Let a copy of this judgment be communicated to the concerned Jail Superintendent for necessary information and compliance.

27. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court, forthwith. AMIT SHARMA, J. MAY 9, 2025