Full Text
W.P.(C) 9309/2015
Date of Decision: 30.09.2015 EX. CT/GD AKHAND PRATAP SINGH Petitioner
Through: Mr.N.L.Bareja, Advocate
At^ #»> ft . X'.
J'" .. €J
A/ .-ft .tX, 5 \
!| K S ' '^}Ji y
JUDGMENT
1. Isshe notice. Mr.\^i^,|ki!Gd^hlr? Central Government Standing Counsel accepts nolS^^ofeeft^o^i^Jtes^^dents. /
2. With the'conserifeof the counsels for the;3pafties matter has been heard. s.N4fWci
3. The petitioner i^^ggi^iisb-y^e order dated 16.10.2014 whereby his revision application questioning the order of dismissal was rejected. The brief facts are that the petitioner was granted earned leave with effect from 01.07.2010 to 30.07.2010. On 28.07.2010, he applied to the employer i.e. Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) for extension of leave stating that he was implicated for committing an offence under Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code (IPC). The petitioner stated that he was convicted by the competent W.P.(C) 9309/2015 Page I 2015:DHC:11441-DB court and was sentenced to undergo one year rigorous imprisonment with fine ofRs.1,500/-. Eventually, the petitioner returned for duty in September, 2010 after which the Commandant, CRPF on 20.10.2010, on the basis of materials on record including the allegation that he concealed the fact that he was arrested, dismissed the petitioner from service.
4. The petitioner had appealed to the Sessions Court against this conviction and sentence under Section 498-A IPC. The appellate court maintained theiC'd^ctionibut redii^l^the sentence and directed^ the petitioner Jo undejgo sixjnonths rigorous imprisonment. -The the Code/of*5Cfiminal PfolMhrdilyasfHisposed order dated 06.11.20|2. The Madhyafpfa:^%hK^lgh Court which ^ealt with the revision ^petition invokediTfs|'dlspletion under Sectiln 4 of the Probationlof Offenders instead of thqipresent term, treated the\fine proceedings. The petitioner was'sdirectfed tOiJurnish a bond o&Rsdft0O/- along with an undertaking to for six months. The^ High Court further directedliifdorSection 12 of the said Probation,of Offenders Act that since the petitioner was a public servant, the conviction would not be treated as disqualification for any purpose.
5. In the light of these developments, the petitioner filed a revision before the Inspector General. This revision was dismissed. The petitioner felt aggrieved and approached this court complaining that the same officer who had dealt with his appeal - at that time a Deputy Inspector General, in fact also acted as revisional authority since he W.P.(C) 9309/2015 Page 2 had been promoted in the meanwhile. This court by the order dated 08.05.2014 {Ex,Ct./GD AkhandPratap Singh vs. UOIand Others in W.P.(C) 2350/2014) set aside the revisional order and directed that revision to be decided afresh by another Inspector General. Ultimately, the impugned orderwas made on 16.10.2014.
6. It is pointed out by Mr.N.L.Bareja, learned counsel for the petitioner that the revisional order impugned inthis case suffers from total non-application of mind. In this regard, it is stated that the Inspector General did^n^tak% into.ac^unt the order of the High Court at all. Thlre (ismW discussion as'lo tfre, meaning of benefit of Section 12 of the'T'fobatiDnfdf/tnef(3f^^ Acf^which was directed to be given 'b# the HighfiColaEtlM tStated counsel, the revision^! order refers to de,pMto!en|ai proceedings thal||preceded the I (| I ||nf 1}If. j;i dismissal! order. However,^fias VaV iriatter of fact, no [^departmental H.lit"''? t proceediilg took place transpired |Was that the petitioner v^as.OifeO10 and after % ^ ¥' 4'' receipt of his'^feply> fre^^s^as dismissied h^^^^the? Commandant on Qx V[4] T' 20.10.2010. "-j'i
7. Counsel for the respohH^ti'^'pbTnted out that quite apart from infirmity sought to be highlighted in the writ petition case, the fact remains that the petitioner did not report about his arrest or the pendency of the criminal case and rather did so only after his conviction. This itself was a misconduct duly punishable under the rules.
8. It is evident from the factual narrative that (a) the petitioner was charged with committing an offence under Section 498-A of the IPC W.P. (C) 9309/2015 Page 3 and found guilty. The intial sentence was reduced by the appellate court, in revision the High Court set aside the sentence and released him on probation; (b) the High Court directed that the petitioner would enjoy the benefit Under Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act.
(c) In fact, no departmental proceedings were initiated and the petitioner was terminated from employment on 20.10.2010.
9. Now, a reading ofthe impugned revisional order of 16.10.2014 clearly shows that though the Inspector General refers to the orders of the court and convictioh recprdcdrtherels-qcomplete non-applicatiorP ot mind as tOp'lwo|impt»rtant^^a§pectsrt.e./tUa%he petitioner^was released on,pirQyti6n and'hiGiM^^^ thitAe Benefit ofSection 12 of th^P^^tion oU®|i|||M was tol^^P^ied to him. Section |2 mandates that%bnvitlibMi'^ would not be treated as civil.1.:.. I disqualiftpation. Significantly,| ufje.'{High Court recor|led that the 1 •. •• f-4'iv. I petitionertieing a publicj|^a||v1^^iven the benefitlbf Section 12 ofthe Prob^on|)p|^i^^y|.||#n^^i5i^ that this was in ordek rtp'k^^fdteq his emplbymehff'^.$^^atever be the circumstances, ^drdfel^-'jhi^bij^pinion ought to hav^ reflected that the conceme3"®fflb1'i!y focused on these issues. The I • petitioner's complaint that the revisional authority did not apply its mind also appears to be well grounded because the revisional order does mention of departmental proceedings having preceded the initial dismissal order and that he underwent six months imprisonment. There appears to be no basis for these observations.
10. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustained. It is accordingly set aside. W.p.(0 9309/2015 Page 4 The inspector general/Revisional authority is directed to apply its mind afresh to the revision order and after looking into the entire record including the effect of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act and as to whether petitioner underwent any part of the sentence at all and pass a reasoned order.
11. The entire process shall be completed within eight weeks from today. Dasti. y BHAT, J sV i' I SEPTEMBER |0,aD15 rb V.'t I^^P^IPEEPA SHAMA, J '£Ml[4] fi V'j/'J- vl-T^'F'si
H. 'CV. iJ«!s% ^ ^ViL"- ^ jA" fj k Ne,,¥ -.-<-i ''-'•i y' /V" ^.:hy y3|'5|"2|' W.P.(C) 9309/2015,35s TJfJi ?>'„•: '^-31." f?p Page 5