Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 15.05.2025
CHAHNA GUPTA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. H.S. Phoolka, Sr. Adv.
Mukhija, Ms. Surpreet Kaur and Mr. Arani Chaudhary, Advs.
Through:
CM Appl.29525/2025[Exemption from filing certified copies]
JUDGMENT
1. Allowed, subject to just exceptions.
2. The Application stands disposed of.
3. The present Petition has been filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter referred to as “CPC”] impugning the order dated 17.04.2025 [hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Order”] passed by the learned Civil Judge-01 (West), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. By the Impugned Order, the Application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC filed by the Petitioner has been dismissed by the learned Trial Court while giving a finding that it is a triable issue whether the suit property is the matrimonial house of Respondent No. 1/ Defendant which can only be ascertained during the course of the trial.’ 3.[1] None appears for the Respondents despite advance service. In view of the order that the Court proposes to pass today, this Court does not deem it apposite to issue notice in the matter.
4. Briefly, the facts are that the suit for permanent injunction, recovery of possession, recovery of charges of use and mesne profits was filed by the Petitioner before the learned Trial Court. It is the case of the Petitioner that the property bearing no. B-82, Ganesh Nagar, New Delhi-110018 admeasuring 102 sq. yds. was purchased by a sale deed dated [hereinafter referred to as “suit property”]. The suit property is stated to be self-acquired by the father of the Petitioner and was purchased from the funds of the father of the Petitioner. The ground, first and second floor of the suit property were constructed after the said purchase. 4.[1] After the death of the parents of the Petitioner, in terms of the family settlement between the Petitioner and her siblings, the first floor of the suit property has come to the share of the Petitioner. It is the case of the Petitioner that the father of the Petitioner had permitted his brother and his brother’s family to reside in the suit property for some time as a licensee. Thereafter, the brother of the father of the Petitioner had passed away, however, his family members (Respondent No.3, his wife, Respondent No.2, his son, and Respondent No.1,daughter-in-law) continued to reside in the first floor of the suit property as licensee. 4.[2] In addition it is stated that initially the suit was filed against Respondent No.1 only however, at a later stage Respondent No.2 and 3 were impleaded in the proceedings upon an objection of misjoinder of parties made by Respondent No.1.
5. The learned Trial Court has given a finding that although in the written statement, the ownership of the Plaintiff is admitted by all the Respondents including Respondent No. 1, however, in view of the fact that the suit property is the matrimonial house, and a shared household of Respondent No.1, an order seeking judgment on admission under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC cannot be passed.
6. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner seeks to rely upon the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in S.R. Batra and Another v. Taruna Batra (smt.)1, to submit that since the house does not belong to her husband or even the mother-in-law, it cannot be termed as a “shared household” under the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 [hereinafter referred to as “DV Act”]. 6.[1] Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner also seeks to rely upon the judgments passed by the Coordinate Benches of this Court in Meenu v. Birma Devi[2] and Sh. Daljit Singh v. Smt. Gagandeep Sidhu[3] in this behalf. 6.[2] Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Respondent No.1 has not obtained any order from the Matrimonial Court or any other Court which protects her possession of the suit property.
7. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner has also handed across a hard copy of the sale deed dated 05.03.1992 to the Court since inadvertently, it has not been placed on record along with the Petition. It is contended that the sale deed dated 05.03.1992 shows exclusive ownership of the suit property by the father of the Petitioner. 7.[1] The Registry is directed to scan and uploaded the same so that it remains embedded in the case file.
8. By the Impugned Order, the learned Trial Court has held that since the Respondent No.1 has submitted that the Respondent No.1 is residing in the suit property as it is her matrimonial house, it raises a triable issue as to whether the suit property is the matrimonial house of Respondent No.1 which can only be ascertained during the trial. Thus, the learned Trial Court dismissed the application under order XII Rule 6 of CPC, filed by the Petitioner.
9. A perusal of the record reflects that it is the case of Respondent No.1 that the suit property was her matrimonial house since after her marriage with Respondent No.2, Respondent No.1 was residing in the suit property. It is further contended that husband of Respondent No. 2 was the co-owner of the suit property thus suit property is her matrimonial house. The relevant extract of the Written Statement is reproduced below: “ Preliminary Objections …
7. That without admitting the allegations levelled in the plaint and without prejudice to the rights and defense of the defendant, it is submitted that the defendant got married to Shri Ankit Gupta (cousin brother of the plaintiff) on 01/07/2018 as per Hindu Rites and ceremonies at Delhi. After marriage, the defendant was brought to her matrimonial home i.e. B-82, First Floor, Opp. Sanatan Dharam Mandir, Ganesh Nagar, Janak Puri, New Delhi by her husband and in laws and all of them were residing peacefully therein. The suit property is the matrimonial house of the defendant. Just after the marriage, the husband and in laws of defendant as well as the plaintiff and other family members made the life of defendant a hell and inflicted various physical as well as mental harassment and cruelties upon her during her stay at matrimonial house. The defendant having no option has filed a domestic violence case against her husband and in laws which is pending before the Court of Ms. Sadhika Jalan, Ld. MM. Dwarka Courts, New Delhi. … …The defendant is residing in her matrimonial home and the plaintiff has no right, title or interest in respect of the suit property and the grounds to file the present suit are baseless and vague and the plaintiff has sufficient accommodation for her residence. Hence the suit filed by the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed with heavy cost. Reply on Merits: …
14. That para no.14 of the plaint is false, frivolous, vague and vehemently denied. It is denied that because of bona fide requirement of the suit property, father of the plaintiff during his life time cancelled the license of the family of his deceased brother and asked them to vacate the suit property in a family meeting held on 01.03.2019 in the presence of all the near relatives. It is denied that in the said meeting Ms. Manju Gupta or her son Shri Ankit Gupta requested to the father of the plaintiff to allow them to stay in the suit property till 31/05/2020 meanwhile they will find suitable place for living. It is submitted that the plaintiff has made a concocted story in collusion with in laws and husband of the defendant only with a sole motive to throw out the defendant from the suit property. The husband of defendant is co-owner of the suit property. The contents of preliminary objections of written statement are hereby read as part and parcel and the same are not repeated herein for the sake of brevity. xxx xxx xxx xxx
17. That para no.17 of the plaint is false, frivolous, vague and vehemently denied. It is denied that the plaintiff also approached defendant on 01/06/2021 or requested her to vacate the suit property as the same is immediately bonafidely required for the plaintiff in the presence of the relatives or neighbors or that the defendant deliberately not vacating the suit property. It is denied that the defendant does not have any legal right to live; use or occupation of the suit property as the license of mother-in-law or her husband or of defendant for residing or using the suit property has already been terminated. It is submitted that no such notice for termination has ever been received by the defendant. No notice was ever sent or served upon the defendant by plaintiff. It is submitted that the plaintiff has made a concocted story in collusion with in laws and husband of the defendant only with a sole motive to thrown out the defendant from the suit property. The contents of preliminary objections of written statement are hereby read as part and parcel and the same are not repeated herein for the sake of brevity. [Emphasis Supplied]
10. The Respondent Nos.[2] and 3 have filed their Written Statement wherein it is stated that the entire suit property was owned by late Shri Subhash Gupta, who is the father of the Petitioner/Plaintiff. The Respondent No. 2 & 3 have admitted the fact that the license of Respondent No. 2 &3 for residing and using the suit property was terminated. In addition, it is stated therein that the Respondent Nos.[2] and 3 vacated the suit property on 18.05.2019 and handed over the possession thereof, however, the Respondent No.1 forcibly continued in possession of the property. The relevant extract of the joint Written Statement as filed by Respondent No. 2 & 3 is reproduced below:
already been terminated.”
11. Concededly, since the right of the Respondent No.1 to reside in the suit property stems from the rights of Respondent No. 2 and Respondent NO. 2 and 3 have admitted to the ownership of the Petitioner and stated that they were licensee in the suit property. Thus, at best Respondent No.1 was also a licensee in the suit property, which license has been terminated.
12. The suit property was the self-acquired property of the father of the Petitioner which was inherited by the Petitioner. The suit property is neither owned by Respondent No.2 (husband of Respondent No.1) nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of a family of which the husband/Respondent No. 2 is a member. It is the exclusive property of the Petitioner and the Respondents were only licensee in the suit property. The rights to reside in the suit premises was terminated by the predecessor-ininterest of the Petitioner, during his lifetime in the year 2019. Thereafter, Respondent No.1 continued to reside therein and Respondent Nos.[2] and 3 vacated the property. 12.[1] The Written Statement as filed by Respondent No.2 and 3 reflects that the Respondent Nos 2 and 3 have admitted the fact that the license to reside in the suit property has been terminated and that they are not residing in the suit property since the last several years.
13. The only defence as raised by Respondent No.1 is that the suit property is her matrimonial house and thus she has the right to reside in the suit property. The record reflects that proceedings under the DV Act have been initiated by Respondent No.1 against Respondent Nos 2 and 3. It is however not the case of Respondent No.1, that Respondent No.1 has been subjected to domestic violence by the Petitioner. Hence, it cannot be called a “shared household” or “matrimonial house”. 13.[1] In fact, it is the case of the Petitioner that in terms of the family settlement between her and her brothers, the first floor of the suit property has come to the share of the Petitioner. The Petitioner contends that after the death of her parents, she has continued to reside in that portion of the suit property which belonged to her brothers, in view of the fact that her share in the suit property is not being vacated by Respondent No.1. Since license of the Respondents has been terminated the Respondent No.1 has been asked to vacate the suit property by the Petitioner. Thus, the Respondent No.1 can at best be considered as a trespasser in the suit property and is liable to be evicted with the due process of law.
14. It is no longer res integra that where the shared household of a woman is tenanted/allotted/licensed accommodation, the DV Act would not operate against the landlord/lessor/licensor in initiating appropriate proceedings for eviction of the tenant/allottee/licensee qua the shared household. 14.[1] The Supreme Court has in the case of Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja[4], held that where the shared household of a woman is a tenanted/allotted/licensed accommodation where tenancy/allotment/licence is in the name of husband, father-in-law or any other relative, the DV Act does not operate against the landlord/lessor/licensor in initiating appropriate household. It has further been clarified that the embargo under Section 17(2) of the DV Act of not to be evicted or excluded save in accordance with the procedure established by law operates only against the “respondent” i.e. one who is respondent within the meaning of Section 2(q) of the DV Act. The relevant extract of the Satish Chander Ahuja case is reproduced below: “124. Drawing the analogy from the above case, we are of the opinion that the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law”, in Section 17(2) of the 2005 Act contemplates the proceedings in the court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, suit for mandatory and permanent injunction/eviction or possession by the owner of the property is maintainable before a competent court. We may further notice that in subsection (2) the injunction is “shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household … save in accordance with procedure established by law”. Thus, the provision itself contemplates adopting of any procedure established by law by the respondent for eviction or exclusion of the aggrieved person from the shared household. Thus, in appropriate case, the competent court can decide the claim in a properly instituted suit by the owner as to whether the women need to be excluded or evicted from the shared household. One most common example for eviction and exclusion may be when the aggrieved person is provided same level of alternate accommodation or payment of rent as contemplated by Section 19 sub-section (f) itself. There may be cases where the plaintiff can successfully prove before the competent court that the claim of the plaintiff for eviction of the respondent is accepted. We need not ponder for cases and circumstances where the eviction or exclusion can be allowed or refused. It depends on facts of each case for which no further discussion is necessary in the facts of the present case. The High Court in the impugned judgment [Ambika Jain v. Ram Prakash Sharma, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11886] has also expressed opinion that suit filed by the plaintiff cannot be held to be non-maintainable with which conclusion we are in agreement.
125. In case, the shared household of a woman is a tenanted/allotted/ licensed accommodation where tenancy/ allotment/licence is in the name of husband, father-in-law or any other relative, the 2005 Act does not operate against the landlord/lessor/licensor in initiating appropriate household. However, in case the proceedings are due to any collusion between the two, the woman, who is living in the shared household has right to resist the proceedings on all grounds which the tenant/lessee/licensee could have taken in the proceedings. The embargo under Section 17(2) of the 2005 Act of not to be evicted or excluded save in accordance with the procedure established by law operates only against the “respondent” i.e. one who is respondent within the meaning of Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act.” 14.[2] The Supreme Court in the Satish Chander Ahuja case has also held that the law as set down in the S.R. Batra case is not good law.
15. Another ground which the Respondent No.1 has taken in here defence is that no notice of termination of license was served upon Respondent No. 1 by the Petitioner. 15.[1] License is defined under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 [hereinafter referred to as “Easements Act”] as something which a person or persons grants another to do upon immovable property which, in the absence of such right would be unlawful and such right does not amount to an easement. Section 52 of the Easement Act is set out below:
15.[2] Section 61 of the Easements Act provides that a revocation of license may be expressed or implied in the following terms:
revoked. (b) A, the owner of a field, grants a license to B to stack hay on the field. A lets or sells the field to C. The license is revoked.”
15.3. Thus, the Easements Act does not provide for a written notice of termination to be served.
16. It is the case of the Petitioner that the father of the Petitioner allowed the Respondent Nos.[2] and 3 in the month of June, 2005 to reside in the suit property, and thereafter, cancelled the license in the year 2019 in the presence of all family members. However, at the request of Respondent Nos.[2] and 3, they were allowed to continue to stay in the property till 31.05.2020. The Petitioner has stated in the plaint that license to reside in the suit property was terminated on more than one occasion by the Petitioner. 16.[1] In any event, the filing of the suit for possession definitely conveyed the unequivocal intention of the Petitioner to terminate the license granted to the Respondent No.1. Thus, the objection raised in this regard is without merit.
17. Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC confers discretionary power to the Court to pass a judgment on the admissions of a party without waiting for a determination of all issues between the parties. It is settled law that when specific, clear, and categorical admissions of facts and documents is made by one of the parties the court at any stage of the suit or suits on the application of any party or in its own motion and without waiting for determination of any other question between the parties make such order or gives such judgment as it may think fit having regard to such admission. It is apposite to set out the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar[5] in this regard. The relevant extract of the Karan Kapoor case is set out below: “23. Order 12 Rule 6 confers discretionary power to a court who “may” at any stage of the suit or suits on the application of any party or in its own motion and without waiting for determination of any other question between the parties makes such order or gives such judgment as it may think fit having regard to such admission.
24. Thus, legislative intent is clear by using the word “may” and “as it may think fit” to the nature of admission. The said power is discretionary which should be only exercised when specific, clear and categorical admission of facts and documents are on record, otherwise the court can refuse to invoke the power of Order 12 Rule 6. The said provision has been brought with intent that if admission of facts raised by one side is admitted by the other, and the court is satisfied to the nature of admission, then the parties are not compelled for full-fledged trial and the judgment and order can be directed without taking any evidence. Therefore, to save the time and money of the court and respective parties, the said provision has been brought in the statute. As per above discussion, it is clear that to pass a judgment on admission, the court if thinks fit may pass an order at any stage of the suit. In case the judgment is pronounced by the court a decree be drawn accordingly and parties to the case is not required to go for trial.” 17.[1] In the case of Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal[6], the Supreme Court has held that where a claim is admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on the admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The relevant extract of the Rajiv Ghosh case is below: “ 23. In Statement of Objects and Reasons, it had been stated:
“Clause 65, sub-clause (ii)- Under Rule 6, where a claim is admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on the admitted claim. The object of the rule is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment at least to the extent of relief to which, according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The rule is wide enough to cover oral admissions. The rule is being amended to clarify that oral admissions are also covered by the rule” (See: Notes on Clauses, Gazette of India, dt. 08-04-1974, Pt. II, S. 2, Extra., p. 316)
24. Rule 6(1) empowers the court to pronounce a judgment upon admissions made by parties without waiting for the determination of other questions.
25. Rule 6(2) states that a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment.
26. The primary object underlying Rule 6 is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment at least to the extent of admission. Where a plaintiff claims a particular relief or reliefs against a defendant and the defendant makes a plain admission, the former is entitled to the relief or reliefs admitted by the latter. [See: Uttam Singh v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120]
27. As observed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for amending Rule 6, “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled.”
28. The provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and permissive. They are not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory. This is also clear from the use of the word “may” in the rule.
29. The powers conferred on the court by this rule are untrammeled and cannot be crystallized into any rigid rule of universal application. They can be exercised keeping in view and having regard to the facts and varying circumstances of each case.”
18. It is no longer res integra that the power under Order XII Rule 6, CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The Supreme Court in Hari Steel and General Industries Limited and Another v. Daljit Singh and Others[7] has while discussing this provision held that the Court on examination of the facts and circumstances of the case has to be exercised judiciously. The admission should be categorical and conscious and deliberate act. It has also been held by the Supreme Court that where Defendants have raised objections which will go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise this discretion. The relevant extract of the Hari Singh judgment is set out below:
2019 (20) SCC 425 v. Jasbir Singh Chadha [Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha, (2010) 6 SCC 601: (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 745].) There is no such admission in this case.”
26. In the judgment in S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj [S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287: (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 589], this Court has held that the power under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a right. It is further held in the aforesaid case that where the defendants have raised objections, which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. Para 8 of the judgment read as under: (SCC p. 291) “8. The words in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC “may” and “make such order …” show that the power under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the court. Where the defendants have raised objections which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an enabling provision which confers discretion on the court in delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent of the claim admitted by one of the parties of his opponent's claim.” 18.[1] The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Delhi Jal Board v. Surendra P. Malik[8], has laid down the parameters which the Courts have to consider while adjudicating an Application under Order XII Rule 6, CPC. The relevant extract of the Delhi Jal Board case is reproduced below:
2003 SCC OnLine Del 292 purpose of rendering a speedy judgment.”
19. Thus, amongst the considerations by the Court while dealing with an Application under Order XII Rule 6, CPC, is whether the objections raised by defendant go to the root of the matter or whether these objections are inconsequential making it impossible for the party to succeed even if entertained.
20. As stated above, in the present case, the Petitioner has filed a suit for recovery of possession, injunction and for recovery of user charges. The title of the Petitioner is not under challenge by either Respondent. The only defence that is set up against ejectment by the Respondent No.1 is that the suit property is a matrimonial house and the “shared household” of the Respondent No.1.
21. The Supreme Court in the Satish Chander Ahuja case has clarified that DV Act would not act as an embargo against the landlord/lessor/licensor in initiating appropriate proceedings for eviction of the tenant/allottee/ licensee qua the shared household.
22. The learned Trial Court has held that whether or not the property is a shared property, requires trial and has thus dismissed the Application under Order XII Rule 6, CPC filed by the Petitioner/Plaintiff. However, and in view of the clear admission of Respondent Nos.[2] and 3 and the sale deed that has been placed on record by the Petitioner and the settled possession of the law, the averment that the suit property is a joint property and a shared household appears to be a defence which is unsubstantial. Other than stating that at the time of marriage, the Respondent No.1 was told that this is the joint property, no other contention has been set out by Respondent No.1 in the Written Statement. No document in support has been filed by Respondent No.1 before the learned Trial Court either.
23. Undisputably, the Respondent Nos.[2] and 3 have not claimed title to the suit property. The Respondent Nos.[2] and 3 have stated that in their Written Statement they have vacated the suit property after being asked to do so in 2019 itself. Thus, the question of the suit property being a “shared household” under the definition of the DV Act does not arise.
24. In the present case, the Respondent No.1 has not raised any objection that would require the conduct of trial in the matter. In addition, the unequivocal admission of Respondent Nos.[2] and 3 have settled the issue in this behalf.
25. In view of the aforegoing discussions, the Impugned Order is set aside. The Application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC directing the vacation of the first floor of the suit property bearing no. B-82, Ganesh Nagar, New Delhi-110018 admeasuring 102 sq. yds. by the Respondents/Defendants including Respondent No. 1 is accordingly allowed.
26. At this stage, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, on instructions from the Petitioner, who is present in the Court today, submits that in the interest of justice, additional time of three months be granted to the Respondent No.1 to vacate the suit property.
27. Accordingly, the Respondents are granted time upto 15.08.2025 to vacate the suit property.
28. The Petition is disposed of in the aforegoing terms.
29. However, it is clarified that the suit shall proceed in the learned Trial Court for the remaining prayers including for the recovery of mesne profits. The rights and contentions of the parties are left open in this regard.
30. List before the learned Trial Court on 29.05.2025 for further proceedings.